ties that bind - sep 11

Government will be guilty in the presence of God’. 139 Generally, Indians were
not very sympathetic to the situation in which the Sultan found himself,
regarding his wounds as largely self-inflicted. A stinging letter from the Nawab
of Dujana State to the Commissioner of the Ambala Division, sent in January
1915, argued that ‘Turkey has waged war against Islamic interests and against
the will of the Muslim world, and so she also must suffer the consequences. No
sane Mohammadan will have now anything to do with her and she alone must
reap what she has sown so wildly’. 140
There was a general perception among Muslim leaders and the British that
those who were most susceptible to Ottoman propaganda were uneducated rural
communities. A report prepared by the British Director of Criminal Intelligence
explored the ‘attitude of Indian Mahomedans towards the war in Europe’. 141
Considering the possibility of rebellion within the police force, it observed that
‘some of the best officers are, however, inclined sentimentally and religiously
towards the Caliph. Some of the young officers of the Aligarh school are rather
inclined towards [sic] Mahomed Ali’s pro-Turkish Pan-Islamism. But, on the
whole, the feeling in the force are [sic] believed to be highly satisfactory’. 142 By
contrast, it noted that in ‘the Army there is much less educated Pan-Islamism than
in the Police. Nor have there been any signs of uneducated fanatical feelings’. 143
Much of the reason for this was because of the different recruitment patterns. The
Indian police force consisted of only a patchwork force, operating in large urban
centres where radical ideas – and the leaders who propounded them – were more
concentrated than in rural provinces. By contrast, the Indian Army focused its
recruitment on rural areas, attracting a different kind of Muslim to the armed
forces.
The report identified Mahomed Ali as an influential pan-Islamist leader who
could incite a pro-Ottoman agitation within India. It found ‘direct Turkish
influences work chiefly through the educated pan-Islamists, the leaders of whom
are Mahomed Ali and his friends and associates. These people have been playing
with fire but are not ready to burn themselves, though somewhat careless of the
consequences to others of their insidious words, writings etc. They are very
anxious to derive personal and political advantages from the war. They would like
the British Government to be dependent on them and they will be very
disappointed if the war does not enhance their power, position and prestige. They
are not content to be mere loyal units of a heterogeneous Empire’. 144
These accounts can, however, create a misleading impression that Indian
Muslims were intimately bound up with Ottoman affairs – and obsessed with
international matters. This, however, was not the case. A letter from W. F. Rice,
Chief Secretary to the government of Burma, sent to a high-ranking official in the
government of India a few days after the Ottoman entry into the war, noted events
in the town of Moulmein in lower Burma. Rice observed that local leaders had
‘considered the question of holding a meeting to make a public pronouncement
of their loyalty to the British government, but came to the conclusion that the
great majority of the local Mohamedans took absolutely no interest in the conduct
of Turkey, and that it would be only attaching undue importance to the feelings
of the community to hold a meeting’. 145
None of this should detract from the very real concerns that Indian Muslims
had when the Ottoman Empire entered the war. They had an affinity for the office
Muslims in the World Wars
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid, p.19
141 The war: Muslim feeling;
expressions of loyalty,
L/PS/10/518, p.495, IOR, BL,
London
142 Ibid., p.498
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., p.41
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