UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

Place’s holding as a “general categorization of canine sniffs as nonsearches”).
158 See Koon Chung Wu, 217 F. App’x at 246 (4th Cir.) (“Probable cause only requires a ‘fair probability’ that contraband will be
found in a certain place, ... and Cody’s positive alerts to the packages in both searches clearly established a fair probability that the
packages contained controlled substances, given his training and certification as a drug-detection dog” (internal citation omitted)).
159 See id. It is enough for some courts that the detection dog has been trained and certified, without any consideration of the dog’s
track record in the field. See United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (observing that “a search warrant based on
a drug dog’s alert is facially sufficient if the affidavit states the dog is trained and certified to detect drugs”).
160 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (observing that because the sniff revealed “only the presence or absence of
narcotics ... [t]his limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods”).
161 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (comparing field testing at issue to a canine sniff).
162 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (applying the canine sniff technique to luggage located in a public place).
163 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (applying the canine sniff technique to a lawfully stopped vehicle).
164 See id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting).
165 An analogous sort of confusion has been generated by the Latin phrase, “res ipsa loquitur.” Creekmore v. United States, 905 F.2d
1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Professor Prosser as stating that res ipsa loquitur “has been the source of so much trouble to
the courts that the use of the phrase itself has become a definite obstacle to any clear thought, and it might better be discarded
entirely” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ballard v. N. British Ry. Co., 1923 S.L.T. 219, 226 (Scot. 1923) (observing
that “[i]f this phrase had not been in Latin, no one would have called it a principle”).
166 Cf. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 138-39 (Minn. 2002) (Page, J., concurring) (“The U.S. Supreme Court dismisses the
intrusiveness of a dog search by labeling it ‘sui generis.’ ... This is convenient, but lacks any persuasive force given that the dog is
used to detect the very thing the officers would look for themselves if the Fourth Amendment did not limit their ability to do so.”
(citation omitted)).
167 See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 520 (2000) (Bureau of Indian Affairs); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573
(1984) (student financial aid programs); Robertson v. Rosenthal, 132 U.S. 460, 464 (1889) (steel hair pins).
168 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 47 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Santana, the defendant was seen standing in the
doorway of a house and retreated into the vestibule upon announcement of police. Id. at 40. Justice Marshall protested the Court’s
failure to consider the then-unresolved question of entry into a home to make a warrantless arrest, and instead, reached a decision
that “appears sui generis, [in that it is] useful only in arresting persons who are ‘as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and
touch’ ... as though in the unprotected outdoors.” Id. (citation omitted).
169 See supra note 157.
170 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also supra note 61.
164