Contents - SPAD

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Whilst a regime change from the current arrangements to an initial Gross Cost Contracting regime would still enable involvement from both Prasarana and RapidKL, the relationship between the two organisations would require change in order to ensure transparency in service delivery together with processes to ensure RapidKL competed on fair terms with private operators. It is suggested that going forward that the service delivery side, currently provided by RapidKL could be devolved from Prasarana, and that the two organisations could operate separately. Infrastructure assets owned by Prasarana such as interchanges and bus garages could be made available to operators who secured contracts – if appropriate on a shared basis with two or more operators. These operators could pay pre-determined charges to Prasarana or simply be granted equal status access according to management and capacity regulations that related to the planned rail and particularly bus network and to a properly assessed measure of the capacity of facilities. The role of Prasarana could therefore be to plan, monitor and enforce the future delivery of the entire network, along with other public sector entities such as local authorities. If this approach were adopted, they would move, in relation to bus services, to an independent, impartial role between public and private provision of bus services. RapidKL would operate as a standalone bus operator, providing services to the public sector through the contracting regime in line with the existing commercial providers. This would require that RapidKL accounted for the costs of all its operations and assets. It would also require that there was a transparency over the provision of any operating losses and in due course subsidy should only be available on the basis of success in tendering for routes requiring subsidy. To ensure that there was no internal cross-subsidy, clear and fair processes for pricing of tenders would need to be introduced. These would be major changes to the practices and basis for RapidKL‟s operations. Recognising this, it is likely that there would need to be a phased move to this semicommercial status and enable improved efficiency in the organisation. Setting aside issues of management, funding and ownership it should be recognised that the brand “RapidKL” has started the process of presenting the LPT network as more cohesive. Whether or not there is a change to the status or role of Prasarana or RapidKL there appears to be a case for retaining and developing the brand “RapidKL” as the network for LPT in GKL/KV. This need not mean that the brand remains “owned” by Prasarana. Instead operators may compete for contracts to provide planned services under the RapidKL network identity. This model is commonplace throughout the world, for example in London and many other European cities and regions, as well as in the less regulated areas of the UK outside London. Page 83
5.8) Transition In identifying that the most appropriate model going forward within the short to medium term is that of Gross Cost Contracting regime, it is important to consider how it is achieved. Initially, the Government will need to ensure that they have the correct mechanisms in place to deliver such a regime, and that the law enables such a model to prosper. These mechanisms therefore centre upon on a number of factors; such as: Legal ability to implement such a model; Ability to manage the process of implementing the regime; Knowledge and staff technical capability to define the network as per the government‟s requirements – as noted above, this could usefully draw upon Prasarana‟s existing expertise; Ability to deal with the giving and receiving of operator payments and „fines‟ It is also important that the government is fundamentally aware that such a regime is likely to involve financial intervention at least in the early period to ensure that services are provided as per their exacting requirements. In terms of the operational aspects for delivery, the network would then be tendered by the public sector. The public sector would, through an open and transparent tendering process, stipulate: Full services specifications (including timetabling, headways & frequencies, routings, integration with other services, service numbers, origins, intermediate points and destinations, etc) Full Service standards (including what is required in terms of publicity and information, vehicle types and qualities, driver standards, etc) Fares (including levels, integrated ticketing, smartcard ticketing, etc) The Gross Cost Model, in essence, affords the government and the wider public sector the ability to stipulate how they would like the entire network to operate. The contract would be expected to build in „incentives‟ to encourage and reward good performance and fines to penalise poor performance. Owing to the significant „knowledge gaps‟ on how the bus network works or performs, part of the initial phases would be to generate data to support more robust procedures and potential alternative future regimes such as Net Cost Contracting. In order to generate this data, it is important to ensure than an effective Performance Monitoring Regime (PMR) is implemented to ensure that data flows freely between the public and private sector. A PMR would ensure that the operator returns full and complete data – specified by the public sector - on a frequent basis. Many contracting arrangements require a daily report to be submitted, including a „nil defects‟ report for those days when the entire service operated to specification. This information requirement will enable the public sector to develop Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the provision of services and for these KPIs to be monitored effectively. This will both create the level of understanding to manage and raise operator performance and to establish a more robust basis for future tendering. Page 84
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Contents 1. Background ............
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6.2) Phasing- Developing the Networ
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KLCP KLIA KLIFD KPI KTM KTMB LA LCC
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Background 1 Page 1
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1.2) Greater KL/Klang Valley region
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the collation of existing data sour
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future of bus services. Chapter 4 l
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2. Assessment of Current Conditions
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2.3) Existing Bus Services The curr
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Indicator Number of Routes Fares Av
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should embrace physical and electro
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Figure 2.5: White Space Definition
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Table 2.3: Existing Fare Structure
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2.8) Journey Times NKRA have set up
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Table 2.5: Interchange Facilities i
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Table 2.6: Bus Stop Classifications
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Closed Circuit Television (CCTV); S
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competing on heavily concentrated r
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Stakeholder‟s plans and proposals
Page 40 and 41: The shortfalls in planning, monitor
Page 42 and 43: 3. Looking to the Future of Bus 3.1
Page 44 and 45: The population forecasts assume a c
Page 46 and 47: Figure 3.3: Forecast Travel Demands
Page 48 and 49: Figure 3.6: Modelled Perceived Trav
Page 50 and 51: 3.6) Modes LPT covers a wide range
Page 52 and 53: 3.7) Corridor Hierarchy The approac
Page 54 and 55: connectivity. Bus services will als
Page 56 and 57: 3.12) Success Factors for Developin
Page 58 and 59: Developing the Future Bus Network 4
Page 60 and 61: Figure 4.1: Bus within the Hierarch
Page 62 and 63: Figure 4.2: Hierarchy and Scope of
Page 64 and 65: 4.5) Bus Rapid Transit A series of
Page 66 and 67: Dedicated Bus way - this option is
Page 68 and 69: Third stage will be introduction or
Page 70 and 71: Figure 4.8: Conceptual Network Chan
Page 72 and 73: 4.7) Other Initiatives 4.7.1) Impro
Page 74 and 75: 4.7.4) Improving Accessibility - Ne
Page 76 and 77: 4.7.7) Improving Bus Stop infrastru
Page 78 and 79: The Transition of the Bus Network 5
Page 80 and 81: trialling and refining these proces
Page 82 and 83: Table 5.1: Key LPT Policies and Obj
Page 84 and 85: Figure 5.2: Bus Industry Models of
Page 86 and 87: them to support socially necessary
Page 88 and 89: Thus the principal benefit of Net C
Page 92 and 93: Whilst the existing regulatory regi
Page 94 and 95: Phasing and Delivery 6 Page 87
Page 96 and 97: 6.1.1) New Licence Issue Section 2.
Page 98 and 99: operational. This early phase shoul
Page 100 and 101: Figure 6.1: Regulatory Timeline 6.2
Page 102 and 103: Table 6.2: Summary of Benefits Obje
Page 104 and 105: 7. Summary SPAD has developed the N
Page 106 and 107: The range of primary and secondary
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Contents - SPAD

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