UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

429 F.3d 575 (6th Cir.2005) (zoning administrator’s intrusion onto owner’s property to post civil infraction notice on front door of
house not a search); State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 13 A.3d 338 (2010) (“police officer has a right to enter a person’s curtilage or
legitimate business,” here “to serve a dog complaint”).
215 United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419 (8th Cir.2001) (where no one answered front door, but several cars parked on driveway and
it a summer evening, it proper for officer to walk through 10-foot opening in fence to backyard); United States v. Hammett, 236
F.3d 1054 (9th Cir.2001) (where no one answered front door, officer properly “circled the house with the intent of locating another
door”); United States v. Thomas, 120 F.3d 564 (5th Cir.1997) (police could take walkway to front door notwithstanding privacy
fence 3 feet from front door, as gate was open and there no door bell or knocker at the gate, so it “reasonable for the officers to
believe the front door was readily accessible to the general public”); United States v. James, 40 F.3d 850 (7th Cir.1994) (no search,
as officer “used a paved walkway along the side of the duplex leading to the rear side door,” “passage to the rear side door was not
impeded by a gate or fence,” and both “the paved walkway and the rear side door were accessible to the general public”); United
States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir.1992) (“walking to the back of the house” proper where police there to arrest
defendant and no answer at front door); United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757 (1st Cir.1990) (where front door “is inaccessible
there is nothing unlawful or unreasonable about going to the back of the house to look for another door”); People v. Bradley, 1
Cal.3d 80, 81 Cal.Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129 (1969) (discovery of marijuana plants no search, as “they were located a scant 20 feet
from defendant’s door to which presumably delivery men and others came”); People v. Shorty, 731 P.2d 679 (Colo.1987) (picking
up unsecured 2 ft. square piece of carpeting serving as door mat in front of basement apartment 7 steps below ground level no
search: “While the Supreme Court has held that the curtilage surrounding one’s home may be protected under the Fourth
Amendment, … the fact that a search occurs within the curtilage is not dispositive if the area’s public accessibility dispels any
reasonable expectation of privacy”); State v. Duda, 437 So.2d 794 (Fla.App.1983) (marijuana seen when officer went to rear door,
which proper for him to do, as he sent to investigate domestic disturbance and noise was heard at rear of house); State v. Lyons,
167 Ga.App. 747, 307 S.E.2d 285 (1983) (proper for officer investigating animal complaint to go to back door, from which he saw
marijuana plants, as he “unable to elicit a response at the front door of a residence reasonably believed to be occupied”); Warner v.
State, 773 N.E.2d 239 (Ind.2002) (police who received no answer at front door properly went to side door); State v. Nine, 315
So.2d 667 (La.1975) (officer on a sideyard “used as a passageway”); State v. Hubbel, 286 Mont. 200, 951 P.2d 971 (1997) (police
“well within their authority to proceed on the open walkway to the front door, where they saw yet more evidence in plain view”);
State v. Ramaekers, 257 Neb. 391, 597 N.W.2d 608 (1999) (officer “was lawfully on the front walk when he observed the ongoing
party” in the yard, and thus observation no intrusion on justified expectation of privacy); State v. Byrne, 149 Vt. 224, 542 A.2d 276
(1988) (officer took walkway to steps, where hair and blood observed); State v. Seagull, 26 Wash.App. 58, 613 P.2d 528 (1980),
aff’d, 95 Wash.2d 898, 632 P.2d 44 (1981) (no search for officer to take sideyard path from south porch to north porch upon
recalling being told occupants could not hear knocking on south porch; though officer “strayed slightly from the most absolutely
direct route between the two doors,” it “would be unreasonable to require, in every case, that police officers walk a tight rope while
on private property engaging in legitimate police business”).
United States v. Cousins, 455 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir.2006) (entry of sideyard area lawful, as it was expected path one would take on
paved walkway); People v. Terrazas-Urquidi, 172 P.3d 453 (Colo.2007) (police approach of backyard shed lawful where defendant
“using the shed as living quarters, and the front door contained a peephole and a dead bolt, suggesting that he expected casual
visitors”); Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.2006) (defendant living at 407 “had no cognizable expectation of privacy
because the backyard and sidewalk were shared with the residents of 405 and were not enclosed by a fence”); Clausell v. State, 326
Mont. 63, 106 P.3d 1175 (2005) (”officers were well within their authority to proceed on the open walkway to the front door,
where they saw evidence in plain view”).
216 United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d Cir.2002) (“we have found no Fourth Amendment violation based on a law enforcement
officer’s presence on an individual’s driveway where,” as here, “that officer was in pursuit of legitimate law enforcement
business”); United States v. Roberts, 747 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.1984) (police drove up shared unobstructed but private road and then
onto lawn of residence where cars parked, where no driveway as such); United States v. Ventling, 678 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.1982)
(driveway and yard adjacent to front door); McDonald v. State, __ Ark. __, 119 S.W.3d 41 (2003) (defendant “had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the driveway” and thus officer’s observation of VIN of vehicles while in driveway lawful); People v.
Edelbacher, 47 Cal.3d 983, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1 (1989) (driveway a “normal route used by visitors approaching the front
doors”); State v. Brighter, 60 Haw. 318, 589 P.2d 527 (1979); State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa 2004) (“the Fourth
Amendment did not prohibit the police from entering Lewis’s driveway” and thus observation of backyard activities from there
lawful); State v. Townsend, 571 A.2d 1206 (Me.1990) (in entering driveway “the police officer did not exceed the ‘implied
invitation’ to use it when he entered on legitimate police business”); State v. Keniston, 483 A.2d 1240 (Me.1984) (driveway in
front of house onto which car being followed parked); State v. Rand, 430 A.2d 808 (Me.1981) (“a common driveway of a multiple
dwelling”); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), 411 Mass. 157, 580 N.E.2d 1014 (1991) (examination of car in driveway no
search where “the driveway was the normal route by which to approach the front door”); People v. Taormina, 130 Mich.App. 73,
343 N.W.2d 236 (1983) (long and circular driveway without gates); Mitchell v. State, 792 So.2d 192 (Miss.2001) (officer “was in
an area of common use, near the driveway”); State v. Hubbel, 286 Mont. 200, 951 P.2d 971 (1997) (“police were thus well within
their authority when they drove into the driveway and parked in the general parking area where they observed evidence in plain
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