Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
2011
7. Policy Implications
Afghanistan’s economy, government and society have all experienced substantial changes since 2001.
This study has sought to explore the various forms of local governance operating in the six study
provinces of Day Kuni, Jawzjan, Laghman, Samangan, Sar-i-Pul and Wardak during 2010, a time when
resource flows to the country were at their peak. Donor assistance has been particularly critical
in supporting programmes orientated toward assisting the Afghan government develop effective
governance and economic structures that will provide the basis for the country’s future development.
However, as the target date for the withdrawal of external military support in 2014 approaches,
development funding is likely to decrease.
Initial efforts after 2001 to reform government institutions focused on the development of central
structures. More recently, there has been an increasing focus on the need to build local government
capacity and reflexive institutions below the central level. However, the process is long overdue,
sometimes confused, and appears driven by the desire to gain public trust and support for the
government rather than deepen representation and the democratic process. Thus, while there
has been an increased momentum in service delivery, the addressing of local governance has been
characterised by hesitancy in addressing related structural issues associated with the formation
of transparent and accountable institutions. This has resulted in a failure to enact the legislation
necessary to define and implement a clear policy towards the status and function of representative
bodies.
The aim of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of local governance
through examining the diversity of its operation. To compliment the many sectoral and area-specific
studies that have taken place, it has sought to capture something of the geographic diversity as well
as the organisational complexity that characterises governance in Afghanistan. More specifically,
it has had the opportunity to examine the nature of administration, the operation of security and
justice, issues of service delivery and representation. Together they form the organised whole, or
“gestalt” of governance. The purpose of this concluding analysis is to draw together and assess
particular elements of the research evidence so as to offer observations on policy.
7.1 The centralised state
As was noted in the brief historical background in Section 2.3, the Afghan state is one of the most
centralised to claim democratic status, and in many respects has more in common with the monarchies
and dictatorships of its past. The drafting of the 2004 constitution and the subsequent establishment
of a government has allowed the international community to engage with a single and geographically
focused executive and administrative apparatus. However, a centralised system operating in a
country like Afghanistan faces problems of geography as well as the diffused nature of power. Given
the international community’s significant influence over the creation of the constitution, a measure
of responsibility for current structural arrangements must rest with them.
It is important to differentiate between the two strands of formal governance that exist in Afghanistan,
comprising state organisation and administration on the one hand, and the various tiers of elected
bodies on the other. While both are held in check by constitutions and the rule of law, many of the
powers and roles of the latter are yet to be formalised in law.
State/administrative structures
The wali and the woluswal are political appointees. The 2010 Local Government Policy puts the wali
in a strong position; he is largely responsible for provincial planning and implementation, and district
administrations are effectively sub-offices operating under the provincial administration. However,
while the wali and woluswal have considerable responsibilities, these are in several instances
overlapping, leading to weak lines of accountability (see the example of dual police reporting lines
in Section 4.2). In addition, their influence is often mediated by local powerholders and elites. In a
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