Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
2011
i-Wahadat factions, and that both parties were structured around individuals. This fragmentation of
political parties around individual leadership was indicative of the fractious nature of Hazara politics.
In multi-ethnic provinces such as Samangan, political choices are reflected in shifting allegiances
and alliances of convenience. Former jihadi commanders have often undergone multiple changes of
political allegiance. Though most have now lost their influence, only a few lead sedentary lives as
village elders, advising CDCs on development projects or discussing priorities with NSP facilitating
partners. Instead, a sizeable number of former commanders now spend of their time looking after
their businesses.
Of all the factors that have led to the undermining of political party structures in Afghanistan, SNTV
has probably been the most significant. Through inhibiting party formation, it fails to recognise how
political parties can be a means to mobilise public action and bring about change. The impact that
this power of mobilisation—or its lack—can have is amply demonstrated in political events in Jawzjan
province over the past few years. In 2007, a demonstration was organised in Jawzjan against the
incumbent Wali Juma Khan Hamdard by members of the youth wing of Junbesh-i-Milli. Events took
a hostile turn when 10 people were killed and 45 injured in ANP gunfire. In response, the Junbeshi
Youth Council registered complaints with ISAF, the PRT and the government and though no formal
investigation was carried out, Hamdard was replaced. This was in stark contrast to the muted protests
that followed the removal of the Turkmen Wali Roz Mohammad Nur in 2005 in what was widely
believed to be a deal between Karzai and General Dostum, the de facto leader 99 of Junbesh and the
Uzbeks. 100 Since then, Turkmens have rallied at various times for political power in Jawzjan—first
by nominating candidates in the Wolesi Jirga and provincial council elections and then by operating
through civil society organisations. However, they have never been able to mobilise themselves to
form an effective challenge to Junbesh dominance. The Turkmen vote for both Wolesi Jirga and
provincial council elections was diluted when Junbesh cajoled or bribed several Turkmen candidates
to stand even though they had no hope of winning. Growing Turkmen resentment has since crept into
all aspects of public life. Few Turkmens have been able to enter Jawzjan University, and the Turkmen
populations of Qarqin and Khamyab Districts are particularly marginalised. Turkmens in Jawzjan have
gravitated towards Jamiat-i-Islami after it opened an office in the provincial capital of Sheberghan
in 2009, a development that clearly shows the potentially important role a political party can play in
allowing voice to marginalised communities.
The demand for a greater space for political parties to operate in is increasing across the study
provinces, despite the limitations of SNTV. Campaigning has become expensive, and the cost of
practices such as distributing gifts among supporters is making it harder to seek election without
access to substantial financial resources. 101 As such, it is becoming increasingly difficult to gain
election to the Wolesi Jirga or provincial councils as an independent candidate. For example, in
the 2009 provincial council elections, only two independents were elected in Samangan and in
Laghman, with none in Day Kundi. Those who failed to gain re-election in 2009 promptly declared
their affiliation and registered with political parties.
While joining political parties may for some be driven by a desire to access power or resources,
for women party membership also opened an avenue for greater engagement in public life. In
Wardak, a women-centric political group—Milli Khowazakht—has emerged, calling for administrative
decentralisation, equal rights for women, and better treatment and opportunities for the families
of martyrs. Though parties such as this might seem insignificant in the larger scene, their existence
99 The official leader of Jumbesh-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan is Sayed Noorullah. Abdul Rashid Dostum gave up his leadership
to take up the position of Defence Minister of Afghanistan in 2004. Though Dostum now divides his time between Jawzjan and
Turkey, he is still very influential and remains popular among the Uzbeks.
100 The removal of the Turkmen provincial governor is one of many examples of the disenfranchisement of the Turkmens
and consolidation of power by Junbesh. For an insight into what caused Jumbesh to develop into an almost exclusively Uzbek
party, see: Antonio Giustozzi, “The Ethnicisation of an Afghan Faction: Junbesh-i-Milli from its Origins to the Presidential
Elections,” Crisis States Working Papers (Series 1) 67 (London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2005).
101 For more on this phenomenon in the context of the Wolesi Jirga see: Noah Coburn, “Political Economy of the Wolesi
Jirga: Sources of Finance and their Impact on Representation in Afghanistan’s Parliament” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit, 2011).
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