GEORGE A. GONZALEZ - fieldi

THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS 23eral government only sought to effectively regulate air pollution emissions inthe 1970s, whereas certain urban governments were seeking to control airpollution as early as the late nineteenth century. Even when the federal governmentdid enter the regulatory fray on this issue, its efforts continued to lagbehind important states and localities. Currently, for example, the federalautomobile emission standards are not as strict as the California standards.Thus, as explained in the preceding chapter, U.S. clean air policies, in manyimportant regards, can only be understood by making specific reference tourban and state politics.THE GOVERNING COALITION AND REGIME COALITION APPROACHESThe governing coalition approach posits a generally fluid and open-endedview of urban politics, where ethnic minorities and other interest groups utilizeelectoral politics to become members of governing urban coalitions. Atthe center of these coalitions are public officials. Utilizing the example of LosAngeles, Raphael Sonenshein (1993) argues that Mayor Tom Bradley, from1973 to 1992, was at the center of a governing coalition composed of ethnicminorities, progressive whites, and the downtown business community.In the governing coalition approach, business elites will normally play aprominent role in any given coalition because they provide the central politicalresource of campaign finance. Additionally, the growth agenda of landowners, developers, and other pro-growth interests is serviced by politicalelites, because capital investment in an area is necessary for local job growthand a growing economy (Peterson 1981). Nevertheless, public interestgroups, representing ethnic minorities and noneconomic perspectives, canhave their policy agendas addressed through the successful mobilization ofvoters and alliances with specific political leaders.In explaining the variation in state clean air regulations, for example,Ringquist (1993) and Potoski (2001) point to the correspondence betweenenvironmental interest group membership in the individual states and the“strength” of such regulations. The positive correlation between environmentalinterest group membership and the strength of state clean air regulationswould suggest that those groups with relatively high membership levelshave been successfully incorporated into the governing coalitions of theirrespective states and/or localities. This inclusion has resulted in more restrictiveclean air regimes.The regime coalition approach offers a view of urban politics where businessis the central actor in any given coalition, and not political leaders. Herecoalition members are incorporated into governing regimes not necessarilybased on whether they can mobilize sufficient votes, but whether certaingroups, and their leaders, can potentially interfere with the local economicelites’ growth agenda. In light of this potential threat, the leaders of public