THE RISE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 65Arguments like these, which could never have been made in behalf of masstransit, appear to have done nothing to diminish the standing of the CPCwith the business and political elite of Chicago. By 1919 the Commission’smanaging director [Moody] could refer to it as an “adviser” to the city council,and from the beginning of its existence it rejoiced in the unanimous andenthusiastic support of the press. (76)The CPC played a key role in the successful effort to reconfigure thepolitical, legal, and physical milieu of the already built-up portions ofChicago so it could accommodate the automobile. First, it was a public championof the automobile and the means to accommodate it. In part, the CPCundertook this public relations campaign through “hundreds of yearly meetingswith neighborhood groups and civic betterment associations” (Barrett1983, 75). Second, “the Commission found or created the [legal] techniques... to help the city adjust to the coming of large numbers of privatecars,” such asthe power to spread assessments over a wide area of the south and west sides,and to condemn more property than would actually be used for the improvement,as that part of the land taken could be sold to finance construction.(Barrett 1983, 77)Finally, according to Barrett, one of the “CPC’s most outstanding successes”was “the new North Michigan Avenue,” which in the 1920s became “a secondCBD [Central Business District], catering to more affluent consumersand relying for access to a large degree upon the automobile and taxi” (78).While Atlanta was considerably smaller than Chicago, and less wealthythan Los Angeles, it nonetheless displayed a similar road and trolley politicsas these other cities during the 1920s. In his history of Atlanta’s accommodationof the automobile in the 1920s, Preston (1979) does not note amongAtlanta’s citizens the hostility toward the local trolley firms that Barrett andBottles describe in the cities of Chicago and Los Angeles, respectively. Nevertheless,as the automobile grew in usage during the 1920s, no effort wasundertaken to publicly salvage the city’s trolley system in light of its deterioratingfinances. In contrast, the city government of Atlanta and the state governmentof Georgia expended large sums to create automobile-friendly roadsand highways. Significantly, while prominent members of Atlanta’s businesscommunity, along with the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, were promotingthe automobile and a system of roads and highways, Preston (1979) observes:During the twenties the automobile was never challenged as a detriment tothe city, and even Preston S. Arkwright, whose street-railway companystood to lose more from the use of motor vehicles in Atlanta than almostany business, never really leveled any sustained attack against the automobileitself.
66THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONPreston goes on to observe that “the result of the private use of motorcars andcity decision makers’ desire for bigness was an Atlanta by 1930 whichembraced a 221.31 square-mile area” (150).While I only highlight three, albeit important, cases here, it appears thatthe politics surrounding the automobile and trolley during the 1920s and1930s in Los Angeles, Chicago, and Atlanta were replicated to one degree oranother throughout the United States. Foster (1981), in his history documentingthe concomitant rise of the automobile and demise of the trolley inthe United States, writes that the automobile, on the one hand, won “theminds of most transportation planners” (91), and, on the other, “althoughthere was some concern even in the 1920s over pollution caused by exhaustemissions, there was no crusade against” the automobile (109). Moreover,Foster contends that it was the public’s general apathy toward, and ignoranceabout, the actual financial state of the trolley that lead to the failure of mostU.S. cities to move to save urban streetcar systems:The 1930s brought the continued decline of the public transit industry ingeneral and the street railway in particular. Obviously, the most importantfactor behind this decline was the public’s preference for individualized masstransit. However, mass transit industry officials must bear some of theblame. Despite growing numbers of pessimists within the industry, too manymass transit executives still deluded the public about the health of America’strolley systems. Partly for this reason, they failed to develop a consensusabout the industry’s weaknesses and effectively dramatize their requirements.Had either public officials or transportation engineers foreseen masstransit’s bleak future, they might have taken more effective steps.Foster adds that “the country may have lost its last real chance to preserve ordevelop viable public transportation systems at reasonable cost during theDepression” (131).CONCLUSIONPolitics and public policies played central roles in the rise of the automobilein the United States. These politics and public policies have to a significantdegree been historically shaped by large land holders and land developers.Beginning with the trolley, means of rapid transportation were subservient tothe interests and preferences of real estate concerns. With the advent of theautomobile, many of the larger players in the real estate field quickly seizedupon this form of transportation as a means to further maximize the value oftheir land through low-density development on the urban periphery. Theseactors, working through such organizations as the NAREB, developed andpromoted the private and public planning methods necessary to accommodatethe automobile and provide the environs which would attract buyers to
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