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guidelines have been periodically reviewed and updated in line with changing<br />
attitudes and events – as occurred in 1996 after two servicemen were found to be<br />
white supremacists and guilty of racially motivated murder against<br />
African-Americans in the previous year. 378 As a result, the Army issued a detailed<br />
pamphlet on ‘Extremist Activi<strong>ties</strong>’, which explored the dangers of white<br />
supremacist and neo-Nazi infiltration in the Army. 379 It explains, ‘Participation in<br />
extremist organizations and activi<strong>ties</strong> by Army personnel is inconsistent with<br />
du<strong>ties</strong> of military service’. 380 US servicemen are told they must ‘reject<br />
participation in extremist organizations and activi<strong>ties</strong>’. 381 The document offers a<br />
wide construction of what kind of group might be defined as ‘extremist’:<br />
Extremist organizations are ones <strong>that</strong> advocate racial, gender, or ethnic hatred or intolerance;<br />
advocate, create, or engage in illegal discrimination based on race, color, gender, religion, or<br />
national origin; advocate the use of or use force, violence or unlawful means to deprive<br />
individuals of their rights under the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States<br />
or any State by unlawful means. 382<br />
In February 20<strong>11</strong>, the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs<br />
Committee released a report by its Chairman, Senator Jo<strong>sep</strong>h Lieberman<br />
(I-CONN), and Ranking Member, Senator Susan Collins (R-ME), entitled, ‘A<br />
Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons From The U.S. Government’s<br />
Failure To Prevent The Fort Hood Attack’. 383 In contrast to the West/Clark report<br />
for DoD a year earlier, this document confronted Hasan’s motivations in detail and<br />
attempts to specify an established practice for tackling ‘radicalization to violent<br />
Islamist extremism’ amongst US military personnel. 384<br />
Building on the potential threats outlined in ‘Extremist Activi<strong>ties</strong>’ (which<br />
focused on far right and neo-Nazi groups), 385 the report bluntly states <strong>that</strong> it is<br />
‘clear <strong>that</strong> ... DoD lacks the institutional culture, through updated policies and<br />
training, sufficient to inform commanders and all levels of servicemembers how<br />
to identify radicalization to violent Islamist extremism’. 386 It advises <strong>that</strong>:<br />
‘DoD should reform religious discrimination and other equal opportunity policies to distinguish<br />
violent Islamist extremism from legitimate, protected religious observance of Islam so <strong>that</strong><br />
commanders will not be reluctant to deal with displays of violent Islamist extremism’. 387<br />
Before the report’s publication, one of America’s most distinguished soldiers,<br />
General Jack Keane (USA, Ret.) told the Committee <strong>that</strong> the current challenges<br />
facing the US military are not unprecedented. ‘It is very similar to what we<br />
experienced at Ft Bragg in the late 90’s where we were wrongfully tolerating<br />
extremists in our organizations who displayed a pattern of behavior <strong>that</strong> put them<br />
at odds with the values and character of the Army’, he said. 388 Had the guidelines<br />
outlined in the ‘Extremist Activi<strong>ties</strong>’ pamphlet been followed, it is likely <strong>that</strong><br />
Major Hasan’s behaviour – such as his adherence to fundamentalist Islamic dress<br />
and proselytising which included ‘explaining’ the mindset of suicide bombers –<br />
would have triggered alarm bells.<br />
The US Senate Committee report thus highlights three existing policies under<br />
which Hasan could have been dismissed from the military long before he<br />
carried out his deadly act of terrorism. 389 However, ‘A Ticking Time Bomb’<br />
Conclusion – Reviving Muslim Service in the Armed Forces<br />
378 http://www.defense.gov/<br />
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=40488<br />
379 Extremist Activi<strong>ties</strong>,<br />
Department of the Army<br />
Pamphlet 600-15 (1 June 2000).<br />
Available at:<br />
http://www.kaiserslautern.army.<br />
mil/sites/installation/DA%20PAM<br />
%20600-15%20EXTREMIST%<br />
20ACTIVITIES.pdf<br />
380 Ibid, p.1<br />
381 Ibid, p.2<br />
382 Ibid.<br />
383 A Ticking Time Bomb:<br />
Counterrrorism Lessons From The<br />
U.S. Government’s Failure To<br />
Prevent The Fort Hood Attack<br />
(U.S. Senate Committee on<br />
Homeland Security and<br />
Governmental Affairs, February<br />
20<strong>11</strong>), available at: http://hsgac.<br />
senate.gov/public/_files/Fort_Ho<br />
od/FortHoodReport.pdf<br />
384 Ibid.<br />
385 Ibid, p. 46.<br />
386 Ibid, p. 9.<br />
387 Ibid, p. 49.<br />
388 The Fort Hood Attack: a<br />
preliminary assessment, Senate<br />
Homeland Security and<br />
Governmental Affairs Committee,<br />
evidence of General John M. Keane<br />
(US Army, Retired), available at:<br />
http://hsgac.senate.gov/<br />
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hea<br />
rings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=70b4e<br />
9b6-d2af-4290-b9fd-<br />
7a466a0a86b6<br />
389 A Ticking Time Bomb:<br />
Counterrrorism Lessons From The<br />
U.S. Government’s Failure To<br />
Prevent The Fort Hood Attack<br />
(U.S. Senate Committee on<br />
Homeland Security and<br />
Governmental Affairs, February<br />
20<strong>11</strong>), pp. 46-7<br />
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