THE FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY 43The issue of cost was particularly paramount for the railroad industry. Inthe case of New York City, railroad firms electrified their lines because thesmoke emitted from coal burning locomotives proved to be a substantialsafety hazard within the tunnels in and around the city—with at least onemajor railroad accident within a tunnel attributed to locomotive-generatedsmoke. Also, the Pennsylvania Railroad ran many of its trains in Philadelphiaon electricity, beginning in the 1910s, because space in its crowded Philadelphiafacilities could be more efficiently used with electric locomotives(Stradling 1999, 112–114). While electric locomotives proved to be cleanand efficient, the railroad industry as a whole was heavily vested in steamlocomotives. One expert estimated that in the early part of the twentiethcentury the railroads owned approximately 70,000 steam locomotives, representinga total investment of $1.4 billion (Crawford 1913). Thus, in electrifyingtheir lines nationally, railroads would not only have to absorb the considerablecosts of doing so but these firms would have to effectively abandontheir significant investment in steam locomotives. In light of these factors, itis not surprising that the railroads consistently opposed any attempts toforcibly electrify their industry (Stradling 1999, chap. 6). Given this strongopposition, those economic elites in Chicago interested in cleaning the city’sair through the mandated electrification of those locomotives runningthrough the area backed down. This backpedaling is reflected in the secondreport put out by the Chicago Association of Commerce.THE LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGY IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROLWith regard to air pollution from factories, not only was there considerablecosts associated with the installation, maintenance, and usage of pollutionabatement technologies but the existing technological approaches to air pollutionabatement were in many cases unreliable. Moreover, the costs anduncertainties associated with air pollution abatement technology gave rise tofree rider problems. The difficulties of controlling coal-generated smokethrough the usage of technology becomes most apparent in light of an effortto control such smoke in anticipation of the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893.Leading members of Chicago’s business community in January 1892formed the Society for the Prevention of Smoke. As historian ChristineRosen (1995, 358) points out, “The founders of the Society were prominentlocal businessmen, ... and all but one of whom was also a Director” of thefair, otherwise known as the Colombian Exposition. Founders of the Societyincluded Bryan L. Lathrop, the organization’s president, and a real estatedeveloper and investment banker. Also on the Society’s board of directorswere Samuel W. Allerton, a banker and cattle rancher, who helped foundChicago’s Union Stockyard Company and was a director of a local street railwaycompany, and James W. Scott, publisher of the Chicago Herald. When
44THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONScott retired from the Society, he was replaced by Owen F. Aldis, a lawyerand real estate developer (Biographical Dictionary 1892, 55–56, 281–282;Rosen 1995, 358). As the General Director of the Colombian Expositionexplained, the objective of the Society was to “get rid of the smoke nuisancebefore the world’s fair opens” (as quoted in Rosen 1995, 359).Initially, it sought to eliminate smoke from the central city area throughvoluntary cooperation. Toward this end, the Society hired five engineers.With these engineers, the Society would advertise those air pollution abatementdevices that were believed to be effective. Additionally, the Society’sengineers would inspect buildings in the central city area, and make recommendationsthrough detailed reports to the owners of buildings that wereguilty of excessive air pollution. These reports would advise owners whattechnologies and changes to design would be required to reduce the emissionof smoke (Rosen 1995, 359–360).Utilizing this approach of voluntary cooperation, the Society achievedmoderate success. By July 1892 it found that approximately 40 percent of offendingbuildings had followed its engineers’ advice and had substantially reducedsmoke. Of the remaining 60 percent, the Society concluded that 20 percentwere not using their abatement equipment correctly or were not properly stokingtheir fires, while 40 percent did not comply at all (Rosen 1995, 360).To address those businesses that were not complying with the Society’sefforts, beginning in August 1892, it sought to force compliance through thecourts. Using an anti-smoke ordinance enacted in 1881 but heretofore unenforced,the Society began to cite those it deemed in violation of the law. Iteven hired its own attorney to prosecute the cases, and it was given the powerto select the judges before which it would try its cases (Rosen 1995, 376). AsRosen (1995, 376) explains, contemporary critics did complain that thisactivity “represented a legally questionable appropriation of police power bya private organization.” Nonetheless, throughout its period of operation theSociety initiated 325 suits against alleged offenders (Rosen 1995, 377). Witha deepening depression in the 1890s, some high profile defeats handed to itby juries, and the opening of the World’s Fair, the Society ended its efforts atsmoke abatement in August 1893 (Rosen 1995, 380–382).A significant hurdle for those who sought to reduce smoke from steam generatingboilers was the limited nature of the technology available to abate pollutionfrom these sources. As explained by Rosen (1995, 359), “In addition toits cost, smoke abatement equipment was often difficult to install.” Moreover,“Devices that worked well in one building often failed completely in another.”It is entirely possible that many of those 20 percent that the Society found to bein partial compliance with its efforts had installed pollution abatement equipment,but such equipment did not work effectively in the given circumstance.Perhaps the most significant obstacle to reducing smoke from coal-burningboilers was that the reduction of smoke required a significant amount of
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 119Brienes, Marvin. 19
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