UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

eceived no answer to knock on front door, but lights were on and dog heard barking in back, it reasonable for officer to walk to
the rear of the premises to see if defendant with dog); Miller v. State, 342 Ark. 213, 27 S.W.3d 427 (2000) (where police entered
curtilage during legitimate police investigation and knocked at front door but received no response, and then followed path around
unfenced property to back porch and knocked on rear door, and smelled marijuana from that vantage point, no search); State v.
Glines, 134 Or.App. 21, 894 P.2d 516 (1995) (officer properly went to side door to knock on door where, as here, “side entry is
about eight feet from the front wall of defendant’s house” and “adjacent to a common driveway that defendant shares with his
neighbor, is visible from the public sidewalk and is equipped with a doorbell”).
Also, what are “normal means” may depend somewhat on the circumstances. See United States v. Jackson, 585 F.2d 653 (4th
Cir.1978) (no search for officer to stand on chair under window and look in open window of house with “for rent” sign in front, as
it would be expected that prospective tenants “would inspect the house, look in the windows and view the surrounding premises in
order to determine what interest they might have in renting”).
Compare People v. Camacho, 23 Cal.4th 824, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 232, 3 P.3d 878 (2000), where police, responding to a complaint of a
loud party at defendant’s home, arrived there at 11 p.m. and heard no excessive noise. The officers walked into a side yard open
area covered with grass without any path or walkway and with no entrance to the home on that side, and looked in a large side
window, visible from the public street or sidewalk though the interior was not, and saw defendant with drugs. In holding this was a
search, the court emphasized that the officers had “proceeded directly into [defendant’s] darkened side yard” “without bothering to
knock on defendant’s front door,” though they arrived there “late in the evening and heard no such noise.” The court added that
“had the officers on their arrival at defendant’s house heard a raucous party, confirming the anonymous complaint that brought
them there in the first place, and had they then banged on the front door to no avail, their entry into the side yard in an attempt to
seek the source of the noise would likely have been justified.”
91 “To come within the implied invitation, a police officer must be on some police business. That does not necessarily mean that the
officer has to have probable cause or even an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The police business
may be administrative as well as investigative, and it may be action based on a suspicion that turns out to be without substantial
basis, provided the suspicion is held in good faith rather than as a pretext for an arbitrary search. Officer Sabin’s burglary
suspicion, based on recent reports of burglaries in the community and the fact that Cloutier’s basement was the only illuminated
room in the house, although tenuous, was held in good faith and was not pretextual.” State v. Cloutier, 544 A.2d 1277 (Me.1988).
92 United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.1972); State v. Deary, 753 So.2d 200 (La.2000) (officer was “conducting a legitimate
police investigation” when he came onto porch and knocked on side of house and looked through open door, as purpose was “to
question the occupants about the individual the officer had observed leave the premises in the company of another person known to
[the officer] from prior narcotics arrests”); State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d 736 (1975); State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817
(Tex.Crim.App.2002) (knocking on door of apartment to which theft suspect fled, at which defendant opened door, was only an
encounter and thus no reasonable suspicion required).
Jones v. State, 407 Md. 33, 962 A.2d 393 (2008).
93 State v. Poling, 207 W.Va. 299, 531 S.E.2d 678 (2000).
94 Hall v. State, 15 Md.App. 363, 290 A.2d 803 (1972); State v. White, 18 Or.App. 352, 525 P.2d 188 (1974).
95 United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir.2001) (no search for officer to look through gap in siding on house while
completing circling of house looking for another door after no one answered front door); United States v. Taylor, 90 F.3d 903 (4th
Cir.1996) (where defendant’s “front entrance was as open to the law enforcement officers as to any delivery person, guest, or other
member of the public,” it no search for officer on front porch to look through picture window); United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d
1219 (7th Cir.1994) (looking into house from driveway no search, as “no evidence that the public had limited access to Glenn’s
driveway”); United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757 (1st Cir.1990) (officer, properly at rear of premises seeking “an accessible main
floor entrance” then “looked up through the window simply to see if someone was at home”); People v. Willard, 238 Cal.App.2d
292, 47 Cal.Rptr. 734 (1965) (while on steps leading up to side door of house, officer observed illegal activity through screen
door); People v. McGahey, 179 Colo. 401, 500 P.2d 977 (1972) (house was located 100–150 yards off street, officer drove into
driveway to within 25 feet of house and then saw marijuana plants in picture window); State v. David, 269 Ga. 533, 501 S.E.2d
494 (1998) (where official accompanied landlord checking on possible unauthorized occupancy, and when landlord knocked on
door it was opened and officer then saw through the open door a marijuana pipe, this no search); State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d
526 (Iowa 1981) (no search to look through window of front door and then photograph what seen); State v. Brisban, 809 So.2d 923
(La.2002) (officer was “on the porch for a legitimate purpose when he looked through the screen door and saw what appeared to be
contraband”); State v. Cloutier, 544 A.2d 1277 (Me.1988) (no search where officer on path from side door looked in basement
window); State v. Gott, 456 S.W.2d 38 (Mo.1970) (while standing at front door, officer looked in window and saw defendant
rolling a marijuana cigarette); State v. Prevette, 43 N.C.App. 450, 259 S.E.2d 595 (1979) (while on front porch, officer saw
marijuana inside); State v. White, 18 Or.App. 352, 525 P.2d 188 (1974) (while on porch approaching front door, officer looked
through window and saw marijuana); State v. Rose, 128 Wash.2d 388, 909 P.2d 280 (1996) (looking through picture window from
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