Hope Not Hype - Third World Network
Hope Not Hype - Third World Network
Hope Not Hype - Third World Network
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Presence<br />
41<br />
Box 4.1: Unauthorized GM corn in New Zealand in 2003<br />
A shipment of sweetcorn grown in the Gisborne (North Island) region of New Zealand<br />
in 2003 was rejected from Japan because an independent testing company detected<br />
GM material. Subsequent testing in Australia confirmed the Japanese results and identified<br />
at least one of the events as Bt11 (an event owned by the Syngenta Corporation<br />
and designed to confer pest resistance and herbicide tolerance).<br />
Bt11 is not approved for cultivation in New Zealand. At that time, a second GMO was<br />
detected but not identified even to the level of a specific type of modification (Heinemann<br />
et al., 2004). The New Zealand Food Safety Authority concluded that because the<br />
“[c]oncentration of [the] GM organism [was] less than 0.05 percent…well below the<br />
Australia/New Zealand standard for unintentional presence of 1 percent…no further<br />
action” – that is, testing, monitoring or recalling food contaminated by the unknown<br />
organism – was required (Heinemann et al., 2004). Subsequently, all remaining seed<br />
was seized and destroyed. However, New Zealand law, like Europe (Devos et al., 2005),<br />
has no threshold levels of safety for unidentified GMOs (Heinemann et al., 2004). Had<br />
the Food Safety Authority taken that into account, gene flow could have caused a recall<br />
of sweetcorn in New Zealand.<br />
The evidence used by New Zealand regulators leaves open the possibility that the contaminating<br />
GMO is an uncharacterized pre-commercial outcross of the same species, a<br />
novel organism that has more than one modification including the one detected, a novel<br />
outcross that arose when an unintentional and uncharacterized DNA insert on another<br />
chromosome of a GMO was acquired by a previously unmodified conspecific, or an<br />
unknown organism engineered to attract the Bt11 event-specific primers used in the<br />
PCR tests and thus tempt regulators to look no further.<br />
The source of the GM material was never confirmed, but it is suspected that the seed<br />
imported from the US was the source, despite it having passed tests in the US before<br />
shipment to New Zealand. This would be of no surprise since most “crops are not<br />
grown under confined conditions, and the supply chains are rarely<br />
segregated…adventitious mixing of GM material with non-GM produce can occur in<br />
all the steps of production and supply chains” (Devos et al., 2005, p. 73). A small<br />
number of GM plants were probably in the seed due to pollen flow during seed production<br />
or mixing of seeds, and then the seed was a vector for gene flow to New Zealand<br />
where the GM material was amplified during cultivation in New Zealand. This example<br />
of trade disruptions, and the cost to local farmers and ambiguities in liability of<br />
seed companies or cultivating countries, provides an acute example of the impacts of<br />
presence of GMOs in food and/or feed.