UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

97 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 422 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (warning that “[t]oday’s decision ... clears the way for
suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots”).
98 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (finding that a canine sniff during an otherwise lawful traffic stop was permissible even without any
suspicion that driver was transporting drugs in vehicle); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1984) (“While the
agents’ assertion of dominion and control over the package and its contents did constitute a ‘seizure,’ ... that seizure was not
unreasonable” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983) (“In short, we hold that the detention of
respondent’s luggage in this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably
suspected to contain narcotics.”).
99 See, e.g., People v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (“The high court’s fleeting reference to a ‘public place’ in
Place simply indicated, at most, that the luggage containing contraband was in an area in which the police and the canine were
lawfully present.” (emphasis added)).
100 Cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951). In Jeffers, the government argued that search and seizure were severable legal
issues in a drug prosecution. Id. The Court disagreed, explaining that “[w]e do not believe the events are so easily isolable. Rather
they are bound together by one sole purpose--to locate and seize the narcotics of respondent. The search and seizure are, therefore,
incapable of being untied.” Id.
101 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Justice Brennan cautioned:
What is most startling about the Court’s interpretation of the term “search,” both in this case and in Place, is its exclusive focus on
the nature of the information or item sought and revealed through the use of a surveillance technique, rather than on the context in
which the information or item is concealed.... [T]he Court adopts a general rule that a surveillance technique does not constitute a
search if it reveals only whether or not an individual possesses contraband.
Id.
102 See id.
103 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (concluding that “the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here--exposure
of respondent’s luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine--did not constitute a ‘search”’ (emphasis added));
see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493-94 (1983) (applying this standard to an airport).
104 See, e.g., Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (allowing a canine sniff at the front door of the
defendant’s apartment because the front door was “open to public access and to a common area”); Jones, 755 N.W.2d at 229
(explaining that where the canine sniff was conducted at the front door of the defendant’s private home, there is “no reasonable
expectation of privacy at the entrance to property that is open to the public, including the front porch”).
105 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (observing that the search of the interior of a home represents “the prototypical
and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy”).
106 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005) (considering a drug-detection sniff conducted while Caballes was seated in a police
vehicle); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.18 (stating that “respondents had entrusted possession of the items to Federal Express”);
Place, 462 U.S. at 696 (explaining that after Place identified luggage as his, DEA agents took the luggage from LaGuardia Airport
to Kennedy Airport in order to subject the bags to a “‘sniff test’ by a trained narcotics detection dog”).
107 Cf. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 94 (7th Cir. 1980) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (arguing that a canine sniff of a person is more
intrusive than a sniff of “inanimate and unattended objects”).
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