UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

22 Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863 (8th Cir.2002) (hotel eviction of unruly guests effective, so that subsequent police entry of their
room lawful, even though hotel “did not follow the procedures set out in South Dakota’s Forcible Entry and Detainer statute,” as
presumably “South Dakota would join many other jurisdictions in concluding that a hotel guest is not a tenant and is subject to
self-help eviction”); State v. Perkins, 588 N.W.2d 491 (Minn.1999) (where registration card defendant signed gave notice guest
would be “removed” if other guests were disturbed by a guest or his associates, and defendant aware of two earlier complaints and
warnings prior to the time manager asked him to leave, and of fact “the ‘party’ remained excessively loud,” defendant no longer
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room).
United States v. Molsbarger, 551 F.3d 809 (8th Cir.2009) (defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in hotel room after
manager ordered him and other occupants evicted for continued raucous behavior after prior warnings); Johnson v. State, 285 Ga.
571, 679 S.E.2d 340 (2009) (when police advised hotel manager defendant selling drugs from his room, and manager decided to
evict defendant and followed established protocol of calling room, then going to room and knocking when no answer to phone, and
then opening door when no answer to knock, defendant “lost his expectation of privacy in the hotel room when he was properly
evicted” in that manner).
Compare United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584 (9th Cir.2004) (where motel manager had taken “no affirmative steps to repossess
the room once she learned that it had been reserved with a stolen credit card,” but merely “asked the police to investigate the matter
* * * and would have evicted Bautista only if he later failed to provide either a satisfactory explanation or another form of
payment,” and “manager did not ask the police to evict Bautista,” defendant “was still a lawful occupant who retained a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the room”). The court distinguished People v. Satz, 61 Cal.App.4th 322, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 433 (1998),
where defendant used a stolen credit card to register and admitted she had no money to pay for the room, and the manager
specifically asked the police to assist her in evicting the defendant.
23 United States v. Mulder, 808 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.1987) (defendant secured payment of bill with American Express card and
indicated one-day stay, defendant returned seeking his bag 48 hours later and hotel had billed his card for another day; no
abandonment).
24 United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir.2001) (where hotel did not strictly enforce noon checkout and defendant indicated
he would stay until 12:30, abandonment occurred only after latter time).
Consider also United States v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228 (6th Cir.2011) (citing cases in support, court notes exceptions to general rule
where defendant “ask[ed] the hotel to extend his stay” and thus “receive[d] permission from the hotel for a later check-out time,”
or where “the hotel had [a] history of acquiescing in delayed departures by” defendant, not present in this case; also, while hotel,
upon discovery of drugs in defendant’s room allowed police to search the room before one-hour “traditional grace period” had
expired, since defendant “knew nothing about the one-hour grace period” hotel free to retract it in specific cases, as where drugs
seen).
25 Commonwealth v. Strickland, 457 Pa. 631, 326 A.2d 379 (1974).
But, additional facts may show abandonment in such circumstances. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 384 Mass. 572, 428
N.E.2d 289 (1981) (defendant, arrested Dec. 26, had paid rent through Jan. 1, but after arrest he told cotenants to move out and
remove his belongings; this “protection of one’s belongings is not inconsistent with an intent to abandon the premises,” and thus
police entry of empty apartment in mid-January proper).
26 State v. Rhodes, 337 So.2d 207 (La.1976) (where armed robber was arrested in his motel room and at time of arrest locker with his
personal effects was taken to station, it was not “unreasonable on the succeeding day to search the motel room, the occupancy of
which had been terminated by the prior day’s arrest and incarceration of defendant on a fugitive warrant”); Commonwealth v.
Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 783 N.E.2d 439 (2003) (day after motel room occupants arrested on murder warrants, manager asked police
to take items remaining in the room; “even if the motel manager let the police into the room slightly prior to the customary
checkout time,” effects were abandoned due to “the guests’ abandonment of the room … due to their arrest on murder charges,”
and fact that the following day “they had not returned to retrieve their belongings, made any arrangements to have someone else
retrieve their belongings, or taken any steps to extend the rental period”).
27 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960).
28 J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused—Pretrial Rights 314 (1972).
29 See § 5.5(b).
30 United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir.1970). See also United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.1992)
(defendant’s argument he had continuing expectation of privacy in motel room “because his arrest prevented him from returning to
the motel to renew the rental agreement” rejected, as he “cannot rely on his own misconduct to extend the period of his expectation
of privacy”); United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1987) (“when a defendant has been arrested, it was presumably his ‘own
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