UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
Justice BRENNAN’s dissent also suggests that “words
such as ‘practical,’ ‘nontechnical,’ and ‘common sense,’
as used in the Court’s opinion, are but code words for an
overly-permissive attitude towards police practices in
derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment.” Infra, p. 2359. An easy, but not a complete,
answer to this rather florid statement would be that
nothing we know about Justice **2334 Rutledge suggests
that he would have used the words he chose in Brinegar
in such a manner. More fundamentally, no one doubts that
“under our Constitution only measures consistent with the
Fourth Amendment may be employed by government to
cure [the horrors of drug trafficking],” post, at 2359; but
this agreement does not advance the inquiry as to which
measures are, and which measures are not, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment. “Fidelity” to the commands of
the Constitution suggests balanced judgment rather than
exhortation. The highest “fidelity” is achieved neither by
the judge who instinctively goes furthest in upholding
even the most bizarre claim of individual constitutional
rights, any more than it is achieved by a judge who
instinctively goes furthest in accepting the most restrictive
claims of governmental authorities. The task of this Court,
as of other courts, is to “hold the balance true,” and we
think we have done that in this case.
IV
[12] Our decisions applying the totality-of-thecircumstances
analysis outlined above have consistently
recognized the value of corroboration of details of an
informant’s tip by independent police work. In Jones v.
United States, supra, 362 U.S., at 269, 80 S.Ct., at 735,
we held that an affidavit relying on hearsay “is not to
*242 be deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented.”
We went on to say that even in making a warrantless
arrest an officer “may rely upon information received
through an informant, rather than upon his direct
observations, so long as the informant’s statement is
reasonably corroborated by other matters within the
officer’s knowledge.” Ibid. Likewise, we recognized the
probative value of corroborative efforts of police officials
in Aguilar -the source of the “two-pronged test”-by
observing that if the police had made some effort to
corroborate the informant’s report at issue, “an entirely
different case” would have been presented. Aguilar,
supra, 378 U.S., at 109, n. 1, 84 S.Ct., at 1511, n. 1.
Our decision in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79
S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), however, is the classic
case on the value of corroborative efforts of police
officials. There, an informant named Hereford reported
that Draper would arrive in Denver on a train from
Chicago on one of two days, and that he would be
carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied
a fairly detailed physical description of Draper, and
predicted that he would be wearing a light colored
raincoat, brown slacks and black shoes, and would be
walking “real fast.” Id., at 309, 79 S.Ct., at 331. Hereford
gave no indication of the basis for his information.12
On one of the stated dates police officers observed a man
matching this description exit a train arriving from
Chicago; his attire and luggage matched Hereford’s report
and he was *243 walking rapidly. We explained in
Draper that, by this point in his investigation, the
arresting officer “had personally verified every facet of
the information given him by Hereford except whether
petitioner had accomplished his mission and had the three
ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag. And surely,
with every other bit of Hereford’s information being thus
personally verified, [the officer] had ‘reasonable grounds’
to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford’s
information-that Draper would have the heroin with himwas
likewise true,” id., at 313, 79 S.Ct., at 333.
**2335 The showing of probable cause in the present case
was fully as compelling as that in Draper. Even standing
alone, the facts obtained through the independent
investigation of Mader and the DEA at least suggested
that the Gates were involved in drug trafficking. In
addition to being a popular vacation site, Florida is wellknown
as a source of narcotics and other illegal drugs.
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562, 100
S.Ct. 1870, 1881, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (POWELL, J.,
concurring); DEA, Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, The
Supply of Drugs to the U.S. Illicit Market From Foreign
and Domestic Sources 10 (1979). Lance Gates’ flight to
Palm Beach, his brief, overnight stay in a motel, and
apparent immediate return north to Chicago in the family
car, conveniently awaiting him in West Palm Beach, is as
suggestive of a pre-arranged drug run, as it is of an
ordinary vacation trip.
[13] [14] In addition, the magistrate could rely on the
anonymous letter, which had been corroborated in major
part by Mader’s efforts-just as had occurred in Draper.13
The Supreme Court *244 of Illinois reasoned that Draper
involved an informant who had given reliable information
on previous occasions, while the honesty and reliability of
the anonymous informant in this case were unknown to
the Bloomingdale police. While this distinction might be
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