THE FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY 47nati, the Wednesday Club of St. Louis, and the Ladies’ Health ProtectiveAssociation of Pittsburgh. These groups’ most significant contribution to theclean air movement was to draw public attention to the air pollution problem(Grinder 1978; Platt 1995; Flanagan 1996; Stradling 1999; Dewey 2000).These women’s groups were not mass organizations, with membershiplargely limited to the hundreds and very low thousands. Moreover, suchgroups had few working class members. Dewey (2000) explains:Working class wives and mothers might have favored smoke abatement...,and they almost certainly hated the smoke that ruined their laundry,befouled their homes, threatened their families’ health, but most of themprobably did not have the time or energy left over from their daily tasks toattend meetings or organize clubs. (25)Instead, the women’s organizations that took up the smoke question werein large part made up of upper-class women (Grinder 1980; Stradling 1999;Dewey 2000). For example, in writing about the Ladies’ Health ProtectiveAssociation, Angela Gugliotta (2000, 173) takes note of the class backgroundof this group when she writes that in 1892 “the elite women of theLadies’ Health Protective Association took the decisive public action againstsmoke” in Pittsburgh. Dale Grinder (1980), in his work on the politics ofsmoke between the Civil War and World War I, acknowledges that the leadershipof anti-smoke women’s organizations was largely drawn from the upperstrata of society. Grinder (1980) writes that “since only those with leisuretime could devote themselves to most reformist causes, upper-middle-classwomen directed the clubs’ anti-smoke efforts.” He adds:Leadership in the local smoke abatement campaigns included Mrs. John B.Sherwood of Chicago, Mrs. Charles P. Taft of Cincinnati, Miss Kate McKnightof Pittsburgh, and Mrs. Ernest R. Kroeger of St. Louis, all members ofthe upper middle class, if not the social register [a publication identifyingmembers of the U.S. upper class].Moreover, “Both the Wednesday Club of St. Louis and the Twentieth CenturyClub of Pittsburgh, in the years prior to World War I, constructed clubhousesthat indicated a membership of great wealth” (88).G. William Domhoff, who has written extensively on the politicalactivity of the U.S. upper class and corporate elite (1967; 1970; 2002),explains that members of the feminine portion of the upper class have historicallyvolunteered in significant numbers in efforts that often deal withsocial ills (2002, 54–56). Drawing upon sociological work done on upperclass women, Domhoff (2002) points out that these women view their civicand charitable work “as a protection of the American way of life” (55). Inthe case of air pollution, upper-class women were seeking to aestheticallyimprove the urban milieu through the application of technology, but their
48THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTIONcritiques of urban air quality did not explicitly or implicitly critique industrialcapitalism nor the socioeconomic structure that it yielded. In the following,Stradling (1999) describes the political outlook of anti-smokeactivists at the turn of the century:Progressive reformers, including anti-smoke activists, rarely offered a comprehensivecritique of the industrial order that lay at the root of the diverseproblems they hoped to solve. Some reformers did organize against specificindustries and even specific companies, but for most progressives the objectof reform was to preserve the industrial system that had so enriched theircommunities and themselves. (2)Given the upper class position of the women leading the anti-smoke movement,such an outlook should not be surprising.CONCLUSIONThe central argument of this chapter (and book) is that locally oriented economicelites have historically provided the key political capital forwardingthe ecological modernization of U.S. society as it relates to the issue of airpollution. This position is predicated on two factors. First, that air pollutionis perceived as an economic negative by these elites. Indeed, as noted above,members of local growth coalitions have historically emphasized the negativeeconomic impact of such pollution. The second factor my argumentation isbased upon is that locally oriented economic elites have viewed technologicalcontrols as an appropriate response to the economic negative of air pollution.Such a response can help manage air pollution without directly affectingthe amount of economic growth that accrues in an urban region.As I explained earlier, the case of Chicago during the late nineteenthand early twentieth centuries takes on specific historical and theoretical significance.It was here where locally oriented economic elites sought to transformtheir concerns about air pollution into regulatory policies. These policiessought to address the acute air pollution of the city through thedeployment of technology. The inherent political and technical difficulties,however, associated with such technology led these elites to end their effortsto control smoke. The political difficulties resulted from the opposition ofrailroad firms to the forced electrification of their lines. The available technologyto control smoke created by the burning of coal was of limited useand expensive to employ. Given these political and technical difficulties,areas like Chicago, which suffered from extremely poor air quality during thelate nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, simply lived with the severeair pollution associated with economic activity and growth. Cities such asNew York, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis were just as pro-growth as Chicago duringthis period, and continue to be so (Belcher 1947; Pred 1966; Eisinger
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