Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 These newly-formed democratic institutions thus have neither the legal and constitutional framework nor the financial wherewithal to respond to local concerns. Nevertheless, provincial councils have an important role in increasing government visibility in the provinces, communicating public preferences and grievances to government institutions, and scrutinising provincial administrations in their delivery of public goods. The failure to fulfil these criteria not only damages the credibility of provincial councils but also drives the public to gain access to services through traditional and informal networks. 120 Ultimately, this emphasises the importance of increased focus on building capacity. While high levels of central control have constrained the development of local government, the profound inefficiencies of the system have also been a factor in preventing the government achieving the legitimacy it so desperately seeks. The lack of devolved responsibility has disempowered the holders of state offices while the discontinuities in planning, disbursement and implementation have undermined confidence in the government. The establishment of what is in effect a weak centralised state with little reach beyond Kabul has seen power diffused across the country among a range of non-state actors, many of whom are by no means benign. Furthermore, those institutions that could assist government in its outreach efforts, such as line ministries and representative bodies, have been constrained by low local technical capacity in ministries and the vestigial powers of oversight institutions. These shortcomings have been exacerbated by a pervading lack of transparency and weak accountability across all institutions. The result has provided a fertile ground for the misuse of funds, which is taking place on a large scale. Policy Issues: There needs to be a check on the executive in any system that claims to be democratic. The government has taken the first tentative steps to achieving this at the local level, but these have so far produced little beyond the formation of consultative bodies. While it will undoubtedly take time to build capacity and develop a legal framework to achieve more effective provincial and district councils, the current proposed arrangements provide them with only the very mildest means of holding the executive to account. To meet their responsibility of acting as a check on the executive, provincial council mandates require greater focus and enhanced powers, something that will require significant political determination to achieve. 7.2 Responsibility for local government Creating the IDLG reduced the politically sensitive responsibilities of the Ministry of Interior. Given the need for a clear focus on local government, this was a constructive move. Shifting responsibility to the president’s office has, however, also allowed the president and those close to him to have much greater awareness of and influence over the country’s local governance institutions and thus to increase presidential power. The nature of any ministry is coloured by its minister and its recruitment policy. The present reality is that ministerial positions are allocated on the basis of factional loyalty or election commitments rather than merit, and ministers themselves regularly hire staff along factional, ethnic, regional or tribal lines. 121 While such behaviours are not in line with the principles of public administration reform, they are understandable within the context of Afghanistan. The growth of ministries has been very much related to donor priorities since they provide the bulk of funds. The situation can be characterised as one whereby ministries have generated programmes to meet the strategic requirements of donors as well as their own. This has been reasonably straightforward in sectors such as health and education where there are single ministries responsible for the sectors. However, this has not been the case in the rural development and governance sectors. As entrepreneurial ministries have grown and others been created, overlaps have emerged. This is especially so in local government, where the IDLG and MRRD have developed programmes— 120 There is a considerable overlap between the two. Informal powerholders have sought to legitimise their power by seeking election to provincial councils. 121 Rubin, “The Political Context of Public Administration Reform,” 5. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 55
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 ASOP and NABDP respectively—which now overlap (see Sections 6.2 and 5.5). There is a further tier of support and policy determination represented by multilateral organisations in the form of the World Bank and UNDP. These institutions are involved in programme design and provide a vehicle for the delivery of funds and accountability to donors. UNDP is the recipient of multi-donor funds for the implementation of the NABDP through the MRRD. The World Bank is concerned with the development and implementation of the multi-donor-funded NSP implemented by MRRD, which receives funds through the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). However, despite their strong governance dimensions, these programmes are not synchronised with IDLG policy. This is further complicated by confusing overlaps of donor funding, with some donors supporting both ASOP and NABDP. Donors have created two funding lines, with the US being the major IDLG funder and other donors funding the divergent or competing approaches of the ASGP and NABPD. Inconsistent, competing and short-term donor funding has thus been a major factor contributing to the current confusion in the development and implementation of local government policy. The consequence of competing donor policies has thus been reflected in the agendas and programmes of IDLG and MRRD, producing a damaging overlap between the two ministries. In part, this has been an issue of timing. MRRD was established in 2002 and launched the NSP in the same year; as the NSP has evolved, its role in governance has increased in significance. By contrast, IDLG was only mandated to assume responsibility for local government in 2007. As it has done so, the inconsistencies associated with the determination and implementation of local government policy have become increasingly apparent, leading to considerable tension between IDLG and MRRD. In the current local government institutional landscape, IDLG has responsibility for provincial and district administrative functions and for the support of provincial councils, while MRRD has assumed responsibility for district planning and service delivery through the DDAs. MRRD is also responsible for the CDCs and an increasing number of CDC clusters that now represent an additional governance tier funded through the NSP. The more recent introduction of the ASOP DCCs in 100 districts is an additional complication, since their mandate overlaps with most functions of the DDAs. Matters are further clouded by the remit, either given or assumed, of CDCs, DDAs, DCCs and provincial councils to undertake dispute resolution. The lack of clear lines of responsibility has resulted in a profoundly unhealthy situation. Whatever may be discussed in Kabul, the realities revealed on the ground and presented in this paper indicate that the formal aspects of representative governance are, to put it mildly, not functioning well. Even when working to the best of their ability, the provincial councils studied under this research were not able to fulfil their mandate effectively; many DDAs appear rudderless and many are corrupt. The MRRD clusters funded through NSP were an additional administrative tier. And while CDCs were enthusiastic and delivered to their development mandate with the help of FPs, a good number were subject to administrative malpractice, frequently in collusion with local administrations and line ministries. Local governance was further influenced by powerful non-state actors, often located in the Wolesi Jirga and provincial councils. Using wasita, they were able to penetrate line ministries and broker government appointments, while their powers of patronage influenced the membership and operation of DDAs and DCCs. At the village level, the institution of the shura remains predominant. In most cases, the shura’s authority underpins the functioning of the CDC and quickly reasserts itself if the latter becomes defunct. An Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Status of Village Councils and District Councils was set up in 2010 to clarify lines of responsibility and to address the dysfunctionality of current arrangements. In particular, it was meant to decide on how the overlapping roles and competing status of DDAs (MRRD) and DCCs (ASOP) could be resolved. It failed to address this critical issue and in so doing it has done a disservice to the establishment of local government in Afghanistan. However, by it not taking a position on this, both MRRD and IDLG avoided weakening the status of important flagship programmes. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 56
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Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

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