Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
2011
It has taken time for provincial councils and walis to establish effective working relations with one
another, and the attitude of the wali is crucial to the nature of the relationship. Alongside this, there
was considerable variation in how provincial councils were perceived by other branches of government.
A number of government actors saw them as rivals and rejected their approaches and suggestions.
Provincial administrations complained that provincial councils should be more active in reaching out to
the people. Line departments tended to view scrutiny by provincial councils as unnecessarily intrusive,
while some provincial justice ministries complained that their approach to legal issues created tension
between the people and government. In Jawzjan, the then wali had little time for the council and
made every effort to exclude them, barring them from Provincial Development Committee meetings.
Provincial party dynamics could also affect how far they were accepted—in Laghman for example, the
provincial council was co-opted by factions opposed to the then wali.
The precise nature of provincial council operation thus varied from province to province. Typically
they form committees related to dispute resolution, rural development, human rights, shura
relations, monitoring, rural development and social services (individual members sit on two or three
committees each). However, provincial councils are not given information on provincial budgets and
thus have little or no influence over resource allocation. One provincial council member complained
that their role in planning was essentially symbolic: “Every line ministry makes their own annual plan
and budget. They do not even inform the wali.” This lack of any substantive involvement in planning
and budgeting was stated as being a cause of reduced motivation.
As policy became clearer, and particularly after the formation of IDLG, considerable training and support
has been provided by IDLG, the Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme and NDI. In addition
there were several INGO contributions to build local government capacity. While certain basic training
components were delivered, capacity building varied greatly with respect to the types of training and with
peripheral areas being poorly served. Gradually, provincial council facilities and equipment were being
improved and to varying degrees provincial council members were seeking to improve their performance.
There was a gap between the mandate given to provincial councils and the powers provided to
them to exercise this mandate. As will be further discussed they have rights to request information
and to be consulted but since this was not obligatory, they were often overlooked or ignored by
administrations and line ministries. Although the provincial councils were required to hold local
administrations and line ministries to account, they had no powers of sanction except in settling
certain civil disputes. While people came to councils to seek help on issues of personal concern, it
was observed that this could be used to exert rents. It is unclear to what extent this was the norm.
Female councillors regularly reported instances of women bringing them problems. Some took great
pains to provide support. However, as noted above, the provincial council was just one of a number
of bodies where people would seek help. Provincial council members complained that the failure to
give them sufficient powers and resources to exercise those powers was indicative of the value being
placed upon them. The public therefore looked to central government rather than the provincial
council. Walis and woluswals paid them little attention, for they had little need to do so.
In general, the provincial councils suffered from a lack of motivation and low morale. Some members
noted that the IDLG (to which they report) has restricted their ability to interact with the Wolesi and
Meshrano Jirgas. Furthermore, it was all too easy for the distortions caused by Afghanistan’s single
non-transferrable vote (SNTV) system (see Section 7.7) and electoral malpractice to produce council
leaders whose primary interests were not aligned with enhancing representative governance. The
research observed that councillors often felt a sense of responsibility only towards the interest groups
that supported them, and there were regular examples of councillors favouring their own villages
and ethnicity at the expense of attending to the needs or concerns of other districts and or groups.
The observations by the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium that provincial councils
either become subsumed within or sidelined from the provincial administration, or alternatively
establish a type of parallel government, are well founded. 85
85 Nasrat Esmaty and Asadullah Ahmadi, “A Broken Relationship: A Study of the provincial councils and their Ability to Serve
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