ties that bind - sep 11

Ties that Bind
47 Geoffrey Bennet, Naval battles
of the First World War (London,
1974)
48 CAB/23/6, National Archives,
London.
49 CAB/24/50, National Archives,
London.
50 CAB/24/54, National Archives,
London.
51 CAB/23/6, National Archives,
London
52 Curzon papers on admission of
Indians to the major ranks of the
Army, Mss. Eur. F/111/442, IOR,
BL, London.
20 | policyexchange.org.uk
India. Although a long way from the main theatres of war, the Indian home front
was not immune to the conflict. In 1914-1915, the south-eastern coast town of
Madras came under sustained German shelling from the Seiner Majestät Schiff (SMS)
Emden – a light cruiser from the Imperial Navy – causing death, injury and
widespread damage to infrastructure. 47 Indians therefore wanted to create an
army dedicated to pursuing their national interest, with one leader telling the
Viceroy, ‘we rely upon you to defend us, but we see your great and numerous
preoccupations elsewhere, and we want to learn how to defend ourselves and
how to help you more’. 48
By April 1918, General Sir Charles Monro, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Indian Army, similarly felt a force was needed to safeguard India against the
possibility of a German-Ottoman invasion. He consequently told London that he
proposed to create two divisions, three infantry brigades, and six cavalry
regiments for the specific purpose of defending India, which he planned to
station just outside the Khyber Pass. 49 Disagreements continued between the War
Office and Commander-in-Chief over whether this was necessary, although the
latter persisted until it was easier for Whitehall to simply concede to his demands.
In the meantime, India was also reassured that were it to suffer an attack, more
troops would immediately be made available for its defence. Yet this was not the
national army Indians had been hoping for and, as their requests continued to fall
on deaf ears, the Viceroy acknowledged there had been ‘a marked diminution in
the belief in our sincerity and honesty of purpose’. 50
Indians also resented the government’s refusal to award them commissions,
even on a temporary basis. 51 Most Indians were deemed by the British to be unfit
to be officers, and there were fears that European soldiers might be unwilling to
take orders from them. It accentuated fears among some Indians that they were
fighting for an ungrateful Empire whose interests did not always match their own.
They continued, however, to push for commissions throughout the war. In July
1917 the War Office warned:
[The Army Council] have warned that to grant commissions to natives of India would entail
a great risk from the military point of view, in that it involves placing native Indians in a
position where they would be entitled to command European Officers. 52
Yet by the following month, plans were agreed in principle for some Indian
officers to be commissioned, although this did not actually happen until after the
war was over. Shortly after the conflict ended, Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State
for India, told Parliament that ‘commissions are going to be given to efficient
soldiers, subject to His Majesty's approval’, through one of four categories:
1. A certain number of substantive King’s commissions in the Indian Army to selected
Indian officers who have specially distinguished themselves in the present War.
2. A certain number of King's commissions conferring honorary rank in the
Indian Army to selected Indian officers who have rendered distinguished
service not necessarily during the present War, and who, owing to age or lack
of educational qualifications are not eligible for substantive King’s
commissions. Such honorary commissions will carry with them special
advantages in respect of pay and pension.