UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

171 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979).
172 See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209-10 (stressing that Terry was “narrowly defined”).
173 See id. at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
174 See id. at 210 (observing that “[b]ecause Terry involved an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause, this Court has
been careful to maintain its narrow scope”). In the only other Fourth Amendment case that uses the term sui generis as a discussion
point, the dissent used the label to argue for a more narrow interpretation of an earlier case than the one used by the plurality. See
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 597 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (protesting the Court’s relaxation of the probable cause
standard by its expansive interpretation of Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), and explaining that an expansive
reading was not proper because “Brinegar itself was very carefully limited to situations involving the arrest of those driving
moving vehicles, ... a problem that has typically been treated as sui generis by this Court” (internal citation omitted)).
175 See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 376 (1974) (disagreeing with the Third Circuit’s assumption
regarding the existence of a “public policy disfavoring compulsory arbitration of safety disputes,” which the Third Circuit had
viewed as “sui generis”); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1973) (disagreeing with the district court’s suggestion
that Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), “in accepting total deviations of 11.9% in a county reapportionment[,] was sui
generis”).
176 Cf. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209 n.11, 210 (requiring that the “intrusion must be carefully tailored to the rationale justifying it” and
observing that the Court had been “careful to maintain [Terry’s] narrow scope”).
177 Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), aff’d, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).
178 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
179 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
180 Fitzgerald, 837 A.2d at 1036 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38).
181 Id. (observing that “[e]ther is not contraband and its mere possession is entirely lawful.... Thus, Karo is factually distinct from both
Place and Jacobsen, where the procedure disclosed only the presence or absence of a contraband item” (quoting United States v.
Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (emphasis omitted) (omission in original)).
182 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing methyl benzoate as being present in insecticides, solvents, and perfumes).
184 United States v. Esparza, No. CR-07-14-S-BLW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66455, at *6 (D. Idaho Sept. 7, 2007) (finding a
suspicionless sniff of a vehicle by an explosives-detection dog was a “search” because the dog detected both contraband and
noncontraband items and because the facts did not raise any “special need” to sniff for explosives based on any imminent danger to
national security).
185 Id. at *6. Although not discussed in the case, the judge’s findings on this issue appear to be borne out by the scientific literature
concerning explosives-detection sniffs. Explosives-detection dogs “respond to the most-volatile compounds present in an
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