ties that bind - sep 11

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However, the unrelenting demands of the Great War soon made the ‘martial races’ policy unsustainable and the social base of recruits was consequently expanded to include Kumaonis, Coorgs, Hill Brahmins, Gaurs and Mahars – the Kumaonis and Mahars gaining themselves an esteemed place in the Indian Army after 1918, having been previously rather overlooked by ‘martial races’ recruitment policies. Groups previously considered ‘incapable’ of being good soldiers were now drafted in to support the war effort. ‘Those classes who formerly never entered the Army are now being hustled into doing so’, a Muslim from Lyallpur wrote to a sepoy in the trenches. 30 This shift in recruitment policy also lightened the burden placed upon those rural communities from which ‘martial fighters’ were traditionally drawn. Coming from only a small number of villages and tribes, it was not unheard of for all the men of a particular village to supply almost all the recruits for a single regiment. 31 This was acknowledged by the Indian mail censor’s office, which suggested maintaining morale on the home front by distributing newspapers there about events in France. Writing to the India Office in London, a Captain Howell reported: It is well known that certain regiments are almost entirely recruited from certain districts. In fact, the majority of regiments are more or less closely connected with one or two particular districts. I do not see that there would be any great difficulty about supplying the newspapers in those districts with the casualty lists of the local regiments and other news about the share of those regiments in the war. 32 Territorially biased recruitment of this kind, reminiscent of the formation of ‘Pals’ regiments, furthered the risk of entire generations being collectively lost and devastating specific communities. Yet, despite the rules being relaxed to allow for the recruitment of ‘non-martial races’, the first half of the war effort continued to be furnished principally by men from traditional sources, as illustrated in Table 2 (see p.14). Indeed, by the end of the war the Punjab had supplied around 360,000 men alone, of which just under half were Muslim. 33 The scale of the conflict was unprecedented. Peacetime recruitment only required around 15,000 men annually – about 75 per regiment. But the remorseless toll of the killing fields in Flanders and Mesopotamia ensured those annual figures were now insufficient to meet even the monthly demand for men. To sustain the scale of numbers needed for the Indian Expeditionary Forces in France and Mesopotamia, changes to the recruitment procedure were also needed to ensure a fresh and constant supply of recruits. The demands of the Great War meant that a more centralised recruitment strategy became unavoidable and the Indian Army was forced to abandon its existing policy of allowing individual regiments to recruit sepoys directly in accordance with their own needs. This had been a long favoured approach because it ensured that recruits felt a particular sense of attachment to their regiment, something reflected in the two oaths of allegiance they swore: the first to the King, and the second to their regiment. The regimental oath was often the most meaningful part of a soldier’s pledge because, although notions of loyalty to the King ran deep, he remained a distant figure to many Indians with whom they could not easily identify. 34 Their regiment was, by contrast, comprised of their own countrymen and formed an integral part of their daily routine. Muslims in the World Wars 30 Ibid, p.38 31 Indian Mail Censor’s Office, Boulogne, 27th November 1915, Censor of Indian Mails, 1914- 1918, L/MIL/5/828/64, IOR, BL, London 32 Indian Mail Censor’s Office, Boulogne, 27th November 1915, Censor of Indian Mails, 1914- 1918, L/MIL/5/828/64, IOR, BL London 33 Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj p.39 34 T. A. Heathcote, The Indian Army: The Garrison of British Imperial India 1822-1922 (London, 1974) policyexchange.org.uk | 15
Ties that Bind 16 | policyexchange.org.uk Copyright: Imperial War Museum (IWM_PST_012579): Recruitment Shortages of available manpower were accentuated by the fact that at the outbreak of war, the total reserve strength of the Indian Army was just 30,000. Many of these men were unpaid volunteers and auxiliary civilian staff, including chefs and cleaners unfit for battle. Lieutenant General (later Sir) Havelock Hudson, Adjutant General of the Indian Army, responded to this potential crisis by establishing a Central Recruiting Directorate in August 1914 which radically overhauled the way soldiers were recruited. To coordinate a coherent national strategy, the Central Directorate ensured that each province was given a Recruiting Officer, aided by an Assistant Recruiting Officer and Assistant-Assistant Recruiting Officer. While they focused on urban recruitment, ‘Special Recruiters’ were despatched to rural villages – traditionally home to the ‘martial races’ – where permanent recruitment offices could not be established. But this task proved to be
Page 1 and 2: Ties that Bind How the story of Bri
Page 3 and 4: 2 | policyexchange.org.uk About the
Page 5 and 6: 4 | policyexchange.org.uk Appendix
Page 7 and 8: 6 | policyexchange.org.uk Executive
Page 9 and 10: Ties that Bind 3 See: http://www.cp
Page 11 and 12: Ties that Bind 17 Stolen Valour: Ho
Page 13 and 14: Ties that Bind 12 | policyexchange.
Page 15: Ties that Bind 27 Omissi, The Sepoy
Page 19 and 20: Ties that Bind 41 Ibid. p.28 42 Ibi
Page 21 and 22: Ties that Bind 47 Geoffrey Bennet,
Page 23 and 24: Ties that Bind 58 Ibid. Also see, M
Page 25 and 26: Ties that Bind 64 Punjabi Musalman
Page 27 and 28: Ties that Bind 74 Omissi, Sepoy and
Page 29 and 30: Ties that Bind 84 The Comrade, 7 No
Page 31 and 32: Ties that Bind 90 Ibid, p.5 91 Ibid
Page 33 and 34: Ties that Bind 107 Ibid. 108 Supple
Page 35 and 36: Ties that Bind 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid.
Page 37 and 38: Ties that Bind 146 Ibid., p.90 147
Page 39 and 40: Ties that Bind 159 Punjabi Mahomeda
Page 41 and 42: Ties that Bind 166 Ibid., p.129 167
Page 43 and 44: Ties that Bind 181 CAB/24/54, Natio
Page 45 and 46: Ties that Bind 187 India’s contri
Page 47 and 48: Ties that Bind 191 Judith Brown, Mo
Page 51 and 52: Ties that Bind 211 Ibid, p.55 212 I
Page 53 and 54: Ties that Bind 224 Omissi, Sepoy an
Page 55 and 56: Ties that Bind 238 Ibid, pp.70-72 2
Page 59 and 60: Ties that Bind 265 CAB/66/58/25, Na
Page 61 and 62: 270 The Gallup Coexist Index 2009:
Page 63 and 64: Ties that Bind 278 Note that Al-Muh
Page 65 and 66: Ties that Bind 286 http://www.times
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Ties that Bind 299 Hans Wehr, A Dic
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Ties that Bind 308 http://www.dohad
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Ties that Bind 315 http://web.archi
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Ties that Bind 329 http://www.indep
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Ties that Bind 340 Keynote Address
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Ties that Bind 350 http://www.publi
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Ties that Bind 364 Humayun Ansari,
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Ties that Bind 390 Ibid, p. 49. 391
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Ties that Bind 406 Policy Exchange
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Ties that Bind 419 http://www.musli
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Ties that Bind 435 Ibid., p.606 436
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439 London Gazette, 3 July 1945, ht
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96 | policyexchange.org.uk Bibliogr
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Ties that Bind 98 | policyexchange.
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