Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
2011
6.6 Concluding remarks
Elections: The system of SNTV plays a major role in undermining the development of party politics
and, by requiring relatively few votes to create winners, encouraged vote buying and bribing of
election officials. The electoral system and the representative bodies that derive from it have not
yet inspired the confidence and trust of the people. Speed and transparency are essential to the
proper functioning of all electoral processes. There is an absence of both in the present system,
where votes go to a central body and results emerge after several months. The system has not
inspired a sceptical public. Voters in 2010’s Wolesi Jirga election saw the process as being used
to legitimise the control of the powerful. The way it was conducted compounded a deep distrust
of democratic process and state institutions. 109 Rightly or wrongly, and despite the efforts of the
Independent Election Commission, people increasingly assume the worst and perceive elections as
a set of negotiated deals.
Provincial councils: The institution of the provincial council represents a significant first step in
the establishment of a representative local government. However, the mantra used by provincial
councils and others within government is that they should form “a link between the government
and the people.” Language such as this overlooks the key functions of representative bodies in the
democratic process, which is to hold the executive to account and to represent constituents. The
legal framework for local government representative institutions has not provided a meaningful
separation of powers and as a consequence there is neither transparency nor accountability.
The resources available to provincial councils are slowly improving, as is their capacity to manage the
administrative tasks associated with their mandate. However, any elected body that is representing
somewhere in the region of half a million people 110 requires the resources of a secretariat and the
means to travel and do its work. It also requires regularly delivered training that is consistent across
the country.
Districts: The achievements of the Helmand DCC model illustrate how a constituency-based approach
to selecting district councillors can result in the formation of a body that engages in a vigorous
debate on planning, prioritisation and resource allocation. What joined these DCCs together was
a common interest in the development of their district intermixed with DCC members’ individual
desires to get the best possible deal for their constituents and themselves. The approach also
generated a new relationship with the woluswal, who actually reported to the DCC and was subject
to its questioning; this represents an important means of accountability. Despite problems such as
the relatively high levels of input required, in broad policy terms the approach provides a realistic
mechanism for delivering resources and enhancing district level organisational capacity. Secondly,
and most significantly, the Helmand model demonstrates the value of representation, transparency
and accountability, the key elements of sustainable democratic governance.
However, the study notes the tension between the ASOP/IDLG DCCs and the MRRD DDAs. It is
unclear what the MRRD’s descriptions of DDAs’ “catalytic development facilitation role” and “multistakeholder
coordination and oversight mechanism” precisely means when set against the role and
functions of the DCC. 111 In this crucial tier of local government the issue of duplication and areas of
responsibility between the two bodies remains unresolved and is not assisted by a lack of clarity in
donor policy toward local government.
Villages and Manteqas: The changes of recent decades have increased the importance of the village
as a place where people locate their identity and sense of belonging. Many groups had traditionally
109 Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Undermining Representative Governance” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit, 2011), 15.
110 According to CSO Population data 2010-11, excluding provinces with large urban centres, Kunduz has the largest
population with 917,900 and Nuristan the smallest with 136,300.
111 “NABDP 1st Quarter Project Progress Report–2010,” 5.
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