Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 6.6 Concluding remarks Elections: The system of SNTV plays a major role in undermining the development of party politics and, by requiring relatively few votes to create winners, encouraged vote buying and bribing of election officials. The electoral system and the representative bodies that derive from it have not yet inspired the confidence and trust of the people. Speed and transparency are essential to the proper functioning of all electoral processes. There is an absence of both in the present system, where votes go to a central body and results emerge after several months. The system has not inspired a sceptical public. Voters in 2010’s Wolesi Jirga election saw the process as being used to legitimise the control of the powerful. The way it was conducted compounded a deep distrust of democratic process and state institutions. 109 Rightly or wrongly, and despite the efforts of the Independent Election Commission, people increasingly assume the worst and perceive elections as a set of negotiated deals. Provincial councils: The institution of the provincial council represents a significant first step in the establishment of a representative local government. However, the mantra used by provincial councils and others within government is that they should form “a link between the government and the people.” Language such as this overlooks the key functions of representative bodies in the democratic process, which is to hold the executive to account and to represent constituents. The legal framework for local government representative institutions has not provided a meaningful separation of powers and as a consequence there is neither transparency nor accountability. The resources available to provincial councils are slowly improving, as is their capacity to manage the administrative tasks associated with their mandate. However, any elected body that is representing somewhere in the region of half a million people 110 requires the resources of a secretariat and the means to travel and do its work. It also requires regularly delivered training that is consistent across the country. Districts: The achievements of the Helmand DCC model illustrate how a constituency-based approach to selecting district councillors can result in the formation of a body that engages in a vigorous debate on planning, prioritisation and resource allocation. What joined these DCCs together was a common interest in the development of their district intermixed with DCC members’ individual desires to get the best possible deal for their constituents and themselves. The approach also generated a new relationship with the woluswal, who actually reported to the DCC and was subject to its questioning; this represents an important means of accountability. Despite problems such as the relatively high levels of input required, in broad policy terms the approach provides a realistic mechanism for delivering resources and enhancing district level organisational capacity. Secondly, and most significantly, the Helmand model demonstrates the value of representation, transparency and accountability, the key elements of sustainable democratic governance. However, the study notes the tension between the ASOP/IDLG DCCs and the MRRD DDAs. It is unclear what the MRRD’s descriptions of DDAs’ “catalytic development facilitation role” and “multistakeholder coordination and oversight mechanism” precisely means when set against the role and functions of the DCC. 111 In this crucial tier of local government the issue of duplication and areas of responsibility between the two bodies remains unresolved and is not assisted by a lack of clarity in donor policy toward local government. Villages and Manteqas: The changes of recent decades have increased the importance of the village as a place where people locate their identity and sense of belonging. Many groups had traditionally 109 Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Undermining Representative Governance” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2011), 15. 110 According to CSO Population data 2010-11, excluding provinces with large urban centres, Kunduz has the largest population with 917,900 and Nuristan the smallest with 136,300. 111 “NABDP 1st Quarter Project Progress Report–2010,” 5. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 51
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 ascribed more value to the manteqa or hawza 112 —a social and geographic zone such as a group of villages or a side valley—than the individual village unit. While the manteqa remains prominent in certain areas, for example in Pashai areas of Laghman, the village is increasing in significance. In large part, this is due to the increase in individual settlement size that has come with a growing population, along with the need for those who have occupied the country in recent years to classify and name. 113 The emergence of the NSP has further emphasised the definition of villages. However, the MRRD has also begun grouping CDCs into “clusters” as a way to improve the efficiency of aid delivery and management. In many ways, this intermediary layer between the village and the district equates to the manteqa. The notion of the manteqa thus provides an intriguing line of enquiry, and may offer a way to turn districts into smaller constituencies of representation in a way that has local meaning. While the formal aspects of political organisation have been discussed above, this is only one way for people to achieve their collective goals. In many cases, political affiliation is a way of linking to networks rather than just being a matter of ideology. For most villagers it is the mosque and the times of prayer that provide the location for people to gather and talk. It was around the mosque that policies are formed, positions taken or action decided upon. The rituals of Islam thus provide structured contact on a daily basis to allow discussion on matters of joint concern. Emerging from this civic space are a wealth of jointly undertaken activities: civil defence militia, the operation of CDCs, parent-teacher associations, and school and health committees. 112 For more on these terms, see: Raphy Favre, “Interface Between State and Society in Afghanistan: Discussion on Key Social Features affecting Governance Reconciliation and Reconstruction” (Addis Ababa: Aizon, 2005) and Katja Mielke and Conrad Schetter, “Where is the Village Local Perceptions and Development Approaches in Kunduz Province,” in Asien 104 (July 2007), 71-87. 113 Pain and Kantor in their discussions on the village republic offer an alternative view. They see the historical primacy of the village as providing social goods and security from which to establish the wider networks important for survival. See: Adam Pain and Paula Kantor, “Understanding and Addressing Context in Rural Afghanistan” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2010), 14-31. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 52
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