Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

frustration would be reduced and the motivation for keeping the cease-fire would
increase.
Dayan’s suggestion was reflected by Israel’s cabinet, although he was not the
only leader who wanted to prevent a war as an outcome of frustration. Dayan, as others,
did not believe the Egyptians could gain in such a war. They continuously thought of the
Six Day War as the prototype of military victory. On September 10, 1973, at an election
meeting in Beer Sheba, Dayan expressed his confidence that: “Six years have already
passed since the six Day War and we are talking now of another period of four years. We
are used to having every ten years a war for six days.” 10
His conviction was based on the belief and determination that, if a war actually
occurred, Israel would conduct it by the same successful doctrine applied in the Six Day
War. In hindsight, it is clear that the Egyptians conceived of the War of Attrition as an
encouraging experience for a more comprehensive war, whereas Israel saw it as an
episode that had not achieved its purpose, one that ought not to be repeated and that they
had the means to ensure it would not.
The lesson that the Israelis did not learn from the War of Attrition was that the
Arabs had for the first time succeeded in forcing Israel into a defensive war in which the
IDF could not apply the decisive maneuvers specified by its doctrine. In the course of the
war of attrition, Israel performed many courageous raids, attacking targets in the depth of
the Egyptian rear. These proved to be of operational importance, but failed to turn the
War of Attrition into the kind that Israel preferred. 10 Understanding this lesson would
have alerted Israel to the difficulties that they would face in the next war.
Instead, believing that they had been victorious and that the probability a war was
low, Israel evacuated 10 emplacements on the Bar-Lev Line, burying them in sand, and
reduced the number of troops at the remaining 16. The Egyptians could see the third
stage of their plans as successfully completed and proceed to prepare for the fourth stage.
The following citations demonstrate how deep-rooted the Israeli mindset was and
how far it was from the Egyptian logic.
Major General (res.) Matti Peled, a professor at Tel Aviv University and a wellknown
political dove, wrote on the fourth day of the war: