ties that bind - sep 11

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from different backgrounds were respected, as already documented earlier in this pamphlet (see pp.21–27) – but the government of the day was also unequivocal about the rightness of its cause. The moral case against the Central Powers, which the Ottoman Empire supported in the First World War, and against Nazi Germany in the Second World War, was clearly explained to men across the Empire. As already illustrated, they largely responded to the openness and clarity of that message, buoyed by Britain’s surety of purpose. Guarding against infiltration Such self-confident messages are too rare today. The corollary is that anger and dissent has increased, alienating large sections of the British Muslim community from the armed forces and its mission. The pressures on active servicemen in this respect can be exceptionally high and the Fort Hood attack in America in November 2009 demonstrates the dangers. Indeed, as the global jihadi movement continues to adopt an increasingly decentralised structure by inspiring ‘self-starters’, such risks are only likely to increase. Mitchell Silber, Director of Intelligence Analysis at the New York City Police Department, confirmed this view in his testimony to the US Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on the Fort Hood attack. ‘[The] home grown threat ... has no operational relationship with AQ Core, but consists of individuals radicalized in the West, who utilize al-Qaeda ideology as their inspiration for their actions’, he told the Committee. 371 Combating that threat means understanding the ideological challenge groups such as al-Qaeda pose and identifying those susceptible or likely to be influenced by its message. The official inquiry conducted by the Department of Defense (DoD) into the attack at Fort Hood, however, attracted heavy criticism after one of the inquiry’s co-chairmen, former Secretary of the US Army, Togo West, said: Our concern is with actions and effects, not necessarily with motivations. 372 Of course, without motivation there would not have been any terrorist attack. That much is evident from the actions of Major Nidal Hasan who proselytised his radical beliefs and maintained contact with radical preachers such as Anwar al-Awlaki. Indeed, Awlaki celebrated the Fort Hood shootings with the following statement on his website: Nidal Hassan is a hero. He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people. This is a contradiction that many Muslims brush aside and just pretend that it doesn't exist. Any decent Muslim cannot live, understanding properly his duties towards his Creator and his fellow Muslims, and yet serve as a US soldier. The US is leading the war against terrorism which in reality is a war against Islam. Its army is directly invading two Muslim countries and indirectly occupying the rest through its stooges. Nidal opened fire on soldiers who were on their way to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. How can there be any dispute about the virtue of what he has done? In fact the only way a Muslim could Islamically justify serving as a soldier in the US army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal. Conclusion – Reviving Muslim Service in the Armed Forces 371 The Fort Hood Attack: a preliminary assessment, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, evidence of Mitchell D. Silber, available at: http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/in dex.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.He aring&Hearing_ID=70b4e9b6d2af-4290-b9fd-7a466a0a86b6 372 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript, DoD Briefing with former Army Secretary West and Adm. Clark (Ret.) from the Pentagon (15 January 2010). Available at: http://www.defense.gov/Transcri pts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID= 4536 policyexchange.org.uk | 81
Ties that Bind 373 http://web.archive.org/web/ 20091110043834/http://www.an war-alawlaki.com/?p=228 374 http://www.defense.gov/ Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?Trans criptID=4536 375 Ibid. 376 Protecting the Force: Lesson from Fort Hood, Report of the DoD Independent Review (January 2010) pp.12-13 Available at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pd fs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce- Web_Security_HR_13jan10.pdf 377 Ibid, p.13 82 | policyexchange.org.uk [...] The fact that fighting against the US army is an Islamic duty today cannot be disputed. No scholar with a grain of Islamic knowledge can defy the clear cut proofs that Muslims today have the right – rather the duty – to fight against American tyranny. Nidal has killed soldiers who were about to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to kill Muslims. The American Muslims who condemned his actions have committed treason against the Muslim Ummah and have fallen into hypocrisy. [...] May Allah grant our brother Nidal patience, perseverance and steadfastness and we ask Allah to accept from him his great heroic act. Ameen. 373 Despite this, the DoD report failed to consider the ideological impulses that motivated Major Hasan. West explained, ‘Our concern is not with the religion. It is with the potential effect on our “ Careful considera�on will need to be given to precisely what criteria are needed to iden�fy soldiers’ ability to do their job’. 374 Even by this standard, no consideration is given to what effect adherence to Islamist beliefs might have on active servicemen. The other co-chairman of the DoD inquiry, former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark (Ret.), explained that the DoD report did not concern itself with issues of self-radicalisation – and, therefore, the associated issues of subversion and infiltration. ‘We were examining, policies, procedures, programs, and so we weren't out there digging around in that’, Clark said. 375 It is clear however that had greater emphasis been given to exploring the ideological sympathies of Major Hasan, then his attack might have been thwarted. At the time of perpetrating his outrage at Fort Hood Major Hasan possessed ‘SECRET’ security level clearance. The DoD report, ‘Protecting the Force: Lesson from Fort Hood’, admits: poten�ally worrying behaviour by individuals suscep�ble to extremism ” This background investigation did not include a subject interview or interviews with co-workers, supervisors or expanded character references. We believe that if a more thorough investigation had been accomplished, his security clearance may have been revoked and his continued service and pending deployment would have been subject to increased scrutiny. 376 The report suggests that it can be difficult for concerned colleagues to know when – and what – information should be offered to their superiors. Current guidelines, it says, ‘do not provide commanders and their personnel with clear distinctions or thresholds for what constitutes significant information that should be forwarded’. 377 Careful consideration will need to be given to precisely what criteria are needed to identify potentially worrying behaviour by individuals susceptible to extremism. Yet the US Army is already well experienced at combating extremist groups within its ranks and, in this respect, the challenge posed by Islamist groups – and their sympathisers – is not unprecedented. For example, the DoD already has an established policy of not tolerating groups, practices or activities that are discriminatory or extremist in nature. These
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Ties that Bind 3 See: http://www.cp
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Ties that Bind 17 Stolen Valour: Ho
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Ties that Bind 27 Omissi, The Sepoy
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Ties that Bind 41 Ibid. p.28 42 Ibi
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Ties that Bind 47 Geoffrey Bennet,
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Ties that Bind 58 Ibid. Also see, M
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Ties that Bind 64 Punjabi Musalman
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Ties that Bind 74 Omissi, Sepoy and
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Ties that Bind 84 The Comrade, 7 No
Page 31 and 32: Ties that Bind 90 Ibid, p.5 91 Ibid
Page 33 and 34: Ties that Bind 107 Ibid. 108 Supple
Page 35 and 36: Ties that Bind 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid.
Page 37 and 38: Ties that Bind 146 Ibid., p.90 147
Page 39 and 40: Ties that Bind 159 Punjabi Mahomeda
Page 43 and 44: Ties that Bind 181 CAB/24/54, Natio
Page 45 and 46: Ties that Bind 187 India’s contri
Page 47 and 48: Ties that Bind 191 Judith Brown, Mo
Page 51 and 52: Ties that Bind 211 Ibid, p.55 212 I
Page 53 and 54: Ties that Bind 224 Omissi, Sepoy an
Page 55 and 56: Ties that Bind 238 Ibid, pp.70-72 2
Page 59 and 60: Ties that Bind 265 CAB/66/58/25, Na
Page 61 and 62: 270 The Gallup Coexist Index 2009:
Page 63 and 64: Ties that Bind 278 Note that Al-Muh
Page 65 and 66: Ties that Bind 286 http://www.times
Page 67 and 68: Ties that Bind 299 Hans Wehr, A Dic
Page 69 and 70: Ties that Bind 308 http://www.dohad
Page 71 and 72: Ties that Bind 315 http://web.archi
Page 75 and 76: Ties that Bind 329 http://www.indep
Page 77 and 78: Ties that Bind 340 Keynote Address
Page 79 and 80: Ties that Bind 350 http://www.publi
Page 81: Ties that Bind 364 Humayun Ansari,
Page 85 and 86: Ties that Bind 390 Ibid, p. 49. 391
Page 87 and 88: Ties that Bind 406 Policy Exchange
Page 89 and 90: Ties that Bind 419 http://www.musli
Page 95 and 96: 439 London Gazette, 3 July 1945, ht
Page 97 and 98: 96 | policyexchange.org.uk Bibliogr
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