UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

view”); State v. Merrill, 252 Neb. 510, 563 N.W.2d 340 (1997) (given “the accessibility and visibility of the driveway from the
public roadway,” “any member of the public could have entered upon Merrill’s property in the same manner the officers did,” and
thus officers viewing of marihuana plants from driveway no search); State v. Johnston, 150 N.H. 448, 839 A.2d 830 (2004) (police
conduct proper, as “the defendant’s driveway was semi-private in nature, and the officers entered the property for a legitimate
purpose”); State v. Pinkham, 141 N.H. 188, 679 A.2d 589 (1996) (driveway “an access route to the house typically used by
neighbors, mail carriers, salespersons, and other visiting members of the public”); State v. Corbett, 15 Or.App. 470, 516 P.2d 487
(1973) (officer proceeded 150–200 feet up longer driveway through foliage; court stresses “the house number is marked at the
entry and there is no gate”); State v. Lodermeier, 481 N.W.2d 614 (S.D.1992) (officer examined exterior of garden tractor parked
in driveway lawful, as “officer with legitimate business may enter a driveway and, while there, may inspect objects in open view”);
State v. Pike, 143 Vt. 283, 465 A.2d 1348 (1983) (driveway “the normal route of access for anyone visiting the premises”); State v.
Maxfield, 125 Wash.2d 378, 886 P.2d 123 (1994) (no search, as officer “stayed on the pathway, the driveway or the immediate
access routes to the house and garage”).
United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57 (1st Cir.2007) (arrest made where officer properly positioned, in driveway next to garage,
especially considering that defendant ran a motor repair business from the garage and allowed customers to enter the driveway and
garage); United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir.2006) (proper that officer “proceeded down the driveway that provided
access to the house” and “went to the front door”); United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir.2004) (officers’ actions in
“walking up the driveway, and shining their flashlight into a car in the driveway * * * do not implicate the Fourth Amendment”);
Tryon v. State, 371 Ark. 25, 263 S.W.3d 475 (2007) (no search as to what police viewed on defendant’s premises from his
driveway); Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798 (Ind.2006) (police properly on driveway where it “wraps around the back of
[defendant’s] house” to the “back door, the main entryway for visitors”); State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 706 S.E.2d 324 (2011)
(lawful observation where police “could properly drive up the dirt driveway to get to the front door”); Robinson v.
Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 639 S.E.2d 217 (2007) (officer could properly drive up driveway, at least to point where it intersected
with path to front door).
217 Bickar v. Gray, 380 F.Supp. 804 (N.D.Ohio 1974) (“There were no signs warning the agents to stay away from the petitioner’s
porch and it was open for the use of tradesmen; thus it cannot be said that the agents were not entitled to go to the door and
knock”); United States v. Grogan, 293 F.Supp. 45 (M.D.Ala.1968) (officer on porch saw illegal liquor in car; this no search, as “it
would scarcely be reasonable to expect that no visitors with legitimate purposes would approach the house”); People v. Edelbacher,
47 Cal.3d 983, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1 (1989) (no search to observe and photograph shoe tracks on front porch); State v.
Detlefson, 335 So.2d 371 (Fla.App.1976) (“It cannot be said the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the front
porch of his home where, presumably, delivery men and others were free to observe”); State v. Tye, 276 Ga. 559, 580 S.E.2d 528
(2003) (where police came onto defendant’s porch to question him in connection with murder investigation, they “were in an
authorized location” when they saw defendant’s bloodstained clothing); Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981)
(where no answer at front door, proper to go to side door and enter screened porch there); State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 793 A.2d
619 (2002) (officer “did not go beyond the porch, thus restricting his movements to the places that any other visitor could be
expected to go”); State v. Kitchen, 572 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1997) (though police entered what court at one point refers to as an
“enclosed entryway,” court concludes it a “porch-type entrance,” as officer knocked on inside door flush with original exterior wall
of the house after entering a “vestibule-like addition” with an unlocked screen door, and police entry no search because that space
“was impliedly open to at least some access by the public”); State v. Rose, 128 Wash.2d 388, 909 P.2d 280 (1996).
Cf. State v. Wilbourn, 364 So.2d 995 (La.1978) (proper for police to view evidence of hit-run accident on exterior of car parked in
carport, where carport must be entered by anyone “knocking at the sidedoor to find out if someone was home or to deliver or sell
something”).
Compare State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460 (Iowa 2001) (“The porch of Reinier’s house was just like any other portion of her
house. It had glass-encased windows covered with blinds. The entrance to the porch had a solid wood door with a deadbolt lock
and a screen door. Reinier stored personal belongings in the porch and kept the wood door locked at night. These circumstances
reveal Reinier maintained an expectation of privacy which society clearly recognizes as reasonable. Thus, entry into the area by
police constituted a search”).
United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251 (2d Cir.2006) (while porch was on side of building, it “was in fact a primary entrance
visible to and used by the public,” as manifested by fact “steps led up to the porch” and there a doorbell “suggest[ing] to visitors
that they could visit the home from the porch”); United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274 (6th Cir.2005) (encounter with defendant
at back deck of residence proper, for “the rear deck was adjacent to the driveway and served as the primary entrance to Hopper’s
home”).
218 But consider Brown v. State, 392 So.2d 280 (Fla.App.1980), where defendant was seen on his back porch by police who had
driven past the gate and all the way up the driveway, and the court concluded this was a search because the events occurred at 1:45
a.m., a time when visitors would not ordinarily call, and thus defendant was entitled to expect privacy within his enclosed yard at
that time.
219 United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.1981) (it a search for officers to climb fence and watch from honeysuckle patch
225