Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 In each province there is an IARCSC representative responsible for building the capacity of government staff in the areas of management, administration, computer training and recruitment. There is also a Provincial Appointment Committee that supervises Pay and Grade recruitment, composed of a member of IARCSC, a provincial council member, a Ministry of Women’s Affairs representative, the Executive Officer and a member of the department undertaking the recruitment. After passing a written exam to an acceptable standard, candidates are interviewed by the panel which then selects on the basis of merit. IARCSC is also responsible for overseeing the annual performance assessment of all civil servants. An increasing number of woluswals are going through this process prior to their appointment. ASOP, a primarily US-funded directorate within IDLG, has also begun recruiting and training deputy woluswals who have passed through PRR recruitment. However, much of the success of the initiative will ultimately depend upon how technocratic outsiders are able to navigate the web of informal institutions and actors that exist in every district. In support of this perspective, research respondents frequently discussed the importance of wasita (reciprocal connections to those with power or influence) 31 in the process of appointing local officials. In one province it was reported that a member of IARCSC forced his provincial representative to arrange for the employment of his son, whose only work involved collecting his salary once a month. While there are no doubt selections made on the basis of genuine merit, the number of reports of malpractice associated with civil service recruitment was disturbing. As one provincial executive officer put it, “It is sad that in Afghanistan no one cares about experience and qualifications. There is no ethnic balance in the line ministries or local government. Nepotism is common. All appointments are by wasita.” 3.5 Concluding remarks Role of the wali: Our research has shown that walis play an important coordinating role across the functions of administration, planning and security—their character and the tone they set greatly influence the nature of governance in a province. Augmenting their formal role, walis also operate through a network of informal actors, such as elders and the ulema that are just as significant as formal office holders. These groups provide information to the wali and are able to transmit government views and policy back to their communities. Although they appear before a selection board, the appointments of both wali and woluswal are essentially political in nature. However, despite this, the newly-appointed walis observed during the research were generally (though not universally) of a higher quality and carried greater legitimacy than those they replaced. Role of the woluswal: The woluswal has a coordinating role in the district and works closely with the chief of police. The influence of the woluswal has been somewhat reduced, especially in the field of justice provision. Nevertheless, as with the wali, woluswals retain substantial influence within their jurisdictions. The tenor set by the woluswal is influential in determining how line ministries deliver, how security issues are addressed and on levels of staff attendance. In practice, there are few checks on the woluswal and, as will be described, some have used this to their advantage. Role of the IDLG: The creation of IDLG in 2007 and the shift of local government responsibilities from the MoI have improved communication and the speed of decision-making. IDLG has provided a valuable role in developing policy, coordinating ministries and the provision of training, and its support to provincial administrations has for the most part improved performance. It has undertaken a thoughtful approach to the division of responsibilities in district administrations where, despite continued challenges, recruitment policies are in some areas producing better qualified staff. However, IDLG’s role in recommending appointments—particularly for the posts of wali and woluswal—has left 31 For more on the background of wasita in Afghan administration, see: Barnett R. Rubin, “The Political Context of Public Administration Reform.” Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 19
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 it subject to pressure from competing lobbyists. In some instances, undertakings given to secure political support were revoked as more immediate compromises had to be made. 32 Provincial planning processes: As it currently stands, the planning process provides little opportunity for provincial needs to be reflected in centrally-approved plans in Kabul, thus discouraging provincial engagement. Several factors are at play. Firstly, provincial administrations are left without any meaningful role in addressing development decisions related to specific provincial needs. Especially in the North, this failure to respond to provincial requests was interpreted through the lens of perceived ethnic prejudice. Secondly, to overcome these shortcomings, influential provincial actors made frequent use of connections to circumvent or modify planning decisions. Thirdly, there were issues related to corruption, such as one provincial Executive Officer who said that the central government’s unwillingness to cede authority was related to the money central ministries were able to make from awarding contracts. Role of the IARCSC: IARCSC policies provide a realistic framework for improving public administration and the presence of an IARCSC staff member in every province represents an important first step. However, especially in the larger provinces, one person is not enough to cover the substantial duties of the post, which include recruiting, performance appraisal and supervision of training. This was not just a resource issue, and more remote provinces and districts in particular faced considerable problems in recruiting and retaining civil servants. Although IDLG and IARCSC have put considerable efforts into building provincial and district capacity, training has tended to be sporadic and lacked a continuity of focus. Capacity building was further undermined by the different, uncoordinated approaches being used by donor programmes and NGOs seeking to build local capacity. Corruption: Corruption was an ever present issue. The walis of some provinces were reported to be manipulating the sale of public property and land, and one even employed an agent specifically to charge plaintiffs seeking to speak to him. A number of district governors were also engaged in extorting rents by various means. There were reports from every province of bribery and wasita undermining the PRR recruitment process, and from the research evidence it was hard to see the Pay and Grade element of PRR as being anything other than institutionalised wasita. The influence of powerholders and patronage networks pervaded all levels of local government in the research provinces. 32 One such example was the presidential commitment given to Dostum over the appointment of the provincial governor in Sar-i-Pul being revoked to replace him with a Khalili nominee. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 20
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Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

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