GEORGE A. GONZALEZ - fieldi

10THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONstrategies. As set under the terms of the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970, statesmust submit State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to the EPA for its approval.These plans must outline how the individual states are going to meet federalclean air standards. The individual states are offered discretion in certainareas to develop standards that exceed federally mandated standards.More significant is the fact that states are responsible for implementingor enforcing air pollution regulations (Game 1979; Wood 1988; 1992;Scheberle 1997; Morag-Levine 2003). States, however, have varied recordsconcerning the enforcement of their clean air regulations. While some statesmay be aggressive on enforcement issues, others have been found to be verylax—even failing to enforce the minimum federal standards (Game 1979;Cushman 1998 June 7; Seelye 2001; “Lung Association” 2002).Thus, the reliance on states to formulate and implement air pollutionabatement programs has lead to an uneven clean air regulatory regime.Defenders of this approach hold that it does have its benefits. Most specifically,it is averred that the use of state agencies to formulate and enforce theclean air regulatory regime allows government regulators to be sensitive tostate and local conditions, and hence it leads to a more efficient and effectivepolicy regime (Nice 1987). Little or no empirical evidence, however, hasbeen generated to substantiate this oft-repeated claim.Much more likely is that state and local officials guard their discretionover federal environmental policies (e.g., Cushman 1998 August 5) becausethey can calibrate environmental regulatory regimes to growth strategies.Those areas with high levels of investment and growth can use environmentalpolicies, including clean air policies, to mitigate the environmental negativeexternalities of economic activity and growth, thereby seeking to insurethat existing growth and investment levels are not jeopardized by such externalities.Whereas those states and localities that have comparatively lowerlevels of growth and investment simply may not have the political will ordesire to regulate emissions, because these emissions, to the extent that theydo exist in these areas, do not present a perceived threat to growth. In otherwords, the pollution “load” has not reached a threshold that represents athreat to the local business climate. Local growth boosters in less developedareas may also perceive pollution abatement politics and policies as a disincentiveto potential local investment.These hypotheses are supported by the aforementioned statistical analysescomparing the “strength” of air pollution regulations in the various states.Such studies have measured and compared the restrictive content of state airpollution regulations as well as expenditures toward the enforcement of theseregulations (Game 1979; Kemp 1981; Lowry 1992; Ringquist 1993; Potoski2001). What these studies have found is that the strength of clean air regulatoryregimes vary positively with the level of wealth and economic activityin a state. Thus, those states with high levels of wealth and economic activ-