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UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

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121 Id. at 37 n.4 (majority opinion) (“We say such measurement is a search; the dissent says it is not, because an inference is not a<br />

search. We took that to mean that, since the technologically enhanced emanations had to be the basis of inferences before anything<br />

inside the house could be known, the use of the emanations could not be a search.”).<br />

122 Id. at 34 (observing that “[w]e think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the<br />

home ... constitutes a search” (citation omitted)). For discussion of so-called “routine” technology, see infra notes 325-42 and<br />

accompanying text.<br />

123 Id. at 38 (observing that the thermal-imaging scan “might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes<br />

her daily sauna and bath-a detail that many would consider ‘intimate”’).<br />

124 Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s rule was “far too broad” because it would embrace “mechanical<br />

substitutes” for detection dogs, a view that would be inconsistent with Place’s conclusion that, because a canine sniff discloses<br />

only the presence of narcotics, it is not a “search”). The dissent pointed out the seeming inconsistency between Kyllo and Place’s<br />

holding and argued that this inconsistency must mean that “sense-enhancing equipment that identifies nothing but illegal activity is<br />

not a search either.” Id. at 47-48.<br />

125 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).<br />

126 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (“The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is<br />

categorically distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his<br />

car.”); see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.<br />

127 468 U.S. 705 (1984).<br />

128 “A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.”<br />

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).<br />

129 Karo, 468 U.S. at 708-10.<br />

130 Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. Although the government obtained a warrant authorizing the installment and monitoring of the beeper, the<br />

warrant was later invalidated, and the government did not appeal that ruling. Id. at 710. Therefore, the Court was asked to consider<br />

whether a warrant was required either to install or monitor the beeper. Id. at 711. On the installation issue, Justice White, speaking<br />

for five other Justices, including Chief Justice Burger, concluded that no warrant was required because the installation created no<br />

more than the “potential for an invasion of privacy.” Id. at 712. The presence of the beeper created “at most” a “technical trespass,”<br />

the existence of which would not be determinative on the Fourth Amendment question. Id.<br />

131 Id. at 715.<br />

132 Id. at 710.<br />

133 Id. at 715.<br />

134 Id. at 716.<br />

161

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