UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF - UDC Law Review

conduct that prevented his return to the [h]otel’ ”); United States v. Ramirez, 810 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.1987) (makes no difference
abandonment involuntary because of defendant’s arrest); United States v. Lee, 700 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.1983) (following Croft on
similar facts); Gardner v. State, 296 Ark. 41, 754 S.W.2d 518 (1988) (after defendant’s arrest motel employees took possession of
his effects per standard procedures and later turned purse over to police on their request; held, notwithstanding fact defendant’s
“inability to return to his room was not of his own choosing,” no “expectation of privacy in the purse after employees of the Inn
had removed it from Gardner’s former room and had taken it into their possession”); Myers v. State, 454 N.E.2d 861 (Ind.1983)
(after defendant’s arrest his two-day rental of motel room expired, at which point “he no longer had an expectation of privacy” in
it); Obermeyer v. State, 97 Nev. 158, 625 P.2d 95 (1981) (defendant arrested, hotel keys found on his person, so 2 days later officer
went to hotel and searched room with hotel personnel; proper, as defendant’s rent past due, notwithstanding fact defendant’s
effects still in the room).
31 R. Anderson, The Hotelman’s Basic Law § 16:9 (1965).
32 The leading case in point is Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 533 Pa. 167, 620 A.2d 1115 (1993), where the court concluded that
while after the rental period on a motel room has run no justified expectation of privacy “exists in the room or in any item in plain
view to anyone readying the room after checkout time for the next occupant,” “a motel guest has a reasonable expectation of
privacy to the contents of discrete and concealed personal effects in a motel room after checkout time.
“While the motel personnel must have access to and use of the motel room after the rental period expires, this does not extend to
items of personal luggage or other containers which do not reveal the nature of their contents. In this case, the motel management
had no economic or other justification to examine the contents of the closed personal possessions of its guests, especially where
only a relatively short period of time had elapsed since checkout time, appellee’s car remained parked at the motel, the room
remained locked, and petitioner returned shortly thereafter to register for a second night. Therefore, the search of the jacket [found
in the closet with a protective bag over it] should have been accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable
cause.”
See also United States v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir.1994) (at end of 5-month lease of condo unit, when defendant to check
out by 10 a.m. and another renter due later that day, cleaners entered that afternoon and summoned police, who looked inside
locked briefcase; in holding lower court erred in ruling briefcase abandoned, court stresses testimony that general practice when
cleaner finds effects was “to pack the personal belongings and hold them until the owner of the items-the departing lessee-could be
located”); United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.1992) (“Although the assistant manager lacked the authority to
consent to a search of Huffhines belongings left in the room, it was not clearly erroneous for the court to find that the assistant
manager’s consent to a search of the room included the area under the mattress where the gun was found”).
See also Johnson v. State, 285 Ga. 571, 679 S.E.2d 340 (2009) (eviction from hotel room, resulting in “loss of the expectation of
privacy in the room does not mean that [defendant] had lost his expectation of privacy with regard to personal items in the room,”
but police check on bulge in jacket justified by safety concerns).
33 United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1987).
34 E.g., State v. Felger, 19 Or.App. 39, 526 P.2d 611 (1974); State v. Disbrow, 266 N.W.2d 246 (S.D.1978) (abandonment re May 1
inspection where all personal effects in defendant’s apartment destroyed in April 25 fire, defendant never paid rent for April or
May, and after living with friend for short time defendant moved to another state).
Even if the tenant is deemed to have abandoned the burned premises, it does not inevitably follow that this would cause his
“privacy interest to shift automatically to [the owner] like some reversionary property interest.” State v. Smith, 656 S.W.2d 882
(Tenn.Crim.App.1983) (no expectation of privacy in landlord, as he also made no efforts to secure the premises).
35 E.g., People v. Bailey, 42 Mich.App. 359, 202 N.W.2d 557 (1972).
The condition of the premises may have some bearing, however, upon the question of whether an arson investigation into the
premises would be a reasonable search. See § 10.4.
36 Swan v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.App.3d 392, 87 Cal.Rptr. 280 (1970). See also State v. Zindros, 189 Conn. 228, 456 A.2d 288
(1983) (no abandonment where tenant came to premises after fire several times and on leaving each time secured the premises).
37 People v. Dorney, 17 Ill.App.3d 785, 308 N.E.2d 646 (1974): “On the record before this court we cannot say that the trial court’s
finding of non-abandonment was clearly erroneous. Although the trailer was rendered uninhabitable by the fire, defendant returned
on at least one occasion to pick up salvageable items of personal property. When the defendant returned a second time for similar
reasons, the trailer had been removed by the authorities without his permission and without notice to defendant of its new location.
These facts certainly do not warrant the inference that defendant intended to abandon his trailer.”
See also State v. Hansen, 286 N.W.2d 163 (Iowa 1979) (rejecting the “habitability” standard as inconsistent with Katz and finding
a search had occurred of house not damaged extensively where defendant, temporarily housed with relatives, still had much
personal property therein).
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