GEORGE A. GONZALEZ - fieldi

THE FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY 41of the Great Depression, total land value in Chicago equaled $5 billion (Hoyt1933, 470; also see Keating 1988).Therefore, the CAC’s first report on railroad-generated smoke, and therecommendation to electrify the railroad lines running through the area,were not a break from the congenial political attitude that Chicago’s growthcoalition had historically maintained toward the railroads, specifically, orcapital, generally. Instead, the CAC report should be viewed as an attempt toinitiate a process, whereby it was hoped that the major railroads would eventuallyagree to electrify its Chicago lines.Reflective of this approach to the railroad-related smoke problem, evenbefore the CAC report was completed, the CAC executive committee beganto meet privately with railroad officials to discuss the idea of electrification.Historians Stradling and Joel A. Tarr (1999) report on the response in theseprivate meetings of one of those railroad firms, the Pennsylvania, to the CACproject of railroad electrification. The executives of this firm stronglyrejected the concept of electrification in Chicago. A General Manager of therailroad, G. L. Peck, stated to the CAC executive committee that railroadelectrification in Chicago “was out of the question.” Another PennsylvaniaRailroad executive at the same meeting pointed to what he described as the“prohibitive cost of electrification and the impracticability of substitutingcoke or anthracite coal” for soft coal. Peck also warned the CAC executivecommittee that “the operating officers of the railroads” would oppose itsreport. In reporting the results of the meeting to a Pennsylvania vice president,Peck explained that the CAC “Executive Committee decided to suppressthe report” (as quoted by Stradling and Tarr 1999, 695). Stradling andTarr (1999) note that “after meeting with other railroad officials, the CACagreed to shelve its study” (695).The CAC, however, not only agreed to end its efforts at having Chicagotrains run on electricity but it aided the railroad industry in putting the issueto rest politically. Under the auspices of the CAC, a committee was formedto again study the smoke from railroads in the Chicago area. This committeewas composed of various officials from the railroad industry. Executives fromsuch railroads as the Chicago & North Western, the New York Central Lines,and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy served on the committee. Additionally,individuals economically tied to growth in the Chicago area were alsomembers of “The Chicago Association of Commerce Committee of Investigationon Smoke Abatement and Electrification of Railway Terminals.”These individuals were bank executives, the senior partners of law firms, andone senior partner of an architect firm. Finally, an executive from the coalindustry was also a member of the committee (Chicago Association of Commerce1915, v).The new report, released in 1915, downplayed the contribution that railroadlocomotives made to Chicago’s air pollution. Specifically, the report