UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

78 People v. Wright, 41 Ill.2d 170, 242 N.E.2d 180 (1968). Though this case involved an apartment house, the reasoning is equally
applicable to a single-family dwelling.
79 The reference is to the post-Katz decision in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968),
concerning “the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view.”
80 United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585 (11th Cir.1986) (no search to surveil from neighbor’s property and on nearby canal open
only to area landowners; court rejects defendant’s argument it is a search because officer’s vantage point not open to general
public); State v. Texeira, 62 Haw. 44, 609 P.2d 131 (1980) (gambling seen and heard from adjoining property); Turner v. State,
499 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); State v. Vogel, 428 N.W.2d 272 (S.D.1988) (no search to look into defendant’s house from
hilltop outside curtilage; “Anyone on the neighbor’s property could have walked, unobstructed, to the hilltop, and seen the plants”).
81 Commonwealth v. Busfield, 242 Pa.Super. 194, 363 A.2d 1227 (1976).
82 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 402 (1974).
83 As in Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), holding the defendant had no justified expectation of
privacy re the interior of his print shop because he failed “to curtain the windows,” though the windows were well above eye level
and the officer had looked in by standing on a four-foot ladder and using binoculars.
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 431 A.2d 964 (1981), involving a 9-day surveillance of a third story apartment from
another apartment 30–40 feet away, including use of binoculars and a startron which permitted the police to see into the apartment
even in darkness, the court timidly distinguished Hernley because in the instant case the police observed “two acts of sexual
intercourse not involving the person … for whom the surveillance was established.”
84 Montgomery, J., dissenting in Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970).
85 Pate v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal.App.3d 721, 89 Cal.Rptr. 893 (1970).
86 As the Court stated in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984), “the curtilage is the area to
which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’ … and therefore has
been considered part of home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to
the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors that determine whether an
individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.” The Court added that “for
most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; and the conception defining the curtilage-as the area around the
home to which the activity of home life extends-is a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience.”
87 Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.3d 626, 108 Cal.Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 (1973).
88 United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.1972), quoting from Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.1964).
See also United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.2000) (officer acted properly, as he “knocked on the door for only a
short period spanning seconds,” “there was no police demand to open the door,” and officer “was not unreasonably persistent in
her attempt to obtain access to Cormier’s motel room”); People v. Holmes, 981 P.2d 168 (Colo.1999) (where police officer called
because of loud party knocked hard on door in effort to get attention of occupant over the noise, and door swung open because not
properly latched, allowing officer to observe bong within, no search; “Knocking on the door of a residence for the purpose of
investigating a crime is reasonable police conduct and does not infringe upon the occupant’s right of privacy”); Commonwealth v.
Acosta, 416 Mass. 279, 627 N.E.2d 466 (1993) (officer, in knocking on defendant’s door, “did no more than any citizen could do
by entering a common area” and thus no search). Compare the Jurez case, note 98 infra.
See also People v. Rivera, 41 Cal.4th 304, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 473, 159 P.3d 60 (2007) (police officer may approach and knock on door
of residence, and such actions “require no articulable suspicion of criminal activity”).
89 State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d 736 (1975).
90 Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.3d 626, 108 Cal.Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 (1973). Sometimes a departure from the most direct
route will be permissible. See United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.1993) (looking in back door no search where, as
here, both front and back door “are readily accessible from a public place like the driveway and parking area here,” so that police
went to back door “reasonably believing it is used as a principal entrance to the building”); United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757
(1st Cir.1990) (where front door “is inaccessible there is nothing unlawful or unreasonable about going to the back of the house to
look for another door”); United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir.1977) (when officer who wished to question defendant
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