21.11.2012 Views

ties that bind - sep 11

ties that bind - sep 11

ties that bind - sep 11

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

guidelines have been periodically reviewed and updated in line with changing<br />

attitudes and events – as occurred in 1996 after two servicemen were found to be<br />

white supremacists and guilty of racially motivated murder against<br />

African-Americans in the previous year. 378 As a result, the Army issued a detailed<br />

pamphlet on ‘Extremist Activi<strong>ties</strong>’, which explored the dangers of white<br />

supremacist and neo-Nazi infiltration in the Army. 379 It explains, ‘Participation in<br />

extremist organizations and activi<strong>ties</strong> by Army personnel is inconsistent with<br />

du<strong>ties</strong> of military service’. 380 US servicemen are told they must ‘reject<br />

participation in extremist organizations and activi<strong>ties</strong>’. 381 The document offers a<br />

wide construction of what kind of group might be defined as ‘extremist’:<br />

Extremist organizations are ones <strong>that</strong> advocate racial, gender, or ethnic hatred or intolerance;<br />

advocate, create, or engage in illegal discrimination based on race, color, gender, religion, or<br />

national origin; advocate the use of or use force, violence or unlawful means to deprive<br />

individuals of their rights under the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States<br />

or any State by unlawful means. 382<br />

In February 20<strong>11</strong>, the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs<br />

Committee released a report by its Chairman, Senator Jo<strong>sep</strong>h Lieberman<br />

(I-CONN), and Ranking Member, Senator Susan Collins (R-ME), entitled, ‘A<br />

Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons From The U.S. Government’s<br />

Failure To Prevent The Fort Hood Attack’. 383 In contrast to the West/Clark report<br />

for DoD a year earlier, this document confronted Hasan’s motivations in detail and<br />

attempts to specify an established practice for tackling ‘radicalization to violent<br />

Islamist extremism’ amongst US military personnel. 384<br />

Building on the potential threats outlined in ‘Extremist Activi<strong>ties</strong>’ (which<br />

focused on far right and neo-Nazi groups), 385 the report bluntly states <strong>that</strong> it is<br />

‘clear <strong>that</strong> ... DoD lacks the institutional culture, through updated policies and<br />

training, sufficient to inform commanders and all levels of servicemembers how<br />

to identify radicalization to violent Islamist extremism’. 386 It advises <strong>that</strong>:<br />

‘DoD should reform religious discrimination and other equal opportunity policies to distinguish<br />

violent Islamist extremism from legitimate, protected religious observance of Islam so <strong>that</strong><br />

commanders will not be reluctant to deal with displays of violent Islamist extremism’. 387<br />

Before the report’s publication, one of America’s most distinguished soldiers,<br />

General Jack Keane (USA, Ret.) told the Committee <strong>that</strong> the current challenges<br />

facing the US military are not unprecedented. ‘It is very similar to what we<br />

experienced at Ft Bragg in the late 90’s where we were wrongfully tolerating<br />

extremists in our organizations who displayed a pattern of behavior <strong>that</strong> put them<br />

at odds with the values and character of the Army’, he said. 388 Had the guidelines<br />

outlined in the ‘Extremist Activi<strong>ties</strong>’ pamphlet been followed, it is likely <strong>that</strong><br />

Major Hasan’s behaviour – such as his adherence to fundamentalist Islamic dress<br />

and proselytising which included ‘explaining’ the mindset of suicide bombers –<br />

would have triggered alarm bells.<br />

The US Senate Committee report thus highlights three existing policies under<br />

which Hasan could have been dismissed from the military long before he<br />

carried out his deadly act of terrorism. 389 However, ‘A Ticking Time Bomb’<br />

Conclusion – Reviving Muslim Service in the Armed Forces<br />

378 http://www.defense.gov/<br />

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=40488<br />

379 Extremist Activi<strong>ties</strong>,<br />

Department of the Army<br />

Pamphlet 600-15 (1 June 2000).<br />

Available at:<br />

http://www.kaiserslautern.army.<br />

mil/sites/installation/DA%20PAM<br />

%20600-15%20EXTREMIST%<br />

20ACTIVITIES.pdf<br />

380 Ibid, p.1<br />

381 Ibid, p.2<br />

382 Ibid.<br />

383 A Ticking Time Bomb:<br />

Counterrrorism Lessons From The<br />

U.S. Government’s Failure To<br />

Prevent The Fort Hood Attack<br />

(U.S. Senate Committee on<br />

Homeland Security and<br />

Governmental Affairs, February<br />

20<strong>11</strong>), available at: http://hsgac.<br />

senate.gov/public/_files/Fort_Ho<br />

od/FortHoodReport.pdf<br />

384 Ibid.<br />

385 Ibid, p. 46.<br />

386 Ibid, p. 9.<br />

387 Ibid, p. 49.<br />

388 The Fort Hood Attack: a<br />

preliminary assessment, Senate<br />

Homeland Security and<br />

Governmental Affairs Committee,<br />

evidence of General John M. Keane<br />

(US Army, Retired), available at:<br />

http://hsgac.senate.gov/<br />

public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hea<br />

rings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=70b4e<br />

9b6-d2af-4290-b9fd-<br />

7a466a0a86b6<br />

389 A Ticking Time Bomb:<br />

Counterrrorism Lessons From The<br />

U.S. Government’s Failure To<br />

Prevent The Fort Hood Attack<br />

(U.S. Senate Committee on<br />

Homeland Security and<br />

Governmental Affairs, February<br />

20<strong>11</strong>), pp. 46-7<br />

policyexchange.org.uk | 83

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!