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L.Ed.2d 331] (1977) (per curiam); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 [92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612] (1972); cf. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561 [96 S.Ct. 3074] (upholding as reasonable a random seizure and noting that it was not dealing with a search). Colyer, 878 F.2d at 477–79 (citations omitted). Professor LaFave has reached the same conclusion with respect to the issue of probable cause versus reasonable suspicion: Assuming now that some uses of these dogs constitutes a search, it does not inevitably follow that they should be encumbered by the restrictions ordinarily applicable to other types of searches which are clearly more intrusive in character. While it has sometimes been asserted that if the use of trained dogs is a search then such surveillance is unconstitutional if conducted in absence of a warrant supported by probable cause, it may be argued that the Fourth Amendment does not demand such a result. In Terry v. Ohio, the Court upheld a limited warrantless search made upon less than full probable cause “by balancing the need to search ... against the invasion which the search ... entails,” and thus a similar approach might be taken as to the kind of search here under discussion. Although there are sound reasons for not employing too generously a graduated model of the fourth amendment, the notion that searches by use of dogs trained to detect narcotics ... is a lesser intrusion subject to lesser Fourth Amendment restrictions is an appealing one. This is because this particular investigative technique is a distinct police practice which quite obviously is much less intrusive than other searches. It seems rather unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court would now reach such a conclusion. The Court has declared that the Fourth Amendment knows no search but a “full-blown search,” asserted that Terry provides no support for “any search whatever for anything but weapons,” and cautioned that the balancing process is appropriate only when warranted by “special needs *54 beyond the normal need of law enforcement.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.2(g), at 540–41 (4th ed. 2004) (quotation marks and footnotes omitted). [4] We agree with the above analyses and note that the parties in the present case have failed to point to a single case in which the United States Supreme Court has indicated that a search for evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, absent special needs beyond the normal need of law enforcement, may be based on anything other than probable cause. We assume that this is because, as noted 20 in the commentary above, all that Court’s precedent in this area indicates just the opposite. And that precedent, we recognize, applies with extra force where the sanctity of the home is concerned. Accordingly, we conclude that probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, is the proper evidentiary showing of wrongdoing that the government must make under the Fourth Amendment prior to conducting a dog “sniff test” at a private residence. IV. <strong>THE</strong> SUPPRESSION RULING [5] [6] [7] A magistrate’s determination that probable cause exists for issuance of a search warrant is entitled to great deference when a trial court is considering a motion to suppress. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (“[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... conclud [ing] that’ probable cause existed.”). And a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress in such a case is subject to the following standard of review: the reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by competent, substantial evidence but must review the trial court’s ultimate ruling independently, or de novo. State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297, 301 n. 7 (Fla.2001); see also Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598 (Fla.2001). In the present case, the trial court granted Jardines’ motion to suppress, ruling as follows: This cause having come before this Court on Defendant, Joelis Alex Jardines’, motion to suppress evidence seized from his house and this Court having reviewed the motion, the arguments of counsel, the court file and the records in this case, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises therein: A drug detector dog was used to support probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant of the Defendant’s house. The Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of drugs recovered from his house as a result of the search warrant. Pursuant to State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), this Court concludes that law enforcement’s use of a drug detector dog at the Defendant’s house door constituted an unreasonable and illegal search. However, the Court must also consider, absent the dog sniff information, whether any independent and lawfully obtained evidence establishes a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to support the issuance of a search warrant for the Defendant’s house.
The probable cause affidavit listed the information provided from a crime stoppers tip that marijuana was being grown at the residence as a basis to support probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. However, the crime stoppers tip was unverified and came from an unknown individual rather than a qualified confidential informant. Additionally, there was no evidence to suggest *55 the crime stoppers tip was corroborated by any evidence resulting from surveillance of the house. The only other evidence contained in the affidavit was that the window blinds were closed and the air conditioner unit was constantly running without recycling. This information, considered in its totality, simply does not suggest a fair probability of any broader criminal activity, such as the growing of marijuana in the Defendant’s house. Therefore, this Court concludes that no independent and lawfully obtained evidence establishes the probable cause necessary to support the issuance of a search warrant for the Defendant’s house. Ordered and adjudged that even with great deference afforded to the search warrant for the Defendant’s house in this case, the probable cause affidavit did not provide a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Therefore, the motion to suppress evidence seized from the Defendant’s house is granted. With respect to the fact that Detective Pedraja testified that he smelled the odor of live marijuana plants as he stood outside the front door of Jardines’ house, the trial court stated as follows in a footnote: “There was evidence that after the drug detection dog had alerted to the odor of a controlled substance, the officer also detected a smell of marijuana plants emanating from the front door. However, this information was only confirming what the detection dog had already revealed.” As explained above, a warrantless “sniff test” by a drug detection dog conducted at the front door of a private residence is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the trial court properly excluded the results of the “sniff test” from its review of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. The remaining evidence consisted of the following: the unverified “crime stoppers” tip, the closed window blinds, and the constantly running air conditioner. As for Detective Pedraja’s statement that he detected the odor of live marijuana plants as he stood outside the front door, we note that the trial court had the opportunity to observe Detective Pedraja’s testimony first-hand at the suppression hearing. Further, the district court in Rabb addressed an identical situation and concluded as follows: [B]ecause the chronology of the probable cause affidavit suggests that the dog alert to marijuana occurred prior to law enforcement’s detection of its odor, we cannot assume that law enforcement detected the odor of marijuana before the dog alerted.... As such, this is not a case in which a law enforcement officer used his senses to detect something within his plain smell; rather, a law enforcement officer used enhanced, animal senses to detect something inside a home that he might not otherwise have detected. Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1191. Based on our review of the present record, we conclude that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence and the trial court’s ultimate ruling is supported in the law. The district court erred in reversing the suppression ruling. V. CONCLUSION “We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’ That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (citation omitted) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371). Given the special status accorded a citizen’s home in Anglo–American jurisprudence, we hold that the warrantless “sniff test” that was conducted *56 at the front door of the residence in the present case was an unreasonable government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and violated the Fourth Amendment. We quash the decision in Jardines and approve the result in Rabb. It is so ordered. PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. LEWIS, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which PARIENTE and LABARGA, JJ., concur. POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., concurs. LEWIS, J., specially concurring. 21
Page 1 and 2: UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUM
Page 3 and 4: article that appeared in the period
Page 5 and 6: incarcerated children in the Distri
Page 7 and 8: Section 3: Writing Exercise Section
Page 9 and 10: Opinion PERRY, J. 73 So.3d 34 Supre
Page 11 and 12: activities, or statements that he e
Page 13 and 14: damaged package and notified federa
Page 15 and 16: B. “Sniff Test” at a Private Ho
Page 17 and 18: was standing in front of the door,
Page 19: justified on the basis of reasonabl
Page 23 and 24: unwavering expectation that there w
Page 25 and 26: otherwise prompt his dog to alert.
Page 27 and 28: (quoting State v. Morsman, 394 So.2
Page 29 and 30: society recognizes as reasonable. A
Page 31 and 32: obtained through the search is not
Page 33 and 34: without implicating the Fourth Amen
Page 35 and 36: [14] The Government contends, howev
Page 37 and 38: the President and Attorney General
Page 39 and 40: nuisance. IV Blackstone, Commentari
Page 41 and 42: The other ‘eroding’ case cited
Page 43 and 44: 11 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
Page 45 and 46: 103 S.Ct. 2317 Supreme Court of the
Page 47 and 48: accompanying remedy. Here, for exam
Page 49 and 50: northbound on an interstate frequen
Page 51 and 52: inapplicable to the decision to iss
Page 53 and 54: L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Justice BRENNAN
Page 55 and 56: case. As the Court points out, “I
Page 57 and 58: forcefully suggest that the exclusi
Page 59 and 60: S.Ct., at 3073-3074. (WHITE, J., di
Page 61 and 62: law-enforcement officers have recog
Page 63 and 64: government enforcement agent.” Id
Page 65 and 66: advance an important underlying sub
Page 67 and 68: Americans must be that the Court gi
Page 69 and 70: 3 In Spinelli, police officers obse
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The only reference to Hereford’s
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v. United States, supra; Sibron v.
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susceptible to the interpretation t
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8 Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U
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104 S.Ct. 1652 Supreme Court of the
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will not be betrayed.” United Sta
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*126 In sum, the federal agents did
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and that search has not left incrim
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privacy in the presence or absence
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surrounding the use of the techniqu
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1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960); Henry
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26 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463
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Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S
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how relatively warm—Kyllo was hea
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concurring). To be sure, the homeow
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homeowner would even care if anybod
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4 This view comports with that of a
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unless the dog sniff itself infring
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probable cause to stop the car for
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and, implicitly, the application of
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3 Kyllo was concerned with whether
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(500 grams and an unspecified amoun
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authority to allow police inside th
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AFFIRMED. We retain jurisdiction an
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that “[t]he right of the people t
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field” did not constitute a Fourt
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Government’s unrestrained power t
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y the government upon the privacy o
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own difficulties. It involves a deg
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search unless it is achieved by suc
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88 Or. L. Rev. 829 Oregon Law Revie
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hidden in open locations, such as f
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While the Place Court’s failure t
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location may be important in evalua
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III Framing the Canine Home-Sniff D
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seemingly making impermissible what
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possessions. Without minimizing the
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4. Even Surreptitious Canine Sniffs
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the sniff--to the satisfaction of a
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focused on the routineness of the a
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6 See People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 10
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27 See Robert C. Bird, An Examinati
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323 (Friedrich G. Barth et al. eds.
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pre-Place decisions issued by the U
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97 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.
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121 Id. at 37 n.4 (majority opinion
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147 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 148 See in
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171 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 2
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199 As Justice Souter explained,
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to school). 219 Cf. Katz & Golembie
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240 See Kyllo v. United States, 533
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263 In 2004, photographs emerged th
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285 Id. at 1362. The story of this
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306 But cf. Fitzgerald v. State, 86
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328 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448 (observi
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1 Search & Seizure § 2.3 (4th ed.)
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establish a right to privacy therei
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were locked and could only be opene
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The Wright rule also should not be
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to investigate. Noting that a metal
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active domestic use. It housed ten
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Ciraolo,191 involving aerial survei
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ackyard of the building was complet
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feet. The viewing from the helicopt
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cases as Ciraolo, Riley and Dow man
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premises were abandoned where all c
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22 Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863
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37.1 McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d
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(1983); State v. Eddy, 519 A.2d 113
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68 Dinkens v. State, 291 So.2d 122
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eceived no answer to knock on front
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870 (1987). In such a case, the fac
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“Second, the agents had a legal r
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131 United States v. Llanes, 398 F.
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167 The reference is to the “open
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however by fact lights were on insi
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properly crossed defendant’s land
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view”); State v. Merrill, 252 Neb
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the area within the ‘curtilage’
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is not to conclude that a search of
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265 Such analysis was challenged by
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