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UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

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verbal notice of eviction.<br />

Nor do I believe that the non-payment of rent would, without more, make the defendant’s expectation of<br />

privacy unreasonable. … Moreover, in view of the mandatory and exclusive nature of [the aforementioned<br />

statute], the fact that the landlady reserved a right to re-enter on the failure to pay rent is immaterial. It is the<br />

better and more modern rule that a landlord entitled to possession by right of re-entry or otherwise must, on<br />

the refusal of the tenant to surrender the leased premises, resort to the remedy given by law to secure it. Any<br />

other rule is prejudicial to the public peace and order. …<br />

The government argues alternatively that property law should not be controlling in determining the scope of Fourth<br />

Amendment protections. It reasons that despite the invalidity of the notice of eviction the defendant could not have<br />

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in any part of the cottage when the rent, electricity and telephone bills were<br />

unpaid, and the landlady had informed him to be out of the premises by July 15. While persuasive in some respects, I<br />

cannot agree with the government’s contention. Although the Supreme Court has stated that it is “unnecessary and illadvised”<br />

to import property law concepts into the law surrounding Fourth Amendment rights, … it is obvious that this<br />

was intended to broaden the protection afforded against unreasonable searches and seizures, not narrow it.<br />

Furthermore, I am not prepared to hold that a defendant with a perfectly legal right to possession or occupancy of<br />

leased premises can be found to have an “unreasonable” expectation of privacy.13.1<br />

The reasoning in Botelho is generally sound. Although, as the court concedes, property law concepts are not necessarily<br />

controlling on Fourth Amendment issues, the justified expectation of privacy which one has in his place of residence<br />

certainly includes the expectation that the processes of the law rather than self-help will be utilized to terminate a tenant’s<br />

occupancy.14 (or, for that matter, an owner’s occupancy14.1).<br />

But the language in Botelho should not be taken to mean that no abandonment by the tenant is possible before the rental term<br />

expires, for this is not the case.<br />

The question of abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes does not turn on strict property concepts but on<br />

whether the accused has relinquished his interest in the property to the extent that he no longer has a reasonable<br />

expectation of privacy in the premises at the time of the search. … This principle has been applied to find<br />

abandonment where a tenant has left residential premises even though he may retain the lawful right to possession.15<br />

This means that if by all appearances the tenant has vacated the premises by the time the lease has ended, then Botelho is<br />

inapplicable, for there would be no occasion for the landlord to seek eviction in such circumstances.16 Thus, in United States<br />

v. Wilson,17 where the tenant was over two weeks overdue with his rent, the landlord learned from neighbors that the tenant<br />

had moved out, and the landlord went to the apartment in question and found the door standing open and the apartment in<br />

disarray, the court quite properly held that the tenant had abandoned the apartment. “The proper test for abandonment,” the<br />

court noted, “is not whether all formal property rights have been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a<br />

reasonable expectation of privacy in the articles alleged to be abandoned.”18<br />

It is a fair generalization that abandonment is more readily found as to rooms occupied on a transient basis. Thus, in Botelho<br />

the court cautioned: “Because of the transitory nature of most motel and hotel rental arrangements, non-payment of rent in<br />

that context might well require a different rule.” Illustrative is United States v. Parizo,19 where defendant rented a motel room<br />

for a single night, paid only for one night, and never informed the desk that he wished to stay on beyond that time. After<br />

check-out time the following day, the manager entered the room, saw a weapon, and summoned the police. In upholding the<br />

police entry of that room, the court reasoned:<br />

[W]hen the term of a guest’s occupancy of a room expires, the guest loses his exclusive right to privacy in the room.<br />

The manager of a motel then has the right to enter the room and may consent to a search of the room and the seizure<br />

of the items there found.20 …<br />

Appellant argues that, notwithstanding the expiration of the rental period, his intent to retain possession of the<br />

room remains the decisive factor and that we ordered the trial court to turn its decision upon findings bearing<br />

upon whether he had such an intent. However, intentional abandonment is relevant in different factual<br />

situations from the situation here. Had the search occurred during the rental period, appellant would have<br />

standing to object to an unauthorized search of the premises, unless prior to the search he had abandoned the<br />

premises, thereby forfeiting his right to occupancy and privacy. … Preliminary to the inquiry into intentional<br />

abandonment by the defendant, it must be shown that the defendant had sufficient control over the premises to<br />

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