Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

An even more striking example is provided by Israel’s fatal misjudgment of its ally,
the Christian forces, in the Lebanon War of 1982-1984. Israel proved to be totally wrong
in judging the Christians’ strength, intentions, and integrity. This mistake turned out to
be a main reason for Israel’s fiasco in that war. Strikingly, Israel conceived of this
development as a betrayal, rather than a surprise.
The most difficult of all to anticipate is surprise regarding a nation’s own strengths
and weaknesses. Nations have a very poor understanding of themselves in relation to
their environment. Governments misconceive their national strengths and weaknesses
more than those of their enemies. They surprisingly reveal themselves in war or, again
citing May (in a study on government and intelligence assessment before the two world
wars): “No nation entered either of the world wars with a clear notion—right or wrong—
of how its side and the other measured up.” 30
Israel’s history, short but dense with wars, also provides some striking examples of
misconceiving one’s strength in relation to one’s enemies. On the eve of their most
impressive demonstration o their superior strength, in the Six Day War, a popular Israel
joke reflecting the public mood was that in the Lod International Airport a new sign was
hung on the main departure hall: “The last to leave, please turn off the lights.”
Misunderstanding oneself in relation to the environment is at the core of most striking
surprises. However, it is not an issue that is covered by intelligence’s responsibilities.
Tacit assumptions about the self cannot be shaken by intelligence inquiry, yet no political
strategic assessment is free of them. Intelligence services are considered as the sole body
responsible for prevention of defense surprises. While the observation and the study of
national self are beyond intelligence’s jurisdiction, it is in this realm that one finds some
of the deepest roots of surprise.
The question most students of intelligence could improve its performance in surprise
prevention. This charge ignores the possibility that there are different types of surprises,
some of which intelligence services can prevent and others, which they cannot.
Instead of conceptualizing surprise only as something that needs to be prevented,
we might view surprises as opportunities to learn about ourselves. Following this
approach, the surprise itself is a kind of signal for something much broader and deeper
than its own appearance. In this respect, body temperature provides a useful analogy.