Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 The system is therefore one that favours the representation of independents at the expense of promoting or allowing the development of party representation. A candidate only needs to poll a relatively few number of votes to get elected and may garner votes exclusively from a single ethnicity or group. Intimidation, graft and other forms of electoral malpractices can also bring about significant electoral gains. In the 2005 Wolesi Jirga elections, for example, the first seats in each province were won with an average of 11.5 percent of the vote and fourth seats won with an average of 5.7 percent of the vote. 130 AREU presented a report that highlighted some of the problems associated with SNTV 131 but in early 2005 the president and his advisors decided that SNTV would best serve their interests. Reynolds describes the deliberations over the voting system during 2003/4 and how and why SNTV was chosen. He concluded that: Afghanistan ended up with SNTV not as a result of extensive deliberation and careful evaluation of its pros and cons, but rather by a fairly random process of elimination...It is important to note that Karzai did not choose SNTV with any understanding of its consequences or history. 132 However, in hindsight this may prove to be a charitable interpretation of how and why the system was adopted. The inhibition of political party formation as occurs through the use of SNTV is in accord with the centrist tendencies to be observed within past and present ruling Afghan elites. This being so, the adoption of SNTV may well have been deliberate and intentional. Since its adoption in 2005, the system has fostered bribery and coercion. It has promoted fragmentation, slowed down the growth of political parties, favoured sectional interests, and inhibited voters’ ability to utilise one of the main functions of a democratic system: their power to eject incumbents. SNTV therefore does little, if anything, to contribute to building the bridge that the government is seeking to create between itself and the people. While these observations about SNTV are not new, the research confirms its negative influence. Furthermore, the DCC election process observed in Helmand sheds light on how a first-past-thepost, constituency-based electoral process could be applied in Afghanistan. As noted in Section 6.2, districts were divided into constituencies in consultation and agreement with local officials, elders and other interested parties; district council members were then elected for each constituency. DCC members were seen to act as a group on matters of joint concern and in the interest of their constituencies when arguing for resources. At stake was their reputation in the community they represented. The way democracy has been applied to Afghanistan has been heavily influenced by Western notions of democratic process. While these may be alien to many in Afghanistan, the basic idea of selecting accountable representatives is not. In this respect, Islam and democracy are not opposed to each other, even though fundamentalists might like to suggest so. Representative institutions such as shuras and jirgas have existed for centuries. They have provided Afghans, from the village to the national level, a platform for consultation and consensus-based decision-making. Historically, however, Afghanistan has been resistant to externally imposed change. Unfortunately, the electoral system and its functioning in 2009 and 2010 have done nothing to inspire confidence in the ideal of democracy. While these failings cannot be blamed on SNTV alone, the use of the system has not contributed to the legitimation of democratic process, but quite the reverse. Policy Issues: While it is unrealistic to expect any action to be taken on the voting system without considered deliberation, it is important that the issue remains on the agenda. Afghanistan’s struggle to generate a functioning democracy has been constrained by many factors, one of which is the 130 Andrew Reynolds, “The Curious Case Of Afghanistan” in Journal of Democracy National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press Volume 17, Number 2 (April 2006), 113. 131 Andrew Reynolds, Lucy Jones and Andrew Wilder, “A Guide to Parliamentary Elections in Afghanistan” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2005). 132 Reynolds, “The Curious Case Of Afghanistan,” 107. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 61
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 SNTV voting system. Although it might suit the interests of incumbents, the major problem with the voting system is that it reduces accountability. As has been discussed, the current system means that elected representatives such as provincial councillors have little incentive to respond to anybody but a potentially very small constituency of supporters. The extension of SNTV to district councils (as and when elections take place) is likely to further compound these problems, perhaps more damagingly so since the district is a much more closely-linked group of communities. 7.8 Corruption The issue of corruption has been a consistent feature throughout this paper. The distorting of wellintentioned programmes into profit-making ventures, collusive links between business groups and government, 133 the use of influence to gain appointment or election to an office, the misappropriation of state funds by government employees and the extortion of bribes for the delivery of services and justice have all contributed to the malfunction of state structures and damaged its legitimacy. In certain instances, even traditional shuras have become corrupt—village elders were sometimes seen to deliver judgements at the direction of government officials and then share bribes with them. Fear of losing their jobs has also compelled honest men to be involved in corruption. The costs of such behaviour are especially high considering that people who are forced to pay bribes often go on to extract them from others to obtain compensation; this places a particular burden on those unfortunate enough to be at the bottom of the chain. 134 It was surprising the extent to which the prevalence of these practices, and even the identity of those involved, was common knowledge. The widespread prevalence—and in many cases acceptance—of corruption is indicative of a systemic crisis of accountability in Afghanistan. People have no means to address blatant wrongdoing by those who have a measure of power, and those who speak out are afraid of the consequences. The problem of corruption has been exacerbated by the large amounts of international aid being pushed through programmes run by institutions that lack sufficient capacity to deliver it. The daunting scale of the state-building project, coupled with the uncertain political environment, has thus combined to focus the attention of public servants on short-term gain. Finally, the “bazaar economy” that Conrad Schetter 135 argues began with the decline of state institutions and administrative capacity in the early 1990s has grown into a full-fledged “war economy” under the present regime—one that is almost completely dependent on conflict. As noted in the introduction, the cost of supplying local services to the US military alone is equivalent to Afghanistan’s GDP, while the large amounts of aid made available for time-bound projects have led to profligate expenditure. Business groups with close links to the government have manipulated weak state regulations to take advantage of such opportunities. Lucrative commercial enterprises have been set up with government consent that significantly affect the way governance structures function. 136 To address corruption, it is important to explore what the term actually means in the Afghan context. According to an AREU study on subnational corruption in Afghanistan, corruption is “a dynamic and adaptive phenomenon in any culture.” 137 The Afghan government deserves credit for recognising this and enlisting the help of a range of institutions (including Integrity Watch Afghanistan, the 133 For an account of the near-collapse of Kabul Bank, see: Dexter Filkins, “Letter from Kabul: The Great Afghan Bank Heist,” in The New Yorker, 31 January 2011. 134 For a description of the various forms of corrupt behaviour, see: Manija Gardizi, Karen Hussmann and Yama Torabi, “Corrupting the State or State-led Corruption Exploring the Nexus between Corruption and Subnational Governance” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2010). 135 Conrad Schetter, “The Bazaar Economy of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Approach” in C. Noelle-Karimi, C. Schetter and R. Schlagintweit, (eds.), Afghanistan – A Country without a State (Frankfurt a.M.: IKO Verlag, 2000), 109-128. 136 The Kabul Bank scandal has shed significant light on government relationships with influential private companies. For an analysis see Martine van Bijlert, “The Kabul Bank Investigations; Central Bank Gives Names and Figures,” 2 May 2011, http:// aan-afghanistan.com/index.aspid=1663 (accessed 12 June 2011). 137 See: Gardizi et al., “Corrupting the State or State-crafted Corruption” This point assumes even greater significance when set against examples of corruption permeating into and becoming institutionalised in traditional structures, through their engagement with the state. Following from this description, as there can be changes in the ways societies perceive corruption, the prevalence of corruption too can induce societal change. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 62
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