ties that bind - sep 11

Ties that Bind
191 Judith Brown, Modern India:
the origins of an Asian democracy
(Oxford, 1992) p.324
46 | policyexchange.org.uk
difficult than the government had expected – and worried also by Japanese military
success – a committee was despatched from Whitehall to the subcontinent in the
hope of enlisting greater Indian support for the war effort. Led by Sir Stafford Cripps,
historians are divided over the precise terms of reference his mission was afforded
and whether he was actually authorised to promise India Dominion status in return
for its support.
Such promises were not new. Many Congress leaders were wary and Gandhi
reponded by offering the government an ultimatum – immediate-self rule in
return for their support. When the government refused, Gandhi launched the
Quit India movement, a renewed campaign of national civil disobedience.
Meanwhile the Japanese Imperial Army had just triumphed in Singapore and
was busy amassing troops on the Burmese border. The demise of the Raj seemed
imminent, inspiring nationalist leaders Subhas Chandra Bose and Mohan Singh
to create the Indian National Army – a paramilitary force known colloquially as
the Azad Hind Fauj.
Yet the government of India was ready for this. It swiftly crushed the Quit India
movement by imprisoning Congress leaders from the outset, thereby cutting off
the brains of the movement in the incipient phase of rebellion. It was not allowed
to take root anywhere – in the way that previous campaigns such as
Non-Cooperation and Salt Satyagraha had. This meant that Quit India was
confined to localised disturbances and lacked national coordination. To ensure
that trouble did not flare up anywhere, over fifty battalions of troops were also
deployed to smother any trouble. Of course, there were some momentary losses
of control; but given the pressures facing the Raj, a remarkable degree of grip was
maintained. Indeed, the Viceroy grew so sure of his ability to manage any unrest
that he told London, ‘the present regime could carry on quite comfortably till the
end of the war...it was this knowledge and the fear that we should do so which
was making the intellectuals so bitter’. 191
Recruiting for war and military modernisation
Indian troops were not immediately called up following the outbreak of war,
although Linlithgow had been quick to declare that India was ready to support
British campaigns wherever necessary. It had seemed unimaginable to anyone in
India that the subcontinent should become embroiled in yet another World War.
When General Sir Robert Cassels, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army,
inquired what support the British government wanted from India in September
1939, the reply came that it was unlikely Indian troops would be needed at all
during the conflict. Aside from three mule transport companies led by Punjabi
Muslims which were shipped to France, there were no immediate plans to draft
extra recruits or even to mobilise existing battalions.
Neglect after the Great War meant that the Indian Army, though one of the most
professional outside Europe, was drastically under-equipped by contemporary
standards. In 1939 there were only 189,000 men enlisted in the Army, of whom
65,000 were not battle-ready. The fighting force consisted of 82 infantry
battalions, coupled with a further 37 from the British Army. Two more were based
in Hong Kong and another two in Singapore. A typical battalion consisted of 662
men, including 12 officers and 17 VCOs (Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer).
Within each battalion was a central headquarters company which contained an