Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 Donors • The JCMB should intensify its efforts to increase coordination between donors in providing support for the development of local government. • Donors should adhere to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action and use it as a framework to improve alignment with government-led local government initiatives. • Donors should jointly agree upon a common strategy for local government and take the lead in encouraging the government and civil society to develop a clear, coherent and comprehensible approach on this subject. • Place a great deal more emphasis on monitoring and evaluation, not only of process but of outcomes and impact. Service Delivery • Devolve planning and budgetary functions to provincial line departments as a way to improve targeting. • Address shortcomings in coordination among provincial and district line ministries through strengthening Provincial Development Committee functions. • Consider establishing sector specific partnerships at the provincial level. • Reduce the extent of militarised development delivery. Capacity Building • Provide IARCSC with increased support to expand its provincial training facilities. • Devise and fund a programme that improves capacity through a mentoring approach to provincial and district administrations and provincial and district councils. • Re-evaluate training resources to make them more relevant and easily understood by the target audiences. • Develop a standardised approach to civil service capacity development to be used by all training providers. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 69
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 8. A Model of Improved Local Government Applying the options presented in Section 7.12 would lead to a re-alignment of structures, as outlined in Figure 3 (on the next page). The most important consequence would be a clearer distinction between the three pillars that form the state: the judiciary, the executive and representative bodies. Representative bodies would have increased powers to hold the executive to account. This is signified by the heavy emphasis placed on the lines of accountability, as opposed to the weak lines of reporting and communication that currently exist. While this study has focussed on provincial and district councils, amendments to the legal framework for representative institutions would also notionally include increased responsibility for the Wolesi Jirga with a corresponding reduction of power held by the president’s office. The enhancement of representative bodies through increased powers would also enable them to have a measure of oversight of the judiciary. Responsibilities deriving from the adoption of an alternative voting system to SNTV would likely improve councillors’ responsiveness to the constituencies they represent. Through the research, it was also observed that there is an apparent disconnect between the judiciary and other pillars of the state and that mechanisms for justice delivery lack transparency. While a detailed study of the judiciary was not part of this research, the consequences of its sub-optimal operation were very evident. Improved local accountability of the justice system could be achieved through increased scrutiny by provincial and district-level institutions of the courts and their legal decisions. The proposed changes would thus see a reduction of the powers now vested in the executive in two ways. Firstly, there would be a decrease of the influence that flows from the president’s office, particularly in respect of the provincial and district administrations. The roles of the wali and woluswal would be focused more on facilitating and coordinating provincial and district line departments. Secondly, the powers and role of the Provincial Development Committees would change with them having responsibility for planning and budget lines to meet locally prioritised needs. Planning would take place within the committees, or their sectoral working groups, to which provincial councils would be able to more constructively contribute, backed up by an expanded legal mandate. Given that information regarding revenues and other funds consolidated by the Mustofiat would be more readily available to the Provincial Development Committees, planning and spending decisions would be better informed and more transparent. In Figure 3, for reasons of simplicity, the MoF is considered to be part of the line ministries and the Mustofiat as part of the provincial line departments. The model represented in Figure 3 emphasises the need to move toward an increased separation of powers, the provision of increased powers to the elected bodies and a consequent reduction of presidential power (particularly over appointment), and the creation of a more accountable judiciary. It implies that there is political will and resources to provide Afghanistan with effective local government. While the model might be considered utopian in its expectations, it nevertheless provides a realistic goal to be worked toward. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 70
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Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

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