ties that bind - sep 11

are…hasten to put all your efforts, with strong resolution, to strangle the enemy
to death and show your hatred and enmity for them’, read the ‘Ghalibnama’. 176
Hasan decided that it was too dangerous for him to carry the letter back to India
himself and asked Mohammed Mian Ansari to take it on his behalf. Despite high
security, Ansari was able to smuggle the document through to Kabul, where he
was received by Ubaidullah Sindhi. The prospect of forging an international
jihadist alliance excited Sindhi, who devised a plan with Ansari and the Turkish
representatives to facilitate the realisation of Hasan’s goals. They suggested
forming a group – ‘Hizbullah’ – an ‘army of God’, with centres in Madinah,
Constantinople, Tehran and Kabul
('Hizb' is usually used to denote a
party). Overall control would rest with
Hasan, while Sindhi would take charge
of the Afghan forces. It was an elaborate
plan which aimed at building an
alliance of pan-Islamic sympathisers for
a coordinated attack on the Raj. 177 The
details were carefully written on three
pieces of yellow silk, which were then
stitched into the inner lining of the
messenger’s coat to avoid detection. 178
Shaikh Abdul Haq was asked to transport the letters to Sind from where Shaikh
Abdul Rahim would take them to the Hijaz. However, while on his way, Abdul
Haq was stopped and detained by the Commissioner of Multan who, despite
reading the letters, thought little of them. He nonetheless forwarded the
information to the Punjab Criminal Investigation Department, into whose
jurisdiction Abdul Haq was transferred. They took the letter much more seriously,
and after interrogating Haq, discovered the extent of the conspiracy. 179 Ubaidullah
Sindhi and his aides were subsequently arrested by the Afghan Amir and turned
over to the British.
The date on these ‘silk letters,’ 9 July 1916, makes it clear that Sindhi was
unaware of developments which were already taking place in the Hijaz. The
government was nonetheless perturbed by events such as this and misinterpreted
the nature of pan-Islamic threats. In reality, the actions of Sindhi and Hasan were
unknown in India until after the war, when the Sedition Committee Report was
eventually published. The failure of their endeavour exposed the inexperience of
Hasan and Sindhi, whose bipolar views were symptomatic of the sheltered
environment in which they were raised. Much of their early planning centred
upon an assumption that the Afghan Amir, Habibullah Khan, was prepared to fight
the British. When he proved unwilling, Sindhi was left dumbstruck and failed to
generate alternative ideas until after he had received Hasan’s letter from Madinah.
The second plan, in which Sindhi argued for the creation of ‘God’s army’, was
also poorly planned. Although he wrote a detailed letter to Hasan, most of the
people earmarked for commanding posts in his new army had not been consulted
over their willingness to participate in the scheme – and, again, most proved
unwilling. 180
Similar fears persisted throughout the conflict. Even as late as 1918, parts of
the Indian Civil Service feared that Muslims might side with the Ottomans
Muslims in the World Wars
“ Much of the recent scholarship into the
ac�vity of Indian Muslims reveals how this threat
was more perceived than real, that the numbers
who supported subversive ac�vity were negligible
and that most of their plans were li�le more than
fantas�c and fanciful ”
176 Sedition Committee Report,
L/PS/20/38, IOR, BL, London
177 Ibid.
178 Afghanistan: the silk letter
case, L/PS/10/633, file
4260/1916, IOR, BL, London;
Sindhi, Kabul men sat sal, p.43
179 Prasad, The Indian Muslims
and World War I, p.143
180 Sedition Committee Report,
L/PS/20/38, IOR, BL, London
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