Express agents placed the tube back into the box. But in the context of their previous examination of the package, their communication of what they had learned to the agent, and their offer to have the agent inspect it, that act surely could not create any privacy interest with respect to the package that would not otherwise exist. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3323, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983). Thus the precise character of the white powder’s visibility to the naked eye is far less significant than the facts that the container could no longer support any expectation of privacy, and that it was virtually certain that it contained nothing but contraband. Contrary to Justice WHITE’s suggestion, we do not “sanction[ ] warrantless searches of closed or covered containers or packages whenever probable cause exists as a result of a prior private search.” Post, at 1665. A container which can support a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, without a warrant. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809-812, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2164-2166, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426-427, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2845-2846, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-765, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2593-2594, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). 18 Both the Magistrate and the District Court found that the agents took custody of the package from Federal Express after they arrived. Although respondents had entrusted possession of the items to Federal Express, the decision by governmental authorities to exert dominion and control over the package for their own purposes clearly constituted a “seizure,” though not necessarily an unreasonable one. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970). Indeed, this is one thing on which the entire Court appeared to agree in Walter. 19 See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-823, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2171-2172, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428-428, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2846-2847, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (plurality opinion). 20 Respondents concede that the agents had probable cause to believe the package contained contraband. Therefore we need not decide whether the agents could have seized the package based on something less than probable cause. Some seizures can be justified by an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). 21 See Place, 462 U.S., at ----, 103 S.Ct., at 2641; Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S., at ----, 103 S.Ct., at 1541 (plurality opinion); id., at ----, 103 S.Ct., at 1547 (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354, 97 S.Ct. 619, 629, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (per curiam). 22 “Obviously, however, a ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy by definition means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as ‘legitimate.’ His presence, in the words of Jones [v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, 80 S.Ct. 725, 734, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) ], is ‘wrongful,’ his expectation of privacy is not one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ Katz v. United States, 389 U.S., at 361, 88 S.Ct., at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring). And it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-144, n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430- 431, n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). See also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (use of a beeper to track car’s movements infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (use of a pen register to record phone numbers dialed infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy). 23 See Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 Mich.L.Rev. 1229 (1983). Our discussion, of course, is confined to possession of contraband. It is not necessarily the case that the purely “private” possession of an article that cannot be distributed in commerce is itself illegitimate. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). 24 Respondents attempt to distinguish Place arguing that it involved no physical invasion of Place’s effects, unlike the conduct at issue here. However, as the quotation makes clear, the reason this did not intrude upon any legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about noncontraband items. That rationale is fully applicable here. 25 In Place, the Court held that while the initial seizure of luggage for the purpose of subjecting it to a “dog sniff” test was reasonable, the seizure became unreasonable because its length unduly intruded upon constitutionally protected interests. See id., 462 U.S., at - ---, 103 S.Ct., at 2645. 92
26 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3479, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734-1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). 27 In fact, respondents do not contend that the amount of material tested was large enough to make it possible for them to have detected its loss. The only description in the record of the amount of cocaine seized is that “[i]t was a trace amount.” App. 75. 28 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 2004, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973) (warrantless search and seizure limited to scraping suspect’s fingernails justified even when full search may not be). Cf. Place, 462 U.S., at ----, 103 S.Ct., at 2644-2645 (approving brief warrantless seizure of luggage for purposes of “sniff test” based on its minimal intrusiveness and reasonable belief that the luggage contained contraband); Van Leeuwen v. United States, 397 U.S. 249, 252-253, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 1032-1033, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970) (detention of package on reasonable suspicion was justified since detention infringed no “significant Fourth Amendment interest”). Of course, where more substantial invasions of constitutionally protected interests are involved, a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). We do not suggest, however, that any seizure of a small amount of material is necessarily reasonable. An agent’s arbitrary decision to take the “white powder” he finds in a neighbor’s sugar bowl, or his medicine cabinet, and subject it to a field test for cocaine, might well work an unreasonable seizure. End of Document 93
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UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUM
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article that appeared in the period
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incarcerated children in the Distri
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Section 3: Writing Exercise Section
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Opinion PERRY, J. 73 So.3d 34 Supre
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activities, or statements that he e
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damaged package and notified federa
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B. “Sniff Test” at a Private Ho
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was standing in front of the door,
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justified on the basis of reasonabl
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The probable cause affidavit listed
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unwavering expectation that there w
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otherwise prompt his dog to alert.
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(quoting State v. Morsman, 394 So.2
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society recognizes as reasonable. A
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obtained through the search is not
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without implicating the Fourth Amen
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[14] The Government contends, howev
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the President and Attorney General
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nuisance. IV Blackstone, Commentari
- Page 41 and 42: The other ‘eroding’ case cited
- Page 43 and 44: 11 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
- Page 45 and 46: 103 S.Ct. 2317 Supreme Court of the
- Page 47 and 48: accompanying remedy. Here, for exam
- Page 49 and 50: northbound on an interstate frequen
- Page 51 and 52: inapplicable to the decision to iss
- Page 53 and 54: L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Justice BRENNAN
- Page 55 and 56: case. As the Court points out, “I
- Page 57 and 58: forcefully suggest that the exclusi
- Page 59 and 60: S.Ct., at 3073-3074. (WHITE, J., di
- Page 61 and 62: law-enforcement officers have recog
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- Page 65 and 66: advance an important underlying sub
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- Page 69 and 70: 3 In Spinelli, police officers obse
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- Page 73 and 74: v. United States, supra; Sibron v.
- Page 75 and 76: susceptible to the interpretation t
- Page 77 and 78: 8 Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U
- Page 79 and 80: 104 S.Ct. 1652 Supreme Court of the
- Page 81 and 82: will not be betrayed.” United Sta
- Page 83 and 84: *126 In sum, the federal agents did
- Page 85 and 86: and that search has not left incrim
- Page 87 and 88: privacy in the presence or absence
- Page 89 and 90: surrounding the use of the techniqu
- Page 91: 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960); Henry
- Page 95 and 96: Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S
- Page 97 and 98: how relatively warm—Kyllo was hea
- Page 99 and 100: concurring). To be sure, the homeow
- Page 101 and 102: homeowner would even care if anybod
- Page 103 and 104: 4 This view comports with that of a
- Page 105 and 106: unless the dog sniff itself infring
- Page 107 and 108: probable cause to stop the car for
- Page 109 and 110: and, implicitly, the application of
- Page 111 and 112: 3 Kyllo was concerned with whether
- Page 113 and 114: (500 grams and an unspecified amoun
- Page 115 and 116: authority to allow police inside th
- Page 117 and 118: AFFIRMED. We retain jurisdiction an
- Page 119 and 120: that “[t]he right of the people t
- Page 121 and 122: field” did not constitute a Fourt
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- Page 125 and 126: y the government upon the privacy o
- Page 127 and 128: own difficulties. It involves a deg
- Page 129 and 130: search unless it is achieved by suc
- Page 131 and 132: 88 Or. L. Rev. 829 Oregon Law Revie
- Page 133 and 134: hidden in open locations, such as f
- Page 135 and 136: While the Place Court’s failure t
- Page 137 and 138: location may be important in evalua
- Page 139 and 140: III Framing the Canine Home-Sniff D
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possessions. Without minimizing the
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4. Even Surreptitious Canine Sniffs
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the sniff--to the satisfaction of a
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focused on the routineness of the a
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6 See People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 10
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27 See Robert C. Bird, An Examinati
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323 (Friedrich G. Barth et al. eds.
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pre-Place decisions issued by the U
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97 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.
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121 Id. at 37 n.4 (majority opinion
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147 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 148 See in
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171 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 2
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199 As Justice Souter explained,
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to school). 219 Cf. Katz & Golembie
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240 See Kyllo v. United States, 533
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263 In 2004, photographs emerged th
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285 Id. at 1362. The story of this
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306 But cf. Fitzgerald v. State, 86
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328 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448 (observi
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1 Search & Seizure § 2.3 (4th ed.)
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establish a right to privacy therei
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were locked and could only be opene
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The Wright rule also should not be
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to investigate. Noting that a metal
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active domestic use. It housed ten
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Ciraolo,191 involving aerial survei
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ackyard of the building was complet
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feet. The viewing from the helicopt
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cases as Ciraolo, Riley and Dow man
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premises were abandoned where all c
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22 Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863
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37.1 McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d
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(1983); State v. Eddy, 519 A.2d 113
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68 Dinkens v. State, 291 So.2d 122
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eceived no answer to knock on front
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870 (1987). In such a case, the fac
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“Second, the agents had a legal r
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131 United States v. Llanes, 398 F.
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167 The reference is to the “open
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however by fact lights were on insi
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properly crossed defendant’s land
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view”); State v. Merrill, 252 Neb
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the area within the ‘curtilage’
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is not to conclude that a search of
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265 Such analysis was challenged by