Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
2011
8. A Model of Improved Local Government
Applying the options presented in Section 7.12 would lead to a re-alignment of structures, as outlined
in Figure 3 (on the next page). The most important consequence would be a clearer distinction
between the three pillars that form the state: the judiciary, the executive and representative bodies.
Representative bodies would have increased powers to hold the executive to account. This is signified
by the heavy emphasis placed on the lines of accountability, as opposed to the weak lines of reporting
and communication that currently exist. While this study has focussed on provincial and district
councils, amendments to the legal framework for representative institutions would also notionally
include increased responsibility for the Wolesi Jirga with a corresponding reduction of power held by
the president’s office. The enhancement of representative bodies through increased powers would
also enable them to have a measure of oversight of the judiciary. Responsibilities deriving from the
adoption of an alternative voting system to SNTV would likely improve councillors’ responsiveness to
the constituencies they represent.
Through the research, it was also observed that there is an apparent disconnect between the judiciary
and other pillars of the state and that mechanisms for justice delivery lack transparency. While a
detailed study of the judiciary was not part of this research, the consequences of its sub-optimal
operation were very evident. Improved local accountability of the justice system could be achieved
through increased scrutiny by provincial and district-level institutions of the courts and their legal
decisions.
The proposed changes would thus see a reduction of the powers now vested in the executive in two
ways. Firstly, there would be a decrease of the influence that flows from the president’s office,
particularly in respect of the provincial and district administrations. The roles of the wali and woluswal
would be focused more on facilitating and coordinating provincial and district line departments.
Secondly, the powers and role of the Provincial Development Committees would change with them
having responsibility for planning and budget lines to meet locally prioritised needs. Planning would
take place within the committees, or their sectoral working groups, to which provincial councils
would be able to more constructively contribute, backed up by an expanded legal mandate. Given
that information regarding revenues and other funds consolidated by the Mustofiat would be more
readily available to the Provincial Development Committees, planning and spending decisions would
be better informed and more transparent. In Figure 3, for reasons of simplicity, the MoF is considered
to be part of the line ministries and the Mustofiat as part of the provincial line departments.
The model represented in Figure 3 emphasises the need to move toward an increased separation
of powers, the provision of increased powers to the elected bodies and a consequent reduction
of presidential power (particularly over appointment), and the creation of a more accountable
judiciary. It implies that there is political will and resources to provide Afghanistan with effective
local government. While the model might be considered utopian in its expectations, it nevertheless
provides a realistic goal to be worked toward.
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