ties that bind - sep 11

clear that we are fighting a new battle in an old war? It is the same struggle against the same
enemies. The facts are the same, only the names and faces have changed. 160
Yet discipline and insubordination was never considered too problematic among
the Indian Corps, many of whom would have regarded it as deeply dishonourable
to rebel against direct orders. A legal framework was in place, detailed in the
Manual of Indian Military Law – which was adapted for Indian needs from basic
British military law. 161 It created a raft of potential liabilities including death,
imprisonment, flogging, transportation, and dismissal – though actual
punishments tended to be relatively light and issued only sparingly. The full
weight of the military law was, however, invoked when three trans-frontier
Pathan regiments deserted their posts in Mesopotamia following Turkey’s entry
into the war in 1914. 162 These soldiers were not just motivated by German and
Ottoman propaganda calling for rebellion, but were also influenced by letters
from relatives in India encouraging sedition. While these letters were untypical of
the views held by the majority of Indian Muslims, an anonymous letter sent to
Muslims in the 6th Cavalry cautioned, ‘All the Muslims who have died in this war
fighting for the British will spend an eternity in hell. Kill the English whenever
you get a chance and join the enemy. If you do not win in this world, you will at
all events gain in paradise...join the enemy and you will expel the kafir from your
native land. The flag of Islam is ready and will shortly be seen waving’. 163
This kind of appeal was relatively rare, but is significant because it
foreshadowed the kind of Islamist intemperance and separatism regularly
displayed today. By the end of 1915, government apprehension about the Pathans
had meant it had stopped recruiting them over official fears they could not be
trusted. 164 After all, the Pathans mainly hailed from the North-West Frontier
Province over which the Raj only had tenuous control. The region was then – as
it is now – largely insular and inward looking, with its leaders attaching little
importance to engaging with the government of India. This made the relationship
between the Raj and NWFP Muslims weaker than it was, for example, in the lives
of Muslims from the Punjab.
Yet the nature of Pathan dissent was highly significant. The troops did not
object to fighting Turkish troops and other Muslims because of a politicised
‘ummah consciousness’, but rather they were concerned about the proximity of
the conflict to revered shrines. The majority of those soldiers continued to serve
when moved to different theatres of war away from sensitive areas. Notably, of
those who refused to fight, very few actually crossed over to the other side and
took up arms against Britain.
Indeed, Indian Muslims had displayed more reservations when fighting against
the Afghans than when they were asked to confront Ottoman troops – whose
ostensible aim was to defend the Caliphate. They often shared a common ethnicity
and history with the Afghans. Indeed, support in India for the Afghan Amir was
arguably higher than it was for the Turkish Sultan-Caliph. During the Second
Afghan War of 1878-80, even Lord Roberts recalled that ‘the Mohammedan
element in my force gave me considerable anxiety’. 165 This strain on their loyalties
had been so severe that the government refused to use them during the
subsequent Frontier expedition of 1897-98. Similarly, when the Afghan Amir was
drawn into a minor skirmish with British troops in May 1919, nearly 1200
Muslims in the World Wars
160 ‘A message to the people of
Pakistan by Ayman Zawahiri’ (As-
Sahab Media, downloaded from
restricted al-Qaeda forum –
Ansarnet). Also see,
http://terrorism.foreignpolicyblog
s.com/2008/08/30/al-qaedassecond-in-command-speaks-out-o
n-pakistan/
161 British Army: Manual of
Military Law 1914,
L/MIL/17/1/2110, IOR, BL,
London
162 Nominal rolls of Indian
prisoners of war suspected of
having deserted to the enemy or
of having given information to, or
otherwise assisted the enemy
after capture, L/MIL/17/5/2403,
IOR, BL, London
163 Anonymous letter to the
Risaldar-Major of the 6th Cavalry,
March 1916 (279) in David
Omissi, Indian voices of the Great
War: soldiers' letters, 1914-18
(New York, 1999)
164 Ibid, p.121
165 Omissi, Sepoy and the Raj,
p.129
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