GEORGE A. GONZALEZ - fieldi

96THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION(1995) specifically avers that the federal government’s post-1970 environmentalregulatory policies (i.e., clean air, clean water, energy, and waste policies)can be most aptly characterized as symbolic responses to the public’sgrowing environmental concerns, rather than as substantive efforts to regulatecorporate America. He arrives at this conclusion by analyzing the contentof these policies. Furthermore, Cahn juxtaposes the content of thesepolicies with the federal government’s continued encouragement of economicgrowth, and its continued support and subsidization of fossil fuels usage(e.g., road and highway maintenance and expansion). These are the primaryfactors that cause air and water pollution, as well as waste creation. Thus criticslike Cahn argue that federal environmental legislation and environmentalpolicies designed to regulate corporate America are symbolic preciselybecause they do not challenge the state’s imperative of economic growth, norhave they sought to alter the economy’s reliance on highly polluting fossilfuels, especially gasoline as an automotive fuel.In the California context, long-term regulatory planning by state agenciescan also be interpreted as a symbolic response to the public’s environmentalconcerns. For example, the CARB promulgated a plan in 1990 thatmandated that 2 percent of automobiles offered for sale in 1998 be Zero EmissionVehicles (ZEVs), 5 percent by 2001, and 10 percent by 2003 (Kamienieckiand Farrell 1991; Grant 1996). Currently, only electrically poweredvehicles have zero emissions. Similarly, California in 1989 adopted the AirQuality Management Plan (AQMP) (Kraft 1993). The state’s AQMP alsorelied heavily on the long-term development of technology to achieveimprovements in air quality. Significantly, neither of these plans put forwardsubsidies to facilitate the development of hoped-for technologies, nor didthey mandate sanctions for industrial sectors that failed to develop the necessarytechnologies. Commenting on the state’s AQMP shortly after it waspromulgated, Sheldon Kamieniecki and Michael Farrell astutely noted that“for mainly political reasons, the more difficult decisions [of the AQMP] havebeen postponed for a number of years, with the hope that new technologieswill allow policymakers to meet federal clean-air standards with minimumdisruption to ... economic growth” (1991, 154). Notably, the targets for themanufacture and sale of ZEVs have been postponed and reduced significantlyby CARB (Cone 1995 Dec. 7; 1995 Dec. 20; 1995 Dec. 22; Hakim 2003April 25). 2 In 2002 California enacted a law mandating the reduction ofgreenhouse gas emissions from automobiles. The law does not go into effect,however, until 2009 (Cushman 2002).The group mobilization incentive structure outlined by Olson (1971)offers part of the explanation as to why, even in the face of persistently poorair quality, rebellious politics in California, or throughout the United States,have not been transformed into a social movement. The symbols emanatedwith the enactment of regulatory legislation, and unenforced regulatory