UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

explosive, not necessarily to the explosive species itself.” See Sniffers, supra note 34, at 207 (explaining that when detecting
plastic explosives, the dog is not responding to the explosive component RDX, “which has a very low vapor pressure,” but instead
“to compounds like cyclohexanone, a solvent used in RDX production”).
186 Esparza, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66455, at *7.
187 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 621 (2006) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting));
see also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1951) (explaining that “Congress, in abrogating property rights in
[contraband drugs], merely intended to aid in their forfeiture and thereby prevent the spread of the traffic in drugs rather than to
abolish the exclusionary rule formulated by the courts in furtherance of the high purposes of the Fourth Amendment”).
188 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599 (finding “knock-and-announce” violation but refusing to suppress evidence seized in a search
pursuant to a search warrant because imposition of an exclusionary remedy was “unjustified”).
189 The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have concluded that a canine sniff of a schoolchild is a “search” that
required a showing of individualized suspicion. See B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1999);
Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982). But see Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980)
(finding close contact sniff was not a search). For a further discussion of the issue, United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 295 (5th
Cir. 2002) (permitting the suspicionless canine sniff of a person at an international border).
190 See Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d at 1266 (distinguishing between the canine sniff of a person and unattended luggage);
Horton, 690 F.2d at 478 (recognizing that “the interest in the integrity of one’s person, and the fourth amendment applies with its
fullest vigor against any intrusion on the human body”).
191 See Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d at 1266 (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis); Horton, 690 F.2d at 479 (observing
that “[i]ntentional close proximity sniffing of the person is offensive whether the sniffer be canine or human”).
192 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (emphasis added).
193 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (observing that determining whether contraband is present through a canine
sniff does not require opening the suitcase and implicitly assuming the accuracy of the technique); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that classification of the canine sniff technique as “sui generis” was based
on the limited intrusiveness of the sniff and its accuracy).
194 See Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1028 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (observing that “[t]he marijuana in the Place case, for
instance, might conceivably have been medically prescribed in a state such as California. The critical holding of the Court,
however, was not to be foreclosed by a mere ‘remote’ possibility.”), aff’d, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).
195 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added).
196 Id.
197 See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); see also supra note 100.
198 See supra notes 151-52, 155-56 and accompanying text.
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