UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

(1983); State v. Eddy, 519 A.2d 1137 (R.I.1987).
United States v. Rheault, 561 F.3d 55 (1st Cir.2009) (tenant of apartment on second floor without expectation of privacy in
washing machine on third floor landing, to which third floor tenants and their guests had relatively unfettered access); United
States v. Dillard, 438 F.3d 675 (6th Cir.2006) (“Dillard did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallway
and stairway of his duplex that were unlocked and open to the public”; court also stresses door was ajar and that “there was no
visible way for the police or anyone else to alert the duplex tenant of their presence”).
54 United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.1976).
55 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948), where an officer climbed through a window into the
landlady’s room and then proceeded to the second floor and, by standing on a chair, looked through the transom into defendant’s
room and saw gambling paraphernalia. Justice Jackson asserted “that each tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude
from the common hallways those who enter lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest in the integrity
and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and entry.”
56 By contrast, entry with permission, even if obtained by a ruse, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v.
Anderson, 517 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa 1994) (officers “gained entry to the apartment building by randomly pushing apartment buzzers
until someone let them in the locked building”; despite such “ruse” officers’ presence “was not unlawful until such time as
someone with authority requested them to leave,” and thus overhearing conversation in hallway no search).
As for consent without a ruse, see United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506 (6th Cir.2001) (officers communicated via intercom with
residents “until they found a resident who was willing to let them in, provided that she not be identified as the one giving them
access,” and thus entry of locked common areas lawful under Carriger).
57 United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.2001) (“the holding of Carriger is applicable here,” as the officers “entered a locked
building without utilizing the proper procedure”; fact they used key lawfully seized from defendant makes no difference, as “the
mere possession of a key will not transform an illegal entry into a valid one,” for it “is the authority to enter, not the manner of
entry, that provides the legality for the officers’ conduct”); Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir.1987) (expectation of
privacy in hallway of fraternity house; “fraternity members could best be characterized as ‘roommates in the same house,’ not
simply co-tenants sharing certain common areas. Moreover, a fraternity, by definition, is intended to be something of an exclusive
living arrangement with the goal of maximizing the privacy of its affairs”); United States v. Booth, 455 A.2d 1351 (D.C.App.1983)
(police not entitled to enter hallway of rooming house where nothing about the premises suggested strangers free to enter); People
v. Trull, 64 Ill.App.3d 385, 20 Ill.Dec. 960, 380 N.E.2d 1169 (1978) (holding “that the common entries and hallways of a locked
apartment building are protected by the fourth amendment”); State v. Di Bartolo, 276 So.2d 291 (La.1973) (“apparently the
building was kept locked and only tenants who had keys and guests whom they admitted could gain entrance to the building”);
Garrison v. State, 28 Md.App. 257, 345 A.2d 86 (1975) (“the entrance door was kept locked and only tenants and management
personnel had keys to the door,” and the “only way one visiting a tenant could gain entrance was by telephoning a tenant who
‘would come down’ and unlock the door”); People v. Beachman, 98 Mich.App. 544, 296 N.W.2d 305 (1980) (Fourth Amendment
protections extend to lobby of locked residential hotel). See also Note, 101 Mich.L.Rev. 273, 310 (2002) (concluding upon wellreasoned
analysis that “Supreme Court precedent, the history of the Fourth Amendment, the intent of the Framers, and
considerations of sound public policy all necessitate the recognition of a constitutionally protected privacy interest within the
locked common-areas of an apartment building”).
58 United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir.1993) (police entry of “high security” apartment building when defendant “buzzed”
in one Nobrega who contacted defendant via intercom and who then cooperating with police in investigation of Nobrega’s drug
supplier; “an apartment dweller has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the building whether the officer
trespasses or not”); United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.1989) (“common hallway” in apartment building is “an
area where there is no legitimate expectation of privacy … even though the area is guarded by a locked door”); United States v.
Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.1985) (arrest within locked common hallway of two-apartment house not within Payton rule
requiring warrant for in-premises arrests; “we never have held that the common areas must be accessible to the public at large”);
United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.1980) (no expectation of privacy in apartment building hallway even though it
within “a security building” which officer only able to enter by getting “security key” from manager); United States v. Eisler, 567
F.2d 814 (8th Cir.1977) (on ground “expectation of privacy necessarily implies an expectation that one will be free of any
intrusion, not merely unwarranted intrusions”); United States v. Moore, 463 F.Supp. 1266 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (holding that the
“common areas of an apartment building, even if they are normally kept locked, are not places in which tenants of the building
have a reasonable expectation of privacy,” and that same is true where “the main entrance … was serviced by a doorman,” as in
“either case, the tenant will find other tenants, visitors to other apartments, workmen and others using the common areas”).
State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723 (Tenn.2010) (collecting federal and state cases in accord with view that there is no “reasonable
expectation of privacy in the common areas of a locked apartment building,” court holds that police entry of locked condominium
building by virtue of assistance from unknown person who opened the door for the officers was lawful, especially in light of fact
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