THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS 29tions, the Committee for Economic Development, the National Associationof Manufacturers, and the Chamber of Commerce. Overall, policy discussiongroups are the arenas where members of the economic elite cometogether with policy specialists to formulate policy positions, and wheremembers of the economic elite evaluate policy specialists for possible servicein government (Eakins 1972; Domhoff 1978a, 61–87; 2002, chap. 4;Barrow 1993, chap. 1). 7 One example of a policy discussion group is theClean Air Working Group. It was organized by the corporate community inthe 1980s and focuses on the issue of federal clean air regulations (Gonzalez2001a, chap. 6).Certain environmental groups, in terms of their leadership and/orfinancing, have the characteristics of economic elite-led policy-planningorganizations. These groups include the Sierra Club prior to the 1960s, theSave-the-Redwood League, and Environmental Defense. EnvironmentalDefense, for instance, receives significant financing from large foundations,and it has several corporate executives on its board of directors (Dowie 1995,58–59; 2001, 93; Roelofs 2003, 138–139). Susan R. Schrepfer, in her surveyof the Sierra Club’s early charter members, found that approximately onethirdwere academics, and “the rest of them were almost all businessmen andlawyers working in San Francisco’s financial district” (1983, 10; also see Jones1965 and Orsi 1985). The club was founded in 1892. Schrepfer goes on toexplain that businesspeople continued to compose a substantial portion ofthe club’s membership and leadership until the 1960s (1983, 171–173; alsosee Cohen 1988). Unlike the Sierra Club, the high level of economic eliteparticipation on Save-the-Redwood League’s governing council has beenmaintained throughout its history. The closed governance structure of theleague created the “tendency for the council and board to be increasinglydominated by businessmen and patricians, while fewer academics were drawninto the organization’s leadership in the 1950s and 1960s” (1983, 113).Through their financing and participation in such organizations businesspeoplecan gain knowledge and policy proposals on environmental issues. Economicelites can then use this information and these policy proposals in theirefforts to shape public policies on environmental questions when deemednecessary (Gonzalez 2001; 2001b).Economic elite-led policy discussion groups have also been formed forthe purpose of shaping decision-making on the urban level. One prominentexample of such an entity is the National Municipal League (Hays 1964;Domhoff 1978b, 160–169). From the nation-wide effort of this organizationcame the Progressive Era urban reforms of the civil service “to regulate personnelpractices, competitive bidding to control procurement, the city managerform of government to systematize decision making, and at-large electionsto dilute the voting power of the working classes” (Logan and Molotch1987, 152).
30THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONREGULATORY POLICIES, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY,AND ECONOMIC ELITESGabriel Kolko (1977), in his work on Progressive Era politics, demonstratesthat economic elites and large firms can and do benefit from government regulatorypolicies. Such policies can protect the value of investments, stabilizethe operation of the market, and enhance the long-term profitability of capital.In the realm of urban politics, Marc Weiss (1987) shows how local zoninglaws, and regulations regarding the building of housing and retail structures,were championed by large land developers beginning in the ProgressiveEra. They did so to protect land values and local investment climates.Despite these seminal works, and others like them (e.g., Stigler 1971;Gordon 1994; and Higgens-Evenson 2003), Barrow (1998) points out that itis assumed by numerous scholars who study state behavior that a negativerelationship exists within jurisdictions between business investment and regulatoryrules applied to business activities (e.g., Poulantzas 1973; Offe 1984;Block 1987; Elkin 1987; Aronowitz and Bratsis 2002). Theorists that forwardthis view will normally link it to the “dependency principle,” wherein it isposited that governments are reliant on private investment for a healthyeconomy and stable tax base (Offe 1974). Barrow explains that “in the literatureon state theory, the operation of the dependency principle is alwayslinked to a laissez-faire concept of the business climate and therefore to thebasic presuppositions of neoclassical economic theory and the model of perfectcompetition” (111). Barrow goes on to point out that theorists of thestate that argue the dependency principle generally equate a “favorable businessclimate” with“low” taxes (and therefore minimal state expenditures); low employee mandatessuch as minimum wages, unemployment insurance, workmen’s compensation,and family leave; minimal social regulation and environmentalprotection; right-to-work legislation to protect a “free” labor market andcorrespondingly low wages. (111)Hence, public officials, in order to attract investment to their specific nation,region, or locality, must provide investors the type of low tax and low regulationmilieu called for in neoclassical economic theory (Bartik 1991; Fisherand Peters 1998).The linkage of the dependency principle to neoclassical thought, however,is empirically unwarranted. Neoclassical assumptions about businessinvestment prove to be poor predictors of where investment and economicgrowth in the United States occur. The General Manufacturing Climates, forexample, was a ten year effort (1979–1988) to “operationalize neoclassicalassumptions through an index that compares and ranks business climates inthe 48 contiguous American states” (Barrow 1998, 112). It was sponsored by
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 119Brienes, Marvin. 19
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