THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS 23eral government only sought to effectively regulate air pollution emissions inthe 1970s, whereas certain urban governments were seeking to control airpollution as early as the late nineteenth century. Even when the federal governmentdid enter the regulatory fray on this issue, its efforts continued to lagbehind important states and localities. Currently, for example, the federalautomobile emission standards are not as strict as the California standards.Thus, as explained in the preceding chapter, U.S. clean air policies, in manyimportant regards, can only be understood by making specific reference tourban and state politics.THE GOVERNING COALITION AND REGIME COALITION APPROACHESThe governing coalition approach posits a generally fluid and open-endedview of urban politics, where ethnic minorities and other interest groups utilizeelectoral politics to become members of governing urban coalitions. Atthe center of these coalitions are public officials. Utilizing the example of LosAngeles, Raphael Sonenshein (1993) argues that Mayor Tom Bradley, from1973 to 1992, was at the center of a governing coalition composed of ethnicminorities, progressive whites, and the downtown business community.In the governing coalition approach, business elites will normally play aprominent role in any given coalition because they provide the central politicalresource of campaign finance. Additionally, the growth agenda of landowners, developers, and other pro-growth interests is serviced by politicalelites, because capital investment in an area is necessary for local job growthand a growing economy (Peterson 1981). Nevertheless, public interestgroups, representing ethnic minorities and noneconomic perspectives, canhave their policy agendas addressed through the successful mobilization ofvoters and alliances with specific political leaders.In explaining the variation in state clean air regulations, for example,Ringquist (1993) and Potoski (2001) point to the correspondence betweenenvironmental interest group membership in the individual states and the“strength” of such regulations. The positive correlation between environmentalinterest group membership and the strength of state clean air regulationswould suggest that those groups with relatively high membership levelshave been successfully incorporated into the governing coalitions of theirrespective states and/or localities. This inclusion has resulted in more restrictiveclean air regimes.The regime coalition approach offers a view of urban politics where businessis the central actor in any given coalition, and not political leaders. Herecoalition members are incorporated into governing regimes not necessarilybased on whether they can mobilize sufficient votes, but whether certaingroups, and their leaders, can potentially interfere with the local economicelites’ growth agenda. In light of this potential threat, the leaders of public
24THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONinterest groups are incorporated and group members are provided “side-payments”in order to pacify them. This allows economic elites’ growth agendato proceed more or less unabated. Clarence Stone (1989) explains howAfrican Americans were incorporated into Atlanta’s regime coalition duringthe Civil Rights Era in order to maintain a positive business climate. In hisanalysis of San Francisco politics from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s,DeLeon (1992) describes one of the few examples of successful public mobilizationefforts to obstruct local economic growth. This broad based antigrowthmovement, allied with specific political leaders, however, collapsed inthe 1990s with the mayorship of Diane Feinstein.SYMBOLIC INCLUSIONThe governing and regime coalition approaches offer two different means tointerpret the ecological modernization efforts that were initiated on the locallevel, and then adopted by state governments, as well as by the federal government—asin the case of the Clean Air Act of 1990 (Gonzalez 2001a,chap. 6). Thus, public policies designed to force the development and implementationof air pollution control technologies could have been the result ofpublic officials incorporating environmental and public health advocates inresponse to voter mobilization efforts around clean air issues. Alternatively,such advocates could have been incorporated, and ecological modernizationpolicies could have been subsequently initiated, because segments of the publicthreatened to be politically and economically disruptive if their air pollutionconcerns were not addressed.A third possible motivation underlying the incorporation of the leadersof public interest groups is to provide a democratic facade to the policymakingprocess. This incorporation would therefore be largely symbolic. Theimplication here is that the incorporation of public interest group leaders intothe policymaking process has little or no substantive impact on policy outcomes.Instead, this incorporation occurs to communicate to the broaderpublic that the public policy formulation process is reflective of various perspectives—therebyenhancing the legitimacy of said policies (Edelman 1977;Wynne 1982; Saward 1992).Mark Dowie (1995), in his critique of large “mainstream” U.S. environmentalgroups, alleges that these groups have been knowingly incorporatedon a symbolic basis. He specifically holds that the leaders of the major environmentalgroups prioritize organizational maintenance over achieving policygoals. Toward this end, environmental groups’ leaders find it more importantto be incorporated, or “close to power,” than to “fight” for political goals,particularly since the former is a better fund-raising strategy.The conclusions of Ronald Shaiko’s (1999) study of five leading environmentalgroups is consistent with Dowie’s argument that environmental
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SIXDemocratic Ethics,Environmental
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 119Brienes, Marvin. 19
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