ties that bind - sep 11

Ties that Bind
265 CAB/66/58/25, National
Archives, London
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
58 | policyexchange.org.uk
This underscored the symbiotic relationship between Muslims and the Raj. Yet not
everyone was happy about it. For many provincial leaders the constant jockeying
for position between different parties on the national stage – including the
Muslim League and Indian National Congress – only inflamed communal tension
in their municipalities, leaving them to bear the brunt of any violence that
followed. A letter from the Punjabi Muslim leader, Nawaz Malik Khizar Hayat
Khan, to Sir James Grigg, Secretary of State for War, chastised him for placing such
a premium on those groups.
The popularity of Congress is confined to certain sections of the people. Its strength is based
largely on the wealth of many of its members and its popularity has been earned by the
preaching, in season and out of season, of hatred of Britain. Alien rule is distasteful to every
country and community and Congress has cheap popularity by exploiting this distaste to the
full. It has made full use of the opportunities afforded by the lack of firmness and determination
on the part of an administration which has always retreated before the demands of this
vociferous minority. For all its claims to the contrary, the Congress had done nothing to promote
the welfare of the masses. 265
He was similarly scathing about the Muslim League which (much like the
Congress)he regarded as being a largely urban phenomenon safeguarding the
particular interests of the industrialised elite. He therefore concluded, ‘it cannot
be assumed that these organisations represent the classes whose cause [they]
plead’. 266 Instead, he advocated sidelining the Congress and League to directly
empower those
enlisted and loyalist classes who have supported the war effort [who] have many interests in
common irrespective of community...they should be given an effective voice in any discussions
on the solution of the present deadlock and of India’s future constitution. At the peace conference
which will meet after the War, those powers who have risked all to defeat the common enemy
will have a deciding voice in solving international problems – not those who have stood aside
from the struggle or opposed the allies. That principle should apply to India also. Those who have
worked hard and loyally that India might play a worthy part in the struggle, should be listened
to and not those who have stood apart from and sabotaged India’s war effort. 267
He explained that ‘the loyalists are no less anxious for self government than the
non-cooperators, but they understand the value of, and desire to preserve, the
British connection and to see India as a free and equal partner of the British
Commonwealth of Nations. They have shown they love their country by their
deeds and not by the declamation of empty phrases’. 268
By the end of the war that commitment and sacrifice meant independence for
India was now inevitable. Following the Japanese surrender on 14 August 1945,
the Secretary of State for India and Burma, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, despatched a
telegram to the Viceroy, Viscount Wavell, expressing his gratitude for India’s
contribution to the war effort:
‘At this moment when the Allied cause has achieved its final triumph in the defeat of Japan it
is my privilege to convey to you the congratulations of His Majesty’s Government on the truly
magnificent part which India has played. We in this country are deeply conscious of the vital