Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 Militias: While the presence of the arbaki improved security around Wardak’s provincial centre, arming such groups is reversing the DDR/DIAG process and potentially has implications for the attainment of longer term peace and security. The arbaki there were deeply resented by the Taliban; the arbaki leader was uncertain how the conflict would unfold and, like many other actors in such unstable provinces, was doing his best to keep his options open. The potentially unpredictable nature of these groups is therefore particularly significant, since they clash with the Afghan state’s aim of establishing rule of law and monopolising means of coercion. Justice Delivery: Although the formal justice system was seen to be functioning in the northern study provinces, it was viewed with deep mistrust, especially in rural areas. Slow, inaccessible, complex, expensive and corrupt, its failings were contributing substantially to a loss of trust in government as a whole. Law officers thus undertook their responsibilities with varying degrees of integrity. Although statutory law was given priority over Islamic law in the 1964 constitution, there remains a dual system in the 2004 constitution whereby primacy of one over the other rests with interpretation. While customary law was not even mentioned in the 2004 constitution, it remains the most commonly used system in rural areas. Despite the training provided by the Ministry of Justice, IARCSC and a number of external actors, particularly the United States, there remains a need for capacity building specific to the justice sector. As one saranwal noted: “Justice is a complicated subject and it is difficult for NGOs and other non-specialists to help us. We have problems in interpreting aspects of civil law, criminal law and the constitution. We need Afghan experts to explain the law as it applies to the realities we work with.” The difficulties associated with achieving justice were reflected in the number of bodies to which those with unresolved disputes turned. Honour, respect and reputation remain critical to the wellbeing of the individual, family and community. These norms have been encompassed in sets of principles and rules tailored to specific contexts, 46 and form the basis on which CBDR takes place and why it continues to be used. Citizens require predictability from justice processes and diverse though it is, customary law was providing this. While negative aspects of CBDR, such as baad, persist in some areas, attitudes are changing. In Laghman people boasted that baad was no longer practiced, while in Wardak the practice was prohibited by the Taliban. However, CBDR practices are not legally recognised under the current Afghan constitution, highlighting a need to understand how the informal and formal systems can cooperate with each other. To this end, the distinction between huqooq-ul- Allah and huqooq-ul-ibad represents an entry point for more interaction between the two systems. 47 46 Barfield, “Afghan Customary Law and Its Relationship to Formal Judicial Institutions,” 42. 47 Tribal Liaison Office, “Linkages between State and Non-State Justice Systems in Eastern Afghanistan” (Kabul: Tribal Liaison Office, 2009), 26. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 27
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2011 5. Service Delivery The management and delivery of goods and services is critical to any government’s ability to achieve and maintain legitimacy. The problem in Afghanistan is that the government cannot be solely held responsible for shortcomings in service delivery since about 90 percent of the national budget is “externally financed” and aid constitutes almost half of the Gross Domestic Product. 48 Most importantly, however, almost 75 percent of the foreign assistance bypasses government budgetary structures entirely, and a large proportion of the aid that is channelled through the government goes unused due to lack of capacity. There are considerable problems with underspending of development budgets. According to MoF figures, government execution of the development budget for 2010/11 is a meagre 37 percent. 49 This presents a major challenge for donors and the government alike. Donors may use the Afghan government’s inability to fully execute existing allocations to justify a reduction in development budgets, while the government itself may find it much more convenient to attribute underspending to uncoordinated and unpredictable donor engagement rather than its own administrative inefficiencies. In either case, consistent underspending results in reduced budgetary allocations, as is evident from the table below. Table 1: Performance and implications of Afghan government development budget execution Sector 2009/10 Development Budget Execution Rate 2010/11 Development Budget Execution Rate (for first 10 months only) Reduction in Development Budget Allocation for 2011/12 as proportion of unused budget for 2010/11 Health 40% 43% 21% Social Protection 46% 25% 33% Education 40% 44% 48% Security 63% 27% 50% Governance, Rule of Law & Human Rights Agriculture and Rural Development Economic Governance and Private Sector Development Infrastructure and Natural Resources 30% 20% 46% 45% 21.50% 51% 21% 17% 63% 30% 28% 72% Source: The 2009/10 development budget execution rate comes from the October 2010, Pre-Budget Report by the Afghan MoF. The 2010/11 execution rate and proposed change in development budget allocations are from the SY 1390 Afghan government budget. 48 The World Bank and DFiD, “Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010,” http://zunia.org/post/afghanistan-publicexpenditure-review-2010-second-generation-of-public-expenditure-reforms/ (accessed 21 May 2011). 49 Ministry of Finance, “Afghanistan’s National Budget for 1384-88,” available at www.harmonieweb.org (accessed 15 April 2011). Data from 1389 from MoF’s 13 March 2011 update on budget execution. Total development budget: $2,251,000,000. Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground 28
Page 1 and 2: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Page 35: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Page 85 and 86: Map A3: Faryab, Jawzjan, Samangan a
Page 87 and 88:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103:
All AREU publications can be downlo
show all

Local Governance in Afghanistan: A View from the Ground

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?