UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

240 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (requiring a search warrant to perform a thermal-imaging scan of a private
home and observing that “[t]he present case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a
home”).
241 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978); see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (emphasizing “the great
significance given to widely shared social expectations” in assessing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment in consent
cases).
242 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (observing that “[n]o single factor determines whether an individual
legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place should be free of government intrusion not authorized by
warrant”).
243 Id. at 178 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977)).
244 Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265 (1960)).
245 Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
246 See supra note 18 (discussing the U.S. Agricultural Department’s choice of beagles for detection purposes, in part, because they
are “nonaggressive” dogs).
247 See supra note 22 (discussing the ATF’s choice of Labrador retrievers, in part, because they “possess a gentle disposition” that
allows them to be used in crowds and around children).
248 See, e.g., Danelle Aboud, Dog Lends City Police a Paw, Detroit Free Press, Apr. 10, 2003, at 6 (observing that police dogs have
the “intimidation factor,” causing “‘[p]eople [to] react differently when they are stopped and see or hear the barking dog in the
back of the police car”’ (quoting Madison Heights Police Officer David Koehler)); Matt Lait, Role Over for Veteran Police Dog,
L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1991, at B3 (noting that although fear is “the handler’s first line of defense,” the genesis of that defense is that
“[t]he dogs are used more frequently for mere presence and intimidation and searching than they are for biting” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
249 See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (observing that a representative from the
security services firm hired to conduct campus sniffs testified that “Doberman pinschers and German shepherds were used
precisely because of the image maintained by the large dogs”). Those breeds of dog were selected “to maintain an image of
strength and ferocity,” id. at 482, although the security firm actually chose individual animals on the basis of their docility. Id.
250 See Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that during a roadblock for narcotics detection, “one person was
bitten by a dog”); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (noting that the thirteen-year-old female schoolchild,
who was strip searched to look for drugs after a drug-detection dog alerted, had been playing with her own dog, which was in heat,
prior to school); see also Matthew Pleasant, Police Dog Suspended During Attack Investigation, DailyComet.com, July 23, 2009,
http:// www.dailycomet.com/article/20090723/ARTICLES/907239926/1212Title=Police-dog-suspended-during-attackinvestigation
(reporting that the detection dog, a Belgian malinois, was taken out of service following allegations that the dog
escaped its kennel and attacked a woman and noting that one of the handler’s previous dogs, also a Belgian malinois, mauled a
seventy-seven-year-old bicyclist in 2007 after the dog was unleashed).
251 As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Caballes dissent, “[a] drug-detection dog is an intimidating animal.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 421 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 411 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Ginsburg in finding
that the introduction of a narcotics-detection dog into routine stop “can in fact be quite intrusive”).
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